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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
1.1 Preface 
        uality has become an important 
parameter in the production and marketing of 
food products. Yet, smallholder farmers, 
particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
often face difficulties in meeting quality 
standards. This can be due to a lack of 
resources and a range of institutional and 
organizational constraints (Ruben, Tilburg, 
Trienekens, & Boekel, 2007; J. Trienekens & 
Zuurbier, 2008; Ziggers & Trienekens, 1999). 
Technical innovations in cultivation, product 
design, processing, storage and logistics may 
well improve the quality of fresh products 
(Vorst van der, 2000) but implementing such product and process innovations often requires 
complementary organizational and institutional innovations. Meeting the increasing quality 
demands of modern food chains therefore requires integrated approaches of co-innovation that 
complement these new technologies with changes in the organization of the value chain and the 
institutions involved in it. 
 
The Co-Innovation for Quality in African Food Chains (CoQA) programme is a programme 
funded by INREF (the Interdisciplinary Research and Education Fund of Wageningen 
University). CoQA is examining integrated quality solutions in three countries, with a focus on 
different products: Benin (pineapple), South Africa (citrus/deciduous fruit) and Ethiopia 
(potato). It does so from an interdisciplinary perspective, including agronomy, development 
economics, business economics, food technology, management, logistics, marketing and 
consumer behaviour and development studies. The key problems that CoQA seeks to address – 
solving quality issues and improving market access in developing countries’ agri-food value 
chains – demands an interdisciplinary perspective, as these are neither purely technical nor purely 
  
Figure 1: Target countries in CoQA programme 
(www.coqa.nl) 
Q
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organizational problems. The CoQA programme follows a coordinated approach with each PhD 
student focusing on a specific problem but also involved in furthering the overall understanding 
of the complexity and interactive nature of the programme. The main objective of CoQA is to 
analyze and design quality co-innovations (i.e. integrated quality solutions that combine different 
approaches) that can support smallholder producers in tailoring the quality of their products to 
the demands of their customers in national and international supply chains, thereby strengthening 
their access to markets and their competitiveness. 
 
The CoQA programme aims to produce three types of output. First, it intends to build scientists’ 
capacities, both in the three participating African countries and in Wageningen. Second, CoQA 
aims to produce academic publications. Finally, it will deliver insights and generate 
recommendations for policy makers, businesses, NGOs, and producer organizations on policies 
and strategies for co-innovations that can lead to quality improvement in agrifood chains. These 
will be relevant not only to the target products in the selected countries but also be applicable to 
other value chains in other developing countries. The present study, on governance, marketing 
and innovation in Beninese pineapple supply chains is one of the outputs of the CoQA 
programme. 
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1.2 Introduction 
 
Despite a growth in per capita income, from US$ 570 in 2005 to US$ 780 in 2010 (World Bank, 
2012), Benin still ranks as a ‘less developed country’. The country has engaged in important 
economic reforms, which have contributed to a sustained economic performance, with an 
average annual growth rate of 4.3% between 1990 and 2009. However, the developmental 
outcomes of this growth have been limited by relatively high population growth (3.1%) and 
regular fluctuations and instability in food prices. The government has worked to improve the 
population’s access to basic social services such as education, health and water. Other sectors, 
such as agriculture and road infrastructure remain big challenges and still need improving. Benin’s 
economy heavily relies on the agricultural sector, notably cotton, as well as on re-export trade to 
neighbouring countries. Cotton remains the country’s major export commodity, generally 
representing 70% of total exports, although its share has declined from 75% in 1996 to 40% in 
2008. This implies vulnerability and underscores the need to promote economic diversification. 
Benin’s agricultural production systems are extensive, mostly relying on family labour, with no or 
limited use of improved or appropriate inputs. Aside from cotton, the main agricultural exports 
are fruits, and nuts and oilseeds. The sector faces the challenges of diversifying exports, 
increasing food production, sustainably increasing farm productivity and reducing post-harvest 
losses. 
 
The country’s Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (World Bank, 2010a), identifies pineapple 
(Ananas comosus) as one of the crops that can diversify agriculture and contribute to exports. The 
supply of pineapple in Benin largely exceeds national demand. However, the development of the 
pineapple supply chain, like many other agri-food chains in Benin, is hampered by several 
structural and infrastructural problems. These include financial and physical constraints on access 
to suitable agricultural equipment, the inputs needed to improve yields and attain production 
growth and to packaging and cold chain facilities (to increase shelf-life and reduce product 
losses). Producers often lack technical knowledge, the chain actors are poorly organized and there 
is a lack of finance for agriculture (Adossou, 2012; Arinloye, Hagelaar et al., 2010; Mongbo & 
Floquet, 2006). 
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It is estimated that some 490,000 
hectares (circa 7% of the country’s 
farmland) is suitable for pineapple 
production1. This suggests a 
significant potential for developing 
the pineapple value chain in Benin. 
Pineapple production in Benin has 
more than quadrupled over the 
past decade, despite the stagnant 
yield per hectare (Figure 1.1) and 
poor access to international 
markets (i.e. those outside Africa). 
Production has grown largely due to increasing demand from regional markets, especially Nigeria. 
Farmers’ access to international markets (in the EU and Asia) is limited by high quality and 
standards requirements covering agricultural practices such as traceability, pesticide residues, 
hygiene, etc. (Garbutt & Coetzer, 2005; Kleih, Ssango, Kyazze, Graffham, & MacGregor, 2007). 
Farmers’ ability to comply with these market requirements is hampered by their weak technical 
and managerial practices. One consequence of this is that the pineapples produced are highly 
variable in quality. To sell them (at a decent price) farmers need to target various markets with 
diverse governance structures (GSs).  
 
1.3 Problem statement and objectives of the study 
 
The increasing globalization and internationalization of trade increases physical distance between 
producers and end-consumers of food products. As a result, actors at both ends of the supply 
chain are unaware of each others’ needs, quality issues, constraints and challenges. In low income 
countries, this is reinforced by high transaction costs between chain actors. It obvious that the 
governance mechanisms which structure interactions between buyers and sellers have an 
                           
1 Data provided by CeRPA (Centre Regional de Promotion Agricole, Atlantique-Littoral), the Regional Center of 
Agricultural Promotion during an interview in 2009 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Fact and trends in pineapple production and yield in 
Benin (FAOSTAT, 2012) 
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influence on transaction costs, cooperation, collective actions and trust among supply chain 
actors (Williamson, 1985). A reduction in transaction costs and a move towards risk sharing 
among actors can also contribute to improving quality and the value added, and promote socio-
economic reforms that will lead to better coordinated chains and enhance smallholder actors’ 
bargaining power (Ruben et al., 2007). 
 
In spite of the growing amount of literature in the field of chain governance (Ferto & Szabo, 
2002; Peter Gibbon, 2003; Sabidussi, 2009; Zaharieva, Gorton, & Lingard, 2003), there is little 
empirical evidence from low income Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. These countries are 
mostly characterized as having high transaction costs, a weak capacity to comply with required 
food quality norms and standards (Faber & Roelfsema, 2001), and a lack of appropriate 
infrastructures (roads, electricity, packaging, cold chain facilities, etc.). However, there is little 
evidence to explain the aspects of governance mechanisms that influence chain actors’ choices 
about participation in different supply chains. Benin’s pineapple supply chain (PSC) offers a 
portfolio of governance structures (GS), ranging from spot markets to collective actions. Farmers 
have to simultaneously make several choices about how to sell their pineapples. The quality levels 
of the pineapples varies, which influences which markets they are sold onto. There is currently a 
lack of scientific evidence on the determinants and factors that affect these multiple choices of 
GS. This has led this research to explore the intrinsic (the characteristics of the farm and the 
farmers) and extrinsic (enabling institutional support, market and transaction attributes) factors 
that could affect farmers’ choices about GS in the PSC and whether such choices are 
independently made or inter-related, This is relevant, since while traditional economic theories on 
the comparative advantage of suppliers in selecting the GS have significantly contributed to 
understanding trade at the local and international levels, there is little empirical evidence to 
explain how chain actors make multiple choices of GSs.  
 
It is recognized that producers in low income countries face significant obstacles. These include 
the lack of an enabling environment that offers institutional and infrastructural support, the lack 
of availability of resources and inefficient and ineffective coordination in value chains. 
Smallholder producers are at a particular disadvantage: they have little capital to invest, use 
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traditional techniques, are dependent upon family labour and lack contact with (international) 
market players.  
 
The literature on participation in market channels has a relatively long history, with most of the 
work dealing with the nature of the producer-distributor relationship (Artle & Berglund, 1959; 
Coughlan, 1985; van Tilburg & van Schalkwyk, 2012). However, these studies have not modelled 
simultaneous participation in different market channels nor did they take into account the role of 
product quality and suppliers’ bargaining power as potential determining factors. 
 
Smallholder farmers generally lack vertical linkages and are rarely collectively organized which, 
many claim, results in their exclusion from marketing channels that supply international (export) 
markets (Delgado, 1999; Fenwick & Lyne, 1999; Jari & Fraser, 2012; van Tilburg & van 
Schalkwyk, 2012; Wynne & Lyne, 2004). These observations have been mainly drawn from the 
South African context, and this study tests these in a different economic context (Benin’s 
pineapple supply chain - see Figure 4.1 - where most pineapples are sold into the national and 
regional markets, for example to neighbouring Nigeria) which have less stringent quality and 
standards requirements than European markets.  
 
This issue of information asymmetry becomes more pronounced when there are more 
intermediaries (collectors, middleman, wholesalers and retailers) along the supply chain. If there is 
asymmetry between farmers and buyers in information about prices, the market for agricultural 
produce may allocate resources inefficiently, either through moral hazard or adverse selection 
(Akerlof, 1970; Holmstrom, 1979; Ozer & Wei, 2006; Resende-Filho & Hurley, 2012). These 
informational problems could be avoided if farmers could access accurate market information, 
such as current prices (Mikami, 2007). The introduction of mobile phones has brought new 
possibilities for people to communicate and share information on markets and services. Most 
SSA countries have mobile phone services that provide accurate and up-to-date market 
information. These are often financially supported by government, development projects, 
investment programmes and international partners for development (Donner, 2009; Donner & 
Escobari, 2010; Kizito, 2011). Much has been written on the role of information and 
communication technologies in Africa, the factors that affect the spread of mobile coverage and 
the impact of the mobile phone use on pro-poor labour market access, employment creation and 
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health care (Aker, 2008; Bosch, 2009; Brouwer & Brito, 2012; Buys, Dasgupta, Thomas, & 
Wheeler, 2009; Lawson-Body, Willoughby, Keengwe, & Mukankusi, 2011; Maranto & Phang, 
2010; Porter, 2012; Porter et al., 2012). However, most of these studies have not investigated the 
potential of this technology as a market information management system. Specifically, there is a 
lack of empirical evidence about how much smallholder farmers are able and willing to pay for 
market information services (excluding any potential external subsidies) and how such a system 
might help overcome the recurrent issue of (price and quality) information asymmetry in supply 
chains. 
 
Thus, the overall objectives of this study are to identify and characterize determinants of 
governance structures and marketing channels selection by smallholder farmers in Benin’s 
pineapple supply chain and use this knowledge to identify an innovation that could overcome 
market information asymmetry. To reach this mail goal, following specific research activities were 
undertaken: 
 
- In the first stage, the study maps the pineapple supply chains with particular emphasis on 
the forms of relationships between chain actors, the constraints and challenges they face 
and their strategies for improving quality and market access. This helps shed light on the 
GSs employed by small-scale producers to reduce their transaction costs and enhance 
their participation in high value supply chains in the absence of adequate institutional 
support. 
- The second stage we provide empirical evidence on the determinants of choice of 
governance structure (GS), based on the logic of transaction cost theory. This considers 
the ‘connectedness’ of a transaction as a determining factor in explaining the choice of 
GS, and further explains why smallholder farmers generally opt for multiple governance 
strategies in their transactions. 
- Third, we investigate the determinants of smallholder farmers’ decisions about 
participation in marketing channels. It uses this information to make policy 
recommendations and discusses the implications of this for sustainable production and 
market access. 
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- Fourthly, we assess the willingness of a group of farmers (in Ghana) to use mobile 
telephony to supply and receive market and quality information on pineapples. This 
exercise looked at the price they were willing to pay for these services. Request 
partnerships among value chain actors for sustainable smallholders’ access to high income 
markets were addressed and suggestions were made for quality and market information 
sharing based on multi-stakeholder innovation platform approach. 
 
1.4  Theoretical framework 
 
The study is based on two main theoretical approaches, which are used complementarily. The 
first is Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), and the second is innovation theory, with a particular 
focus on dynamic capabilities and incremental vs. radical innovation in technological adoption. 
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is an approach for the study of economic systems and 
organizations. TCE is based on an integrated perspective of institutions, the law and economics 
(Rao, 2003). (Coase, 1937) was one of the first to recognize the centrality of the role of 
transaction costs in the theory of the firms. The main approach of TCE is, as Williamson (1989) 
suggested, to assign attribute to differentiated transactions under various GSs in a transaction-
cost-minimizing manner. He viewed the firm as a nexus of contracts, and aimed to identify the 
GS that would provide the lowest transaction costs under different circumstances (Williamson, 
1979, 1996). TCE explains why some transactions are better accomplished by using one 
institutional arrangement rather than another. TCE concludes that organizations should choose 
the spot market GS when the transaction has low asset specificity or low transaction costs, while 
a more hierarchical GS is preferable in high asset specificity or high transaction costs context 
(Greenberg et al., 2008). Bogetoft and Olesen (2004) have identified transaction costs as one of 
the main issues in contracting theory. However, since the assessment of the frequency specificity 
is subject to discussion and controversies in the literature (because of the difficulties in measuring 
this), this study focus on the specificity of investments, uncertainty and connectedness as a way 
of exploring how the attributes of transactions can influence the governance structure of agri-
food chains. 
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In innovation theory, dynamic capabilities are referred to as the ability to sense and seize new 
opportunities, to reconfigure and protect knowledge, competencies and complementary assets 
and technologies to achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
This requires continuous adaptation so as to integrate and reconfigure internal and external skills, 
resources and functional competencies to match the requirements of a changing environment 
and consumers’ needs. In the Beninese pineapple supply chain, dynamic capability is one of the 
main characteristics of actors that could influence their choice of GS and their willingness to pay 
for mobile phone-based MIS to overcome information asymmetry. 
 
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
 
The structure of this thesis is presented in Figure 1.2. there was need to first get an overview of 
the chain organisation as shown in Chapter 2 on mapping the supply chain and presenting 
further insights on the existing forms of GS as well as the constraints and opportunities 
associated with high quality production and matching buyers’ demands. The lack of scientific 
evidence, on the determinants and factors affecting multiple choices of GS, led the study to 
explore if farmers’ selections of a GS are independent or interrelated, and investigate which 
intrinsic and extrinsic factors might affect GS choices when alternative choices are available. 
Chapter 3 therefore proposes a new construct of ’multi-governance choices’, as a further 
contribution to the transaction cost theory literature on how and why smallholder farmers select 
among alternative GS in agrifood chains. Chapter 4 investigates how smallholder farmers’ 
characteristics, production systems, product quality and marketing context affect farmer’s 
selection of a marketing channel under a lack of up-to-market price and quality information and 
low education level contexts. Chapter 5 investigates how smallholder farmers can overcome this 
information asymmetry, and knowledge gap issues through using information and 
communication technologies (ICT). Based on an explorative case study (from Ghana) the 
premium that farmers are able and willing to pay to access quality and price information was 
assessed and recommendation made for a policy and managerial implications. Finally, Chapter 6 
discusses the main conclusions, explores their implications and presents recommendations for 
policy makers and practitioners. 
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Figure 1.2 Thesis outline  
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Chapter 2: Barriers for smallholders’ participation in high 
value agrifood chains: Evidence from the pineapple supply 
chains in Benin 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The increased globalization of international trade can provide an opportunity for developing and 
less developed countries to export high-value products to developed countries. However, the 
high quality standards required for such exports can also be an entrance barrier to trade. Product 
quality is also critical as it affects the market value of a good. This quality is determined by many 
attributes, some of which may be directly observable, others which can only be observed at a 
cost (M Fafchamps, Hill, & Minten, 2008). Problems with meeting food quality standards tend to 
be more pronounced in agri-food supply chains in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). This is 
due to a combination of factors, including: the poor quality of planting materials, poor storage 
and processing and a lack of capital to invest in improved technologies. This chapter analyzes the 
types of relationships between chain actors and the constraints and challenges facing the 
pineapple supply chain (PSC) in Benin, particularly in terms of quality. In spite of the growing 
amount of literature about supply chain governance (Boger, 2001; Ferto & Szabo, 2002; Peter 
Gibbon, 2003; Sabidussi, 2009; Zaharieva et al., 2003), there is little empirical evidence on the 
impact that it has on product quality and incomes in developing countries and particularly in 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, where supply chains are characterized by high transaction 
costs and a weak capacity to comply with the food quality norms and standards required by 
export markets. 
 
The export of pineapples from Benin is a relatively new agri-food chain, which only started 
flourishing a few years ago. This is in contrast to other chains (e.g. those for exporting bananas 
and oranges from developing countries to European markets), which are well-established and 
have a ’settled’ governance structure and where choices about channel are relatively well-
established. Interviews were conducted with 55 actors, including input suppliers, producers, 
traders, processors, exporters and those providing supporting services to individuals and groups. 
The interviews sought to address the following main questions: 1) What linkages exist in Benin’s 
pineapple supply chain (technical advice, access to finance, gifts, knowledge and information) 
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and how do these affect pineapple quality and farmers’ access to more profitable markets?, and 
2) What are the barriers to smallholder farmers’ access to profitable markets and which 
endogenous governance structure(s) is/are established by actors to overcome these barriers?  
The answers to these questions will provide a better understanding of the organization and 
structure of Benin’s PSC. 
 
 
2.2  Transaction cost theory 
 
Transaction costs are generally thought to consist of two components (Clemons, Reddi, & Row, 
1993): coordination costs and transaction risks. Coordination costs include the costs of crafting 
safeguards; through communication, negotiation and co-ordination; screening and selection (ex 
ante) and measurement (ex post). Transaction risks include the hazards that a party in the 
transaction will not honour an agreed arrangement, because of information asymmetry and/or 
opportunistic behaviour (Grover & Malhotra, 2003; J. Hobbs, 1996; Williamson, 1998). One 
feature of transaction cost economics (TCE) is its ability to explain the role that different 
governance structures play in influencing why some transactions are accomplished at a lower 
cost than others. Williamson (1979, 1996) uses the governance structure approach to explain a 
number of characteristics of transactions: bounded rationality; behavioural uncertainty; the 
specificity of investments and the frequency of transactions. Under the logic of TCE, 
organizations should opt for a spot market governance structure when the transaction has a low 
asset specificity, since the transaction costs will be low under such circumstances (Williamson, 
1985). Transaction costs are considered to be one of the main factors influencing the type of 
chain governance. Ruben et al. (2007) hypothesized that transaction costs and risk reduction can 
be achieved through different chain configurations. Pineapple is a perishable product, meaning 
that actors at all stages of the chain need to ensure timely handling and transactions of the 
product. This raises the issue of the temporal specificity of transactions, which has a major 
influence on transaction costs. From a transaction cost perspective, firms not only need to 
manage their level of production costs, but also must manage the level of transaction costs 
associated with their exchanges with their customer of choice (Jones & Butler, 1988). To some 
extent, producers involved in food chains have to make a strategic choice between (a) market 
outlets devoted to exports where quality attributes such as size, sugar content, and the absence of 
any external and internal damage are the key determinants for a successful business relationship, 
and (b) domestic markets  (i.e., rural and urban markets), where different qualities and delivery 
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modes can be accommodated and agreed on by buyer and seller. This decision is affected by the 
transaction costs implicit in these two choice – which the supplier has to bear - and illustrates the 
link between transaction costs and the actors’ choice of channel. 
 
Before developing the transaction cost theory perspective, this chapter first provides a 
description of how the PSC in Benin is organized and the transaction costs involved. This, in 
turn, leads to an analysis of the factors that affect smallholders’ participation in different chains 
and characterises the existing governance structures  
 
2.3 Data collection and methods 
 
This study used a non-probability sampling method. This approach involves selecting 
respondents in a non-random manner, using convenience sampling techniques2. Respondents 
were selected based on their experience in production and trading activities, their distance from 
the main markets, firm size (small, medium and large), the type of market served (rural, urban, 
regional and international), and membership (or not) of a pineapple farmers’ or traders’ 
association,. This combination resulted in a representative and balanced sample. Different 
techniques were used to gather data.  
 
Secondary data related to the whole supply chain were first collected from libraries, national 
public and private research and development institutes. Secondly, interviews were carried out 
with chain actors: 55 actors in the south of Benin were selected based on the criteria listed above. 
These included inputs suppliers, pineapple farmers, traders, processers, exporters, agents from 
the Ministry of Agriculture, NGOs, research institutes, universities, local authorities, and 
extension service agents. The sample was drawn from three main production locations 
(Departments), namely Atlantique, Littoral and Plateau all in the Guineo-Conglian and Coastal 
Zones (Figure 2.1). In addition, focus group discussions were conducted with five to ten 
producers in each production area and with traders in retailers’ and wholesalers’ markets. These 
discussions provided information related to the specific constraints and challenges in pineapple 
production, trading and export, the available documentation and data. 
 
                           
2 A convenience sample is often used for exploratory purposes, that is, to get different views on the dimensions of 
an issue, to probe for possible explanations or hypotheses, and to explore constructs for dealing with particular 
problems or issues. For more detail on convenience and judgment sampling techniques see Marshall (1996) and 
Ferber (1977) 
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Figure 2.1: Pineapple production area 
 
2.4  Results 
 
 
2.4.1 Overview of the pineapple supply chain in Benin 
 
To have a good understanding of the reasons that guide chain actors’ choice of governance 
structure, it is necessary to have an overview of how the chain is organized. The organization of 
the chain and the actors involved are discussed below. 
 
 
Pineapple production 
 
A wide range of producers are involved in pineapple production in Benin. They differ in terms 
of their farm size, scale of production, technical and financial capacities and access to inputs, 
land and labour. Nevertheless, pineapple farmers can roughly be divided into three different 
categories: small, medium and large-scale producers. 
 
Pineapple production zone 
Coastal zone  
Guineo-Congolian 
Zone  
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Small-scale producers have a plantation size of between 0.5 and 1 ha, the medium-scale 
producers have 1 to 5 ha and the large-scale producers have more than 5 ha. There are many 
small-scale producers and very few large-scale producers. In between, there are a number of 
medium-scale producers. The exact numbers of pineapple producers in Benin is difficult to 
estimate, due to a lack of statistics. In general there has been a steady increase in their numbers in 
recent years, as the price of pineapples compares favourably to that of other commodities. 
Women are strongly represented, more than in most other commodity production, and are 
estimated to make up about 15% to 30% of the total (Agbo, Agbota, E., & Akele, 2008). Large-
scale pineapple producers often cannot meet the quantities and delivery dates required by the 
international markets and often collaborate with small and medium-scale producers (outgrowers) 
to reach the quantity required for export. 
 
Not all pineapples are eligible for the European and Asian markets. If the pineapples are too 
small or too big they are not accepted in these markets and, instead, are sold in domestic and 
regional markets at a lower price. 
 
The principal inputs needed for pineapple production are planting materials, fertilizers and 
growth regulators, such as Ethephon3 which is used to induce the uniform ripeness of a 
pineapple crop. Achieving this physical uniformity depends on the quantity of Ethephon used, 
which generally leads to residues that exceed the MRL (Minimal Residual Limit). According to 
ColeACP (Europe-Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Liaison Committee) the residual dose should not be 
high than 0.2 ppm4. According to the Industry and Trade Chamber of Benin, most pineapple 
farmers are not aware of, or ignore this residual limit. 
 
In the 1920s, Ethephon was discovered to be an effective way of artificially inducing flowering in 
pineapple (Burg & Burg, 1966). Floral Induction Treatments (FIT), using ethylene, allow the 
farmer to control the production cycle and can have many economic and social benefits. These 
include the uniformity of the fruits, the concentration of the harvest at the desired time, the 
control of diseases and ultimately, the efficient use of labour (Lebeau, 2009). Pineapple farmers 
                           
3 Ethephon has a substantial commercial value as a plant growth regulator with the trade name Ethrel. The chemical 
name of this compound is 2-Chloroethylphosphonic-acid. For more details see Qu, et al. (2004). 
4 One of the major advantages of the MD2 cultivar from Costa Rica, which is now also grown in Ghana and the 
Ivory Coast is that it does not needing an Ethephon application to achieve a uniform ripeness and colouration. This 
variety is still only experimentally grown in Benin. 
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generally apply an FIT eight months before harvesting, inducing plant flowering two months 
later. 
The production life cycle of the pineapple (i.e. the period from planting to harvesting) varies 
from 14 to 18 months, depending on the maturity of the growing material, which generally 
weighs between 300 and 600g. To spread the harvest and obtain uniform pineapples, producers 
sort the planting materials before planting them based on their weight. Pineapple quality is also 
affected by cultivation practices, such as the fertilizer dose. At present, there is no specific 
fertilizer formulation in Benin for pineapple production. The fertilizers used are the same as 
those applied to cotton or are imported from Ivory-Coast, (which has different agro-ecological 
conditions). According to experts the optimal K/N ratio, which is 2.5 for pineapple production 
in Benin, is not met. According to farmers in Allada district, the unbalanced mineral intake 
negatively affects fruit quality and saps soil fertility. 
 
The extension service of the Atlantic Department estimates that, in 2009, there were around 
4,000 pineapple producers in Benin, mainly located in the south of the country. Production has 
increased almost fourfold over the past decade (confer Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). This 
improvement is the result of the growers’ increased interest in pineapple and extensive pineapple 
production. The biggest fresh pineapple outlets are the national fresh pineapple markets (rural 
and urban) and regional markets in Nigeria, Niger, Burkina-Faso and Togo. In 2009, it was 
estimated that less than 2% of the production was exported to Europe, which is far below the 
export potential, given that Benin has favourable production systems, coastal access, and well 
appreciated cultivars. 
 
 
Mapping Benin’s pineapple chains 
 
There are five main supply chains for pineapple in Benin: the domestic fresh chain, the domestic 
juice chain, the regional fresh chain, the international fresh chain and the processed pineapple 
chain (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). 
 
Domestic fresh consumption: this marketing channel is one of the major outlets in Benin, absorbing 
about 35% of production in 2010. The produce is sold at urban (Dantokpa in Cotonou) as well 
as rural (Glo-Djigbé, Sekou, Sèhouè, Zinvié, Ouegbo, Ze, etc.) markets. 
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The regional market for fresh pineapple: the supply of pineapples in Benin exceeds national demand. 
Therefore, producers need to find other marketing channels to sell their surplus pineapples. 
Although there are no official statistics on the quantity of pineapples exported to neighbourhood 
countries, it is estimated to be around 40% of national production. Wholesalers in Dantokpa 
market (Cotonou) stated that the Nigerian market alone absorbs more than 40% of national 
production. 
 
Juice from fresh pineapple: pineapple juice is produced in traditional and semi-industrial processing 
factories and packed in 0.25 or 0.33 litre bottles. This market channel is not well developed and 
is dominated by single producers or producers’ associations. The juice is mainly sold on the 
domestic market and not exported to Europe, because of shelf-life difficulties. This channel 
consumes almost 15% of national production (which increases the domestic consumption of 
fresh pineapples to about 50%). 
 
 
 Figure 2.2: Map of Benin’s pineapple supply chain   
 
Chapter 2 
 
34 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Fresh and processed pineapple markets (Adapted from Agbo et al., 2008) 
 
 
Fresh pineapple exports: the international market (beyond West Africa) accounts for about 2% of 
total production. This market includes EU countries (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, 
Germany, the Netherlands, etc.), Asian countries (United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) and 
North African countries (Algeria and Libya). Exports, either by air or by sea, are problematic. 
Until 2008, plane freight cost 518 €/tonne by KLM/Air France and 609 €/tonne on DHL5. By 
boat, the freight cost is 380 €/tonne, less expensive than by plane, but it is necessary to ship 
quite large batches. International exports require a wide range of additional inputs (boxes, bags, 
and other packaging materials) to ensure that the perishable fruit is effectively conserved. These 
inputs need to be available and affordable. 
 
Dried pineapple and marmalade export chain: this market channel is not well developed. The major 
destinations are France, Switzerland, Belgium and Austria. The Tropical Fruit Drying Centre 
(CSFT-Benin) is the main factory that supplies dried pineapple export from Benin, including 
pineapple marmalade and syrup. 
 
The research has shown that the price of pineapple in the domestic and regional markets varies 
significantly throughout the year. This is in contrast to the international market, where the 
wholesale pineapple price is defined by the exporters and is relatively stable throughout the year. 
During the production campaign of 2009-2010 fresh exporters were paying €183 for 1 tonne of 
                           
5 Data provided by ADEx (Association des Exportateurs), the association of exporters in Cotonou-Benin during an 
interview in 2009. 
Regional Fresh
Export, 40%
Fresh Export 
to EU, 2%Local process 
to Juice, 15%
Local Fresh 
consumption, 
35%
Dried 
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Export, 8%
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pineapple and processing factories €152 (see Table 2.1). These prices include other transaction 
and supervision costs: the actual farm gate price was €143/tonne and €137/tonne respectively. 
 
Table 2.1: The components of the price of fresh and dried pineapple paid by exporters and 
processors  
Description Processor 
price (€) 
Exporters 
price (€) 
1. Gross price paid (A)  152.4 182.9 
2. Intermediate costs (B):  Tax/charge 6.1 - 
Conditioning - 4.6 
Handling - 1.5 
Communal supervision - 3.0 
Village supervision  1.5 0.0 
Administration fees* 7.6 10.6 
 Ethephon application - 19.8 
3. Farm gate price received by farmers (A-B) 137.2 143.3 
* Administration fees include the deductions made by RePAB (Network of Pineapple Producers of 
Benin), UGPAT and district authorities. Source UGPAT6  
€ 1 = 655.975 FCFA 
 
Participation in the export chain involves fulfilling certain quality attributes, such as size, sugar 
content, and the absence of external and internal damage. These attributes determine the price 
paid. The lowest prices for pineapple in the rural, urban and regional markets are recorded 
during May and June. One respondent indicated that one of the main causes is market 
competition with other fruits (oranges, mangoes, and bananas), which ripen in the same period. 
Farmers selling at this time generally record huge losses, but these can be compensated for by an 
increase in price from July to September. During this period, the average price of 40 pineapples7 
can be as much as US$30 corresponding to US$0.75/kg (for the smooth cayenne cultivar). The 
causes of this annual cycle of price fluctuations are explained below. 
 
First, pineapple production in Benin mainly depends on natural rainfall patterns that do not 
allow farmers to apply inputs (mainly fertilizers and Ethylene for FIT) during the dry seasons. In 
south Benin the dry season occurs in December, January and early February. It is difficult to 
apply the FIT at this time, meaning that there is a shortage of pineapples eight months later, 
between July and September.  
 
                           
6 UGPAT is the General Union of Pineapple Producers of Toffo In Benin (a farmers’ organization) 
7 Selling pineapples in heaps containing forty single pineapples is a common practice among pineapple retailers in 
Benin. Heaps are sold either on the road (e.g. in Sékou, Zè, Toffo,etc.) or in rural and urban markets. 
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Second, there is a socio-cultural condition that affects the profitability of pineapple chains: 
Muslims’ fasting period generally falls in the period between July and September. During this 
period there is a peak in the demand for fruits, and the local prices experience a significant 
increase. In the normal season a bunch of forty cayenne smooth pineapple might fetch between 
2500 to 3500 FCFA8 and even as little as 1500FCFA. In the period of Ramadan the same fruit 
might sell for between 4000 and 5000FCFA and large size fruits might even reach 11000 FCFA. 
The market price for the Sugarloaf variety is normally between 1500F and 2000F (for forty), but 
can increase to 2500 or 4000 FCFA during the fasting period. Aware of this price fluctuation, 
farmers now try to managing their production systems so they can produce during the peak price 
season. 
 
Third, a similar pattern of seasonal demand from other neighbouring countries with significant 
Muslim populations, such as Nigeria - with more than 160 million habitants (which accounts for 
more than 35% of national production) and other landlocked countries (Burkina Faso and Niger) 
adds to this high price. 
 
The size of pineapples also affects channel choice. When harvested, pineapples are generally 
sorted in two categories. The first category is uniform in size and shape and fit well into 
packaging boxes. This category of pineapple is exclusively reserved for the export markets. The 
remaining pineapples, of variable sizes, are sold on the domestic (urban and rural) and to regional 
(neighbouring country) markets, either for direct consumption or to be processed. Clearly the 
price for these two categories differs. This strategy of channel differentiation allows farmers to 
sell their low quality products at low prices instead of throwing them away if rejected by 
exporters. 
 
 
  
                           
8 $US1= 502 FCFA during data collection in 2009 
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2.4.2 Barriers to smallholders’ development 
 
Financial access 
 
Financial markets in developing countries and particularly in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) are 
largely underdeveloped, lacking in depth, highly inefficient, concentrated in urban areas and 
dominated by a few, often foreign-owned, commercial banks (Mpuga, 2010). Benin’s financial 
sector is no exception: underdeveloped, and concentrated in urban areas, leaving the majority of 
the agricultural producers and the rural population with no access to finance. One of the major 
constraints faced by pineapple farmers is the difficulty in accessing financial support for their 
activities. Establishing one hectare of pineapple requires an average initial investment of around 
$US 4,500. Raising this amount is beyond the financial capacity of more than 90% of producers 
(Agbo et al., 2008). Therefore, most farmers need access to credit or a loan. However, the 
available credits and loans are inappropriate for pineapple cultivation for two main reasons. 
Firstly, because of the long production cycle of pineapple (14-18 months) financial institutes are 
unwilling to provide credit. Secondly, the high interest rate (between 36% and 47% from Micro 
Finance Institutes - and as high as 20% a day in the informal sectors - walking banks, groups, 
informal lenders, etc.) are a disincentive for pineapple farmers. Moreover, the short repayment 
period of such loans (6 months) makes them unsuitable for pineapple production, (where the 
cycle is 14-18 months). 
 
Personal savings and relationships remain the main source of finance for most producers. Some 
receive pre-financing in-cash (for labour payments) or in-kind (for fertilizers, pesticides and 
planting materials) from pineapple traders and/or exporters. This (should) give traders a 
guarantee that they will obtain the fruits at harvest (see box 1) and allows the farmers to produce. 
Some producers argue that this arrangement is not profitable for them as some traders buy at 
below production cost prices. However, most producers who receive loans from exporters do 
not complain about the profitability of the arrangement since the purchase price (per kilogram) is 
pre-determined and stable. This form of arrangement makes small-scale actors dependent on a 
specific governance structure, namely a relational contract or an outgrowing scheme. 
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Quality issues in the pineapple supply chain 
 
In recent years, increased consumer awareness has given rise to higher consumer requirements. 
In response, international standards have emerged. The original goal of standardization was to 
balance consumers’ and producers’ interests and to promote socially responsible behaviour 
(Ruben et al., 2007). In Benin, however, the cost of complying with EurepGAP standards has 
forced smaller growers out of the international market. The standards aim to introduce more 
transparency into agri-food chains. Since the costs of monitoring for compliance are essentially 
the same for a large and a small firm, small firms face high inspection costs unless they can 
obtain compliance certification for a large number of farms linked by common practices into 
groups, associations or cooperatives. Some pineapple producers’ unions (e.g. UGPAT) and 
processors (e.g. CSFT), who meet the standards and requirements of ISO and Fair Trade have 
done this. 
Smallholder farmers can realize scale efficiencies through collective actions that help them to 
meet international standards and provide either substantial premiums or access to new markets 
otherwise unavailable to them. Most individual small-scale producers are unaware of these 
international standards. They are more familiar with consumer’s quality standards in domestic 
(Cotonou, Porto-Novo, Calavi, Sème, etc.), border and regional markets (Krake, Lomé, Grand 
Popo, Lagos, etc.), which are largely taste related. The difficulties that most farmers have in 
complying with these standards have restricted the number of fresh pineapple exporters to two 
major companies (Fruit Tillou and Fruit d’Or). This is one contributory reason why the majority of 
fresh pineapple is sold either on national or regional markets. 
 
Despite the existence of national institutes and support services (CEBENOR, PDQC, CeRPA, 
etc.) involved in quality control and building the capacity of actors to comply with quality 
standards (Figure 2.2), there is still a need to refine and redesign the chain coordination 
mechanism. Investments are needed if small and medium scale producers are to be able to 
respond to quality norms and standards (for regional as well as international markets). Such 
investments are needed to provide safe on-farm storage facilities for (small quantities of) 
pesticides, disposal pits for waste chemicals, hand washing facilities, personal protective 
equipment, knapsack sprayers, certified planting materials, etc. However, most small-scale 
pineapple producers lack the financial capacity to make such investments. 
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It is also important to emphasize the lack of adequate transport facilities. Trucks and cars are 
often used to ship pineapples to market and it is common that the pineapples at the bottom of 
the truck are damaged, due to the poor state of the roads and a lack of sturdy packaging 
materials. Wholesalers in Dantopka market confirmed that the recorded losses due to 
inappropriate transportation can be as high as 20%. 
 
 
Production systems 
 
Benin has an estimated 490,000 hectares suitable for pineapple production, (circa 7% of 
farmland nationwide). In the Atlantic Department, land suitable for growing pineapple is subject 
to speculation. The high cost of labour is another major problem for small-scale producers in the 
expanding pineapple production area. Farmers can use herbicides to overcome the scarcity and 
high cost of the labour but this can have negative effects on the environment and their health. 
While there are many farmers’ organizations in the region, only few of them are functional and 
well organized – many are affected by recurrent internal conflicts amongst members. Because of 
a lack of knowledge and financial support to farmers, yields on small farms areas remains low 
(confer Figure 1.1.). Based on extensive production, pineapple production in Benin exceeds 
national demand. This sometimes forces producers to sell their produce cheaply or, in the worst 
case, let it rot in the fields (Tidjani-Serpos (2004). 
 
 
Transaction costs and conflict management 
 
Pineapple production and marketing involve high transaction costs. Traders in Dantokpa Market 
and the farmers that transport their pineapples to the urban markets stated that they face many 
informal costs (including corruption and bribes), administrative constraints, border controls, and 
unbalanced market information (information asymmetry). These costs generally account for 10% 
to 15% of total turnover. This is in line with the findings of van der Meer (2006) who argues that 
transaction costs can be reduced by shortening the supply chain, bypassing traditional 
intermediaries and if corruption can be avoided (Collier, 2000). Other transaction costs faced by 
actors in the supply chain include: the cost of searching (for information on prices and good 
quality pineapples), negotiation (time, facilities, etc.), inspection (to ensure conformity between 
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the end-product and the specification), and enforcement (non-fulfilment or lack of respect of the 
contractual agreements).  
 
In Benin there is a common contract arrangement mechanism that sometimes leads to conflicts 
between farmers and traders. Traders give money in advance to producers to facilitate the supply 
of fertilizers, planting materials and other inputs. Usually, traders and farmers write down the 
elements of their agreement, which specifies the recipient’s acknowledgment, the price and place 
of harvesting and the signature of both parties. Unfortunately, this contract arrangement is not 
always fulfilled. The following example, from a 2009 interview, gives an idea of how such a 
conflict arises and was resolved. 
 
Box 1: Transaction costs related to conflict resolution between buyer and seller 
 
In order to acquire inputs (planting materials, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and 
labour), a pineapple producer asked a wholesaler in Dantopka for a loan of €300. It 
was agreed that the loan would be reimbursed with two full trucks (known locally as 
bâché) of fresh pineapple. Fifteen months later, the trader learnt that the pineapples 
were ripe and ready to be harvested. One week later he was surprised to learn that 
the producer had harvested the entire crop and sold it to another trader. The first 
trader went to get the assistance of a police officer, using the signed agreement letter 
as proof of the transaction. One week after an intervention by the police officer, 
who temporarily seized the producer’s motorcycle, the producer was obliged to 
reimburse the entire loan. The transaction cost related to this contract enforcement 
and the conflict resolution was roughly estimated by the trader at €70, excluding 
other opportunity costs (time lost and communication costs). 
 
In international high-value supply chains, contracts between producers and buyers are becoming 
increasingly important. These contracts cover a range of parameters, such as quantity, quality and 
price. Production contracts can improve the coordination of a chain and reduce risks. In 
agriculture, such contracts are known to play three major roles. First, they improve predictability, 
allowing farmers to allocate resources with greater confidence. Second, they allow market 
participants to share risk, and third, they are contribute to increase performance (Hueth, Ligon, 
Wolf, & Wu, 1999). However, it is not clear what the main incentives are for small-scale 
pineapple producers to engage in contracts with other supply chain actors. Written contracts that 
specify the main attributes of the a transaction can be useful in preventing a divergence between 
the offer and demand in terms of quality and quantity. 
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2.4.3 Governance structures 
 
The governance structures (GSs) most often found in tropical agri-food chains, such as in Sub-
Sahara Africa, consist of spot market, relational contracts, producer organizations and a 
combination of contracts and collective action (Key & Runsten, 1999; Stockbridge, Dorward, 
Kydd, Morrison, & Poole, 2003). Governance structures are chosen when they are the most 
efficient way to carry out a transaction (Williamson, 1991). While Williamson focused on three 
generic forms of GS (market, hybrid and hierarchical) and three attributes of transactions (asset 
specificity, frequency and the uncertainty related to opportunistic behaviour), in reality there is a 
myriad of intermediary forms of governance. These (hybrid) forms include long-term 
contracting, joint ventures, relational contracting and bilateral governance. Altenburg (2006), 
emphasized that shifting from an anonymous or spot market-based exchange of products to a 
more durable, vertically coordinated arrangement, that gives a more prominent role to the 
leading firms, can have many implications for chain management.  
 
Pineapple producers, especially small and medium scale ones, need to make investments in order 
to be able to respond to quality norms and standards for regional and international markets. As 
they lack the financial capacity to make these investments, many are involved in a form of 
arrangement known as ’outgrowing’. An outgrowing scheme allows small-scale producers 
(outgrowers) to benefit from a relationship with larger exporting and processing companies and 
wholesalers. In this form of governance structure, the buyer takes the lead in some or all of the 
following: (1) controlling production and harvesting practices on farm to ensure pineapple 
quality, (2) providing the farmer with a loan to buy inputs and accomplish the production on 
time, or (3) directly supplying inputs (growing materials, Ethephon, fertilizers, etc.) to farmers as 
a form of credit, and (4) training farmers on good production practices and monitoring their 
progress. This type of scheme is generally backed up by short or medium term contracts (one 
harvest or one production cycle). Garbutt and Coetzer (2005) argue that when small-scale 
farmers associate with exporters as outgrowers this brings mutual benefits. The small-scale 
producers rely on the exporter to get advice and a supply of inputs, while the exporter gets a 
predictable supply of high-quality crops that satisfy the importer’s requirements. Many, 
development organizations promote outgrowing schemes, as they see this as a way to create 
improve the livelihoods of producers and advance the competitiveness of developing countries 
(USAID, 2009). Both of Benin’s pineapple export companies (Fruit d’Or and Fruit Tillou) run this 
form of partnership that still needs to be structured and organised with clear and formal contract 
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terms, legitimated by the government. Fruit Tillou’s has 157 small and medium-scale producers 
(0.1 - 5 ha), in its outsourcing scheme, who produce pineapple on the basis of agreed 
arrangements: some are members of the pineapple producers’ union (UGPAT), others are 
individual producers. To manage the outgrowing scheme, the exporter employs full-time staff, 
who devote their time to resolving issues that these small-scale producers may have in complying 
with the required norms and standards. 
 
The idea of outgrowing started from the traders and exporters’ desire to reduce the high 
transaction costs related to transact with individual farmers and to reduce the opportunistic 
behaviour. The outgrowing scheme helps farmers solve two issues: (1) reducing information 
asymmetry and the opportunistic behaviour of individual traders, and (2) to get the needed 
inputs and financial support to efficiently produce the pineapples at the right time. One attribute 
of the transaction costs that does not apply in the case of PSC is related to the frequency of 
transactions. Pineapple has a long production cycle (14-18 months), and the crop can only be 
harvested twice every three years. This means that the transaction frequency is very low. 
Moreover, farmers regulate the harvesting period by controlling the FIT through applying 
Ethephon. This allows them to harvest the whole pineapple crop at the same time, as specified 
by the buyers. 
 
But it is not just traders who engage in opportunistic behaviour. The pineapple exporters claim 
that they have a major problem with small-scale producers sometimes cheating on them by 
selling their products to other traders who offer a higher price, bypassing established links and 
agreements (see Box 1). This problem is gradually being addressed through the establishment of 
‘semi-formal’ contracts between exporters and small-scale farmers’ associations, such as 
UGPAT, ARPA and REPAB9. 
 
The development of closer relationships with fewer suppliers can also create problems of 
transactional dependency and opportunism (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Hoffmann and 
Vossenaar, 2008). As such, a chain based on an outgrowing scheme requires a fluid, protecting 
and reliable institutional environment to avoid conflicts among actors. In Kenya ,this is done 
through existing legal structures that allow farmers to apply for a legally recognized ‘self-help 
group’ status (United Nations (2008). Such groups can only come into effect when each 
                           
9 ARPA is the Regional Association of Pineapple Producers and REPAB the Network of Pineapple Producers of 
Benin 
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individual farmer has signed a legally binding agreement. Similar schemes have been successfully 
developed in several other countries, where innovative contracts support the development of 
outgrowing schemes. When farmers receive support (such as improved access to inputs, 
credit/loans, private and public extension services) this may improve their productivity, even 
having spill-over effects on other crops - increasing and stabilizing farmers’ incomes. This has 
been demonstrated in a study on green beans in Madagascar (Minten, Randrianarison, & 
Swinnen, 2007), where micro-contracts between wholesalers/exporters and small-scale farmers 
allowed the latter to participate successfully in emerging value chains, giving them access to 
extensive farm assistance and supervision programmes that enabled them to meet complex 
market requirements. 
 
 
2.5  Discussion and conclusions 
 
This chapter has discussed the governance structures that exist in Benin’s PSC and the way that 
some of them attempt to create marketing channels that can overcome the lack of a supporting 
and enabling institutional environment. It has also discussed the constraints and challenges that 
farmers and traders face in getting a high product quality and a high and stable market price. The 
research shows that the production of pineapple requires certain inputs such as planting 
materials, specific fertilizers and chemicals for FIT. The quality of the planting material is a 
strong determinant of the quality of the final product. The more vigorous and healthy it is, the 
better the quality of the fruits (Garnier, 1997). Producers find it tremendously difficult to access 
these inputs. The limited supply of planting material, especially for the smooth cayenne cultivar, is a 
crucial weakness that needs to be overcome if Benin is to strengthen its pineapple production. 
Farmers also expressed frustration about the lack of information about where to get these 
materials, even when they are available. This problem is further reinforced by the lack of farmers’ 
skills and know-how about how to develop and multiply high quality planting materials in their 
own nurseries. Most of farmers whom we interviewed typically lack good access to quality and 
market information about inputs and their final products. In addition, there is a serious deficit of 
storage facilities such as cooling rooms and warehouses. As a result, traders in local, urban and 
regional markets prefer to buy unripe pineapples which have a longer shelf-life. 
 
The sale of fresh pineapple on international markets is restricted by different problems. For 
shipments by boat, it is necessary to combine pineapples from various producers and, if there are 
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problems, it is very hard to tell which producer at fault. So, there needs to be a traceability 
system to know which pineapples came from where. Fruit d’Or experimented with exporting 
pineapples by boat in 2007 - their experience was not positive and they stopped using this 
channel. The problems they faced included an absence of cold chain facilities in the harbour, 
insufficient quantity of produce and the long transit time. 
 
Ghana has seen rapid rise in pineapple exports since the late 1990s, the main destination being 
the EU (especially Belgium, France and the United Kingdom). This increase was due mainly to 
the introduction of sea freighting, which overcame the problem of limited and expensive air 
cargo capacity (also freeing up air cargo for higher value products). Benin could learn from this 
experience and re-design its PSC in such a way that sea freighting may be viable. 
 
As stringent international regulations on quality norms and standards pose significant challenges 
to many small-scale pineapple producers and exporters in Benin. Alternatively, other strategies 
for increasing market access could also be explored. Such alternatives should be complementary 
to the existing ones, rather than seek to substitute them. The most important of these consists of 
assisting small-scale producers to develop cross-border trade. Benin has a strategic geographical 
position that makes it one of the transit countries for West Africa’s land-locked countries, such 
as Niger, Burkina-Faso and Mali as well as neighbouring countries, such as Nigeria and Togo. 
More than 35% (Agbo et al., 2008) of Benin’s total pineapple production is already transported to 
those countries (mostly Nigeria), where the requirements for quality norms and standards are less 
stringent than in the EU. (Kleih et al., 2007), in their study on the impact of EurepGAP on small-
scale fruit and vegetable growers in Uganda, found that there are rich opportunities for cross-
border trade. It is important to secure these markets in the short-term as this might prove more 
lucrative and sustainable than a riskier focus on overseas markets. 
 
Improving processing and packaging processes would help producers, processors and exporters 
cope with Europe’s more stringent food safety requirements. Standards for processed fruit and 
vegetables can be easier to comply with if producers can meet good manufacturing practice 
requirements (Verkerk, Linnemann, & van Boekel, 2007). For example, Kenya and Madagascar 
have substantially increased their share of EU imports of processed beans; the Ghanaians are 
seeking to increase their exports of sliced pineapple and pineapple juice; and Senegal has 
upgraded the quality of its exported green beans, which led to a remarkable increase of amount 
exported to the EU since 2006 (Maertens, Dries, Dedehouanou, & Swinnen, 2007). 
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The lack of adequate market information can increase transaction costs. For Benin’s PSC to 
become more efficient there is a need for a centralized information system and coordinated links 
that can help small-scale producers, traders and exporters to increase their profit margins while 
reducing transaction costs related to information asymmetry. 
 
It is possible that the costs of coordinating small-scale producers to ensure that they comply with 
the stringent requirements of international markets may actually make them less profitable. This 
problem could be avoided by focusing on alternative markets, the regional markets and/or less 
demanding export markets. The fluctuation of the pineapple price throughout the year –means 
that the price on the Nigerian market can be higher than that on the international market (e.g. 
0.46 €/kg in Nigeria compared to 0.14€/kg in the EU). This could constitute a competitive 
advantage that could be exploited if the chain actors were better organized. Furthermore, 
regional markets may provide a practical option for numerous small-scale producers to 
overcome logistical problems (lack of road transport, cold rooms etc.). 
 
The domestic market may also provide profitable options for smallholders, through processing 
to add value to pineapple products. This approach has been successful in other countries, such as 
Ghana, where prices for processed mangoes on domestic markets are reportedly high (Berg & 
Fiege, 2006). 
 
This exploratory study shows the need to investigate the incentives for small-scale pineapple 
producers’ to engage in contracts with other supply chain actors. Written contracts can be used 
to specify the main attributes of the transaction in the outgrowing schemes, thereby contributing 
to a reduction in transaction costs. In this way they can help balance the supply and demand (in 
terms of both quality and quantity). Outgrowing schemes could also provide a mechanism for 
more effectively tapping into the Nigerian market, through formalizing trading arrangement (i.e. 
through the involvement of a third party in contracting to safeguard the investments). This 
arrangement would be helpful in reducing the informal transaction costs paid by actors along the 
PSC due to market information asymmetry. It would also help reduce bounded rationality and 
opportunistic behaviour as it would shift the governance structure from the spot market 
(currently the most dominant) to a more integrated approach.  
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Chapter 3: Governance choices by smallholder farmers in 
the pineapple supply chains in Benin: An application of 
transaction cost theory 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, pineapple production in Benin has increased more than four-fold from 
50,000 tons in 2000 to 222,000 tons in 2009 (World Bank, 2010b). Production is consumed 
locally (35%), exported in the region (40%), and processed into juice (15%). Regional exports in 
dried form account for 8% and exports to the European Union for just 2% (GTZ & MAEP, 
2008). It is estimated that the value of pineapple production amounted to US$25.8 Million in 
2006 (4.3% of agricultural GDP and 2.1 % of total GDP), and the value chain created 15,000 
direct jobs and 25,000 indirect ones. Pineapple production represents an important economic 
opportunity and the government recognizes its importance. Pineapple production follows a two-
year cycle and requires a significant level of investment, often beyond the financial capacity of the 
individual smallholders. The various pineapple supply chains (PSC) (local, regional and export 
markets) have different forms of governance structures (usually bi- or multilateral agreements), 
often put in place to safeguard chain actors’ investments. These governance structures range 
from the spot market to collective actions. Farmers choose from this portfolio of options, and 
are often simultaneously involved in more than supply chain – with their choices often influenced 
by the heterogeneous quality of their produce. As highlighted in chapter 2, there is a lack of 
scientific evidence on the determining factors that affecting of simple or multiple choices of 
governance structures. In response to this, this chapter investigates the following questions: 
Faced with a context of different governance structures (GS) and alternative choices, are farmers’ 
selections independent or related?, and 2) What are the intrinsic (farm and farmers’ 
socioeconomic characteristics) and extrinsic (enabling institutional support, market and 
transaction attributes) factors that affect the choices about governance structure in the pineapple 
supply chain? 
 
From the perspective of transaction cost theory (TCT) a rational farmer will chose a governance 
structure that helps minimize production and transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). Some projects 
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have been established with the aim of reducing transaction costs, such as contract farming 
(Glover & Kusterer, 1990), cooperatives and producers’ associations (Bijman & Wollni, 2008). 
However these have not always been successful. 
 
Traditional economic theories, based on how the supplier seeks comparative advantage when 
selecting a governance structure, have significantly contributed to understanding trade at local 
and international levels. However these do not fully explain the multiple choices of governance 
structures by chain actors. The present study seeks to add to the literature by empirically and 
simultaneously considering how intrinsic (farm and farmers’ characteristics) and extrinsic 
(enabling environment, transaction attributes) factors can explain farmers’ choice of governance 
structure. The study contributes to propose a new construct, namely ‘multi-governance’, the 
simultaneous use of more than one governance structure, to deepen the understanding of how 
and why farmers in less developed countries select governance structures. Using transaction cost 
theory, the chapter seeks to explain the major reasons guiding the choice of governance structure 
in Benin’s PSC, drawing on a broader range of explanatory factors than previous studies. The 
study provides empirical evidence based on transaction cost theory and the choice of governance 
structure. It also considers the connectedness of transactions as a determinant of governance 
structure choices. 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical background 
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is an approach to studying economic systems and 
organizations. TCE integrates perspectives from institutional theory, the law and economics 
(Rao, 2003). Coase (1937) was one of the first to explain the role of transaction costs in the 
theory of the firms. The main approach of TCE is, as Williamson (1989) suggested, to assign 
attribute to differentiated transactions in a transaction-cost-minimizing manner. Transaction 
costs can be broadly interpreted as the costs of planning, adapting and monitoring for 
compliance under alternative governance structures. North (1990) has described these as the 
costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged, the costs of protecting 
rights and of policing and enforcing agreements. These definitions indicate the main focus of 
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TCE on the institutions and the evolution of governance structures in relation to the role of 
transaction costs. In other words, TCE focuses on the costs involved in making transactions, 
rather than of producing something. The production cost for a particular task/function is the 
cost of performing that task, and is borne by the firm performing it. Several factors affect 
production costs, including; resource requirements, scale effects, and buyer experience. By 
contrast transaction costs are the costs required to write, monitor, and enforce the contract. 
These costs include the costs of running a market-based system, or the costs associated with the 
allocation of tasks to external agencies or outsourcing (Bello, Dant, & Lohtia, 1997). According 
to Williamson’s transaction cost framework (Williamson, 1991) the magnitude of the transaction 
costs is determined by several key attributes. These include the specificity of investments, the 
level of uncertainty, bounded rationality and the connectedness of the transaction. Governance is 
viewed in terms of the design of the particular mechanisms that support an economic transaction 
involving an exchange of property rights. TCE tries to explain the optimal governance structure 
under different sets of situational contingencies (Barney & Hesterly, 2006). 
 
 
 
TCE distinguishes a continuum of three major forms of governance structures, ranging from the 
spot-market and hybrid exchanges to vertical integration, also known as a hierarchical governance 
structure, (see Figure 3.1). Hybrid forms of governance structures include bilateral contracts 
(classical, neo-classical and relational contract arrangements), networks (collective trading, 
partnership) and alliances (cooperatives, join venture). Following Williamson (1985), when there 
is a high level of collaboration and a strong relationship between the buyer and seller the GS will 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Continuum of governance structures in the chain  
(Adapted from Ménard, 2004 and Pascucci, 2010) 
Hybrid governance
structures 
Spot Market Vertical 
integration 
| Bilateral contract     | Networks          |               Alliance      | 
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be closer to the vertical integration model. When the relationship is weaker, the GS will be closer 
to the spot-market mode. The TCE framework also identifies that the costs of any transaction 
can be broken down into ex ante and ex post costs. Ex ante costs such as search costs, information 
costs, and the costs of negotiating and developing a contract or agreement, are incurred before 
and during the transactions. Ex post costs are the costs that arise after the transactions, such as 
the costs of monitoring and enforcing contracts or agreements (Williamson, 1996). Ex post 
transaction costs, also known as coordination costs among organizational theorists (Douma & 
Schreuder, 2002), are the resources dedicated for the creation, maintenance, and use of 
institutions and organizations (Furubotn & Richter, 2005). Following Coase (1937), Williamson 
(1985) developed tools for exploring the mechanisms of governance. These contributions have 
been used to accumulate a significant amount of knowledge about the different structures that 
can support and secure transactions. 
 
Several factors influence the choice of governance structure or the institutional arrangement 
between and within actors involved in a transaction. The anticipated complexity of sharing tasks 
among partners and coordinating across organizational boundaries is a major factor in the choice 
of a specific mode of governance and in the design of mechanisms for monitoring the 
arrangement (Gulati & Singh, 1998). However, in the literature, the influence of the institutional 
environment on the choice of governance structure is still unclear (J. E. Hobbs, 1997; Ménard, 
2004). The number of parties to be included in the arrangement will influence the choice between 
bilateral and multilateral agreements, which chain actors also have to decide on. Bilateral 
arrangements are easier to monitor but involve more dependency; while multilateral agreements 
make the management of the relationship more complex, but allow comparisons and 
benchmarking, a powerful tool for constraining opportunism (Ménard, 2004). 
 
North (1981, 1990, 1991) has investigated how interactions are undertaken among agents, and 
emphasized the importance of the rules of the game for understanding how actors play that 
game, choosing ways to organize transactions. Williamson (1991) went a step further,  
introducing the possibility of shifts in parameters that could explain changes in the mode of 
governance at the micro level. Based on Williamson’s model, Oxley (1999) developed an 
econometric test, showing how the legal definition and the implementation of property rights 
significantly influence the choice between equity and market-based contracts in hybrid 
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arrangements designed for transferring technologies. Economics started with a dichotomist view 
between systems based on decentralized decisions and those planned from the centre, expressed 
in various, but similar, ways: ‘markets and plans’ (Coase, 1937), ‘markets and hierarchies’ 
(Williamson, 1975), ‘hierarchies and polyarchies’ (Sah & Stiglitz, 1986). Grandori (1997), added a 
third type of governance form, drawing on a range of concepts from other economists: clans 
(Ouchi, 1980), trust (Bradach & Eccles, 1989), democratic polyarchies (Lindblom, 1977), 
networks (Levacic, Mitchell, Thompson, & Frances, 1991) and many others) and constitutional 
ordering (Sabel, 1993). It is difficult to properly compare these categorizations with the two types 
of markets and hierarchies (Grandori, 1997). The growing literature on hybrid forms of 
governance structure, which stand between markets and hierarchies, shows the growing 
importance of their nature and role in a market economy. A previous study (Arinloye, Hagelaar et 
al., 2010) on the pineapple supply chain in Benin identified market type governance structures, 
and three other types of governance structure falling into the hybrid class: namely relational based 
GS, outgrowing schemes, and the farmers’ organization. 
 
 
3.3 Empirical measurement of governance structures 
 
The governance structure indicates the type of inter-relation agreement that is used between 
farmers and traders. These can take different forms. They include a spot market relationship, a 
reputational based arrangement, an outgrowing scheme (minority holdings) and collective actions 
(producers’ organizations). As argued before in chapter 1, these transaction arrangements cover 
the full range of governance structures that form a continuum between arms-length arrangements 
and full integration (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009; 
Williamson, 1985). Each type of governance structure is considered as a multiple choice equation 
system, where farmers have a possibility to select one or more than one GS among the four 
possible alternatives. The following are descriptions of the different GS types in the pineapple 
supply chain: 
 
A spot market GS is characterised by a handshake and ‘one-shot’, unrepeated relationship between 
buyer and seller (Williamson, 1985). 
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A relational-based GS is an informal form contracting based on a relationship and previous 
experiences between buyer and seller (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Gibbons et al., 1994; Ménard, 
2004). It can be classified as a bilateral form of governance structure (Pascucci, 2010) and implies 
a degree of trust in the transaction. Several authors see trust as a way to secure transactions when 
contracts are incomplete (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Zucker, 1986). This reputational selection is 
guided by familial and/or friendship relations between both parties and the transactions are 
characterized by a high level of trust and commitment. 
 
An outgrowing scheme GS is considered as bilateral contract farming between small farmers and 
processors or traders. It has the following characteristics. (1) It gives the buyer a high level of 
control in controlling production and harvesting practices on the farm to ensure pineapple 
quality. (2) It provides the farmer with a loan to buy inputs and accomplish the production on 
time. (3) And /or it provides inputs (growing materials, Ethephon, fertilizers, etc.) directly to 
farmers. ,(4) It provides training to farmers on good production practices and monitors their 
performance (Brüntrup & Peltzer, 2006). This type of GS is generally accomplished under short 
or medium term contracts (one harvest or one production cycle) and falls under marketing 
specification, resource-providing and product management types of contracts (Baumann, 2000). 
The emphasis here is on partners’ monitoring and controlling the actions and decisions of others 
through specific and identifiable organizational devices that they have intentionally designed and 
agreed upon. 
 
In a farmers’ association GS the farmer is a member of an organization that provides all the needed 
assistance through (1) monitoring, (2) group selling, (3) assisting members in finding markets, and 
(4) social assistance. A farmers’ association can more easily access extension services and financial 
support. This form of governance is characterized by long term contracts and is generally open-
ended, lasting as long as membership of the association is valid (Wennink & Heemskerk, 2006). 
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3.4  Data collection and methods 
 
 
3.4.1 Research model 
 
The research model hypothesizes some factors that affect the choice of a particular chain 
governance structure. These include (1) the socio-economical characteristics of the actors and the 
firms, (2) the transaction attributes (including asset specificity, uncertainty, and the connectedness 
of the transactions) and (3) the institutional environment (see Figure 3.2). 
 
  
 
Figure 3.2: Research model 
 
 
Firm characteristics 
 
The firm characteristics10 include the following constructs: geographical location (distance 
between the production area and the market), farm size (hectares), ratio of land dedicated to 
                           
10 Hereinafter, firm characteristics refer to farmers’ socio-economical characteristics and farm attributes. 
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pineapple growing to the total cultivated land). Farmer’s characteristics are also considered 
through the constructs such dynamic capabilities (i.e., capability to cope with changes in the 
market and environment and to satisfy customers’ needs), age, trust and commitment between 
farmer and buyer. Farmers feel safer in a market setting where they have long-term relationships 
with their buyers (Lu, 2007). Moreover, on the basis of previous studies farm size was expected 
to influence farmers’ decisions (Akinola, 1987; Polson & Spencer, 1991). This leads us to 
hypothesize that large scale farmers who are located far from the market place will be more likely 
to be involved in long-term relations and more integrated chain governance structures. 
 
 
Asset specificity 
 
Asset specificity refers to the extent to which non-fungible assets are tied to particular 
transactions specified by contracts or other forms of commitment (Williamson, 1985). Assets are 
specific to a particular use if the returns they provide are valuable only in that use, and cannot be 
put to any alternative use. The degree of asset specificity may be assessed in terms of the 
investment value that is lost when the asset is switched from its intended original use to an 
alternative use. According to TCE these three aspects of asset specificity have implications for 
firms seeking the optimal (most efficient) governance mechanisms for carrying out transactions. 
Williamson identified site, physical, human, temporal and dedicated asset specificity as distinct 
types of transaction-specific investments. This study focuses on the specificity of human and 
investment assets. Human asset specificity refers to relation-specific ‘know-how’ developed 
between actors involved in the transaction. As defined by Heide and John (1992), human asset 
specificity can include empirical knowledge specific to a particular supplier's product, or the time 
and effort that goes into learning about a supplier's specific requirements (Artz & Brush, 2000). 
Following Williamson, we used different operationalized constructs of human asset specificity: 
membership of a pineapple farmers’ association, investment in education and experience 
cumulated in pineapple farming. The evidence suggest that the probability of choosing a 
hierarchical form of governance structure is significantly and positively influenced by a high level 
of human and physical specificity. When assets have a high specificity, there is a greater risk of 
actors facing a hold-up (non-transferability) problem. Menard (2004) stated that the likelihood of 
contract-based arrangements is even higher when uncertainty coincides with investments that 
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cannot be redeployed for another transaction. This may lead farmers to choose an integrated 
form of governance structure in order to protect their investment. It can therefore be assumed 
that the greater the human and asset specificities, the more likely it is that the actors will be 
involved in an integrated form of governance structure. 
 
 
Uncertainty 
 
When transactions are conducted under uncertainty, it can become very costly or impossible to 
anticipate all contingencies (S. D. Frank & Henderson, 1992). Under conditions of market 
uncertainty actors are more likely to restrict their range of exchange partners to those with whom 
they have had prior interactions and have transacted in the past (March, 1988; Podolny, 1994). It 
is therefore important to determine the types of transaction uncertainty that affect the choice of 
governance structure. Ruben et al. (2007) stated that ’central’ governance is needed more when a 
the environment of a supply chain is uncertain in order to guarantee that objectives of all 
stakeholders are attained. A high level of uncertainty may discourage a supplier from making 
investments in specialized assets if appropriate safeguards are absent (Lu, 2007). To measure 
uncertainty, we used information about price stability and the quality and quantity of pineapples 
delivered to buyers over time. Pineapple producers may involved in contractual arrangements to 
produce specific labelled products (organic or Fair Trade pineapples for EU markets) that require 
specific investments, but may at the same time maintain other production channels, not included 
in the agreements, to which they can switch. When they have this capacity to reduce the 
uncertainties associated with the agreement, they adopt a mode of governance that is close to a 
spot market arrangement (Sauvee, 2000, 2002). Hence, the more uncertainty over price, quality 
and quantity, the more integrated the governance structure will be. 
 
 
Connectedness 
 
Transactions may be inter-connected in different ways, especially those transations that involve 
making highly specific investments. It is possible that the assets or service that they yield might 
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be highly complementary. Some transactions are largely dependent on others and give rise to a 
hold-up problem and lock-in effects (Slangen, Loucks, & Slangen, 2008). An example of strong 
inter-connectedness is the relation between water and an irrigation system. Without water, an 
irrigation system is useless and also the other way around. This raises the question of property 
rights, ownership and the best governance structure. When the transacting parties have divergent 
interests, these become harder to coordinate, increasing the transaction cost. To understand the 
behaviour of any single supplier within a supply chain, it is necessary to look at the supplier’s 
dependence on the dominant buyer and the their connectedness to the other network of 
suppliers (Cook, 1977; Provan, 1993). When the supplier is highly dependent on the buyer this 
strengthens their cooperation (Provan, 1993). When the transactions are strongly connected with 
other transactions, or occur in small batches, or over short periods of time, this will increase the 
coordination costs (Bogetoft & Olesen, 2004; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Wood & Parr, 2005). 
When there is a strong connection between the transactions a strong coordination mechanism is 
more appropriate as this reduces the transaction costs (Meyer, Milgrom, & Roberts, 1992). The 
stronger the ties between buyer and seller, the higher the level of transaction connectedness will 
be (Wong & Chan, 1999). The present research measures the transaction connectedness with the 
following constructs: chain actors’ awareness of the quality required by the customers of their 
buyers and of the price paid by them, and the connectedness of the harvesting period to the 
demands of traders and consumers. We assume that the higher the degree of transaction 
connectedness, the more likely it will be that the actors are involved in a more integrated GS. 
 
 
Institutional environment 
 
The term ‘institutions’ refers has a broad range of meanings which are often used ambiguously. 
Douglass North was one of the first scholars to link institutions and economic performance. The 
works of Davis and North (1971) and North (1990) shed light on how institutions affect 
economies and economic agents. These works distinguish between the institutional environment 
and institutional arrangements. The institutional environment sets the rules of the game of 
human interactions and the institutional arrangements are the players of the game. The 
institutional environment can be either formal (public, legal, governmental) or informal (social, 
moral). Institutions enable, constrain and direct human interactions (Nelson & Sampat, 2001). 
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They reduce uncertainty by setting the rules of the game and creating a stable structure to human 
interactions, that keeps transaction costs low. Several authors have argued that the relative 
importance of formal institutions increases as the scope of market exchange broadens and 
deepens (Dixit, 2007; M. Fafchamps, 2006). This is partly because establishing formal institutions 
requires high fixed costs but low marginal costs, whereas informal institutions have higher 
marginal costs. Examples of formal institutions can be credit institutions, property rights, 
constitutions, etc. Informal institutions refer to norms of behaviour, conventions, self imposed 
codes of conduct, reputation, etc.  
In the present study, we consider the influence of an enabling institutional environment such as 
institutional support, good controls over agronomic practices, capacity building, quality control 
(norms and standards) services, market facilities, subsidies etc. and how these can influence the 
farmers’ choice of one (or more) governance structure(s) in the pineapple supply chain. 
 
 
3.4.2 Survey design 
 
Questionnaires were elaborated to collect the data needed to assess the factors affecting the 
choice of governance structure in the pineapple supply chain.  The questionnaires were built on 
the theoretical background elaborated above and information from existing studies on Benin’s 
PSC (Arinloye, Hagelaar et al., 2010). The questionnaires were pre-tested with 10 key informants 
in Allada and Cotonou districts. The pre-test allowed adjusting the questionnaire to focus on the 
most relevant questions. In addition, the original 7-point Likert scale was changed to a 5-point 
scale (1=not agree at all, to 5=totally agree), to it more appropriate to the low literacy level of the 
people to be interviewed. 
 
 
3.4.3 Data collection 
 
Data were collected through face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The respondents were 
selected using the following criteria: acreage under pineapple cultivation in 2009, i.e. small scale 
(<1 ha), medium scale (between 1ha-5ha) and large scale (>5ha), participation in an 
Chapter 3 
 
 
60 
integrated/spot market governance regime (with and without contract, cooperation, organization, 
outgrowing, etc.), distance from the main urban market (located in Cotonou) and trading with 
exporters or regional market buyers (from Nigeria). Other factors also contributed to the 
selection criteria: being knowledgeable about the subject matter and willing and able to 
communicate with the researcher (Campbell 1955). An overview of the number of respondents 
per farmer category is shown in Table 3.1. The data was collected between September 2009 and 
July 2010. 
 
Since more than 95% of pineapples produced in Benin come from the Atlantique Department 
(district), we randomly selected our respondents from this area, using a randomly stratified 
sampling scheme based on the above criteria,11 Pineapple farmers were traced with the assistance 
of the regional agricultural extension services department which provided a list of names of 
farmers in each district. The second source of information on pineapple farmers were the 
pineapple producers’ association and councils. Equally important was information from the 
literature review. In total 219 farmers were interviewed across Zé (rural), Abomey-Calavi (peri-
urban), Allada, Toffo and Tori-Bossito (all rural) (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1: Sample sizes of each type of farmer per location 
 
Famers categories 
Locations/districts  Total  
Abomey-Calavi Zè Allada  Tori-Bossito  Toffo 
 
Small-scale   [<1ha]  20 (9.1) 32 (14.6) 25 (11.4) 18 (8.2) 18 8.2) 113 (51.6)
Medium-scale [1-5ha] 19 (8.7) 19 (8.7) 17 (7.8) 12 (5.5) 13 (5.9) 80 (36.5)
Large-scale   [>5ha] 6 (2.7) 8 (3.7) 3  (1.4) 5 (2.3) 4 (1.8) 26 (11.9)
Total 45 (20.5) 59 (26.9) 45 (20.5) 35 (16) 35 (16) 219 (100)
(*) percentage in brackets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
11 Stratified sampling is commonly used probability method that is better than random sampling as it reduces 
sampling error. A stratum (or criteria) is a subset of the population that shares at least one common characteristic. 
Examples of strata are farm size or (non) - membership of a farmers’ association. We first identified the relevant 
criteria and whether they were sufficiently well-represented in the population. ’Sufficient’ here refers to a sample size 
large enough to give us reasonable confidence that the stratum represents the population of pineapple farmers 
(estimated at 4,000 in 2010)  
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3.4.4 Analytical approach 
 
The study sought to explain the effects of internal and external factors (transaction attributes, 
social capital, the institutional environment and socio-economic characteristics) on the choice of 
governance structure and outlet and these two features were investigated as dependent variables. 
 
As one actor can be involved in one or more than one type of governance structure, we found it 
appropriate to use a multivariate probit model to analyze the determinants of choice(s) of 
governance structure in Benin’s pineapple supply chain. A Multivariate probit estimates M-equation 
probit models, using the maximum simulated likelihood method (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003). 
The variance-covariance matrix of the cross-equation error terms has values of 1 on the leading 
diagonal axis, and the off-diagonal elements are the correlations that are to be estimated (ρji = ρij, 
and ρii = 1, for all i = 1,...,M). For each observation, a likelihood contribution is calculated for 
each replication, and the simulated likelihood contribution is the average of the values derived 
from all the replications. The simulated likelihood function for the sample as a whole is then 
maximized using standard methods. For a detailed description of this model see Greene (2003) 
and Train (2003). 
 
In this model, the governance structure is considered as a system of a multiple choice equation 
(i=1...4; j=1,…..n) respective to each type of governance structure. 
 
ܩ݋ݒ݁ݎܵݐݎ௜௝ ൌ ߙ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܶݎܽ݊ݏܣݐݐݎܾ݅௜௝ ൅ ߚଶ௝ ܫ݊ݏݐܧ݊ݒ௜௝ ൅  ߚଷ௝ ܥܽݎܽܿݐ௜௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝    ሺ1ሻ 
 
Where:  GoverStrij  = Governance structure i choice by the farmer j 
  TransAttribij  = Transaction attribute i of the farmer j 
  InstEnvij  = Institutional environment  
  Caractij = Farm characteristics  
   ε୧୨= Error terms and α୧୨,  = the coefficients to be estimated. 
 
The software package STATA SE was used to estimate the empirical version of equations (1) 
using data gathered from the 219 respondents. 
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3.5 Results and discussion 
 
3.5.1 Governance structure selection 
 
The data collected from the 219 pineapple farmers indicates that more than 90% of them are 
involved in the spot market GS (Table 2) followed by the relational based GS (58%), the 
association GS (41%) and an outgrowing scheme (21%).  
 
 
Table 3.2: Types of governance structure identified 
Types of Governance 
Structure 
Observations Percent (%) Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Spot Market 198 90.41 0.020 0.865 0.943
Relational 128 58.44 0.033 0.518 0.650
Outgrowing 47 21.46 0.028 0.160 0.269
Association 91 41.55 0.033 0.350 0.481
 
 
Table 3.3: Number of governance structures in which farmers are involved 
Degree of Multi-governance  Observations Percent (%) Std. Err. [95% Conf.Interval
Farmers with 1 type of GS  44 20.09 0. 027 0.147 0.254
Farmers with 2 types of GS 111 50.68 0. 033 0.440 0.574
Farmers with 3 types of GS 58 26.48 0. 029 0.206 0.324
Farmers with 4 types of GS 6 2.74 0.011 0.006 0.049
Total 219.00 100.00    
 
 
Table 3.4: Participation in governance structures by farm size  
Farm size 
Total number of GS in which famer is involved 
Total 1 2 3 4 
 
Small<1ha 28 (63.64) 67 (60.36) 18 (31.03) 0 (0) 113 (51.6) 
Medium 1-5ha 14 (31.82) 32 (28.83) 29 (50) 5 (83.33) 80 (36.53) 
Large>5ha 2 (4.55) 12 (10.81) 11 (18.97) 1 (16.67) 26 (11.87) 
Total 44 (100) 111 (100) 58 (100) 6 (100) 219 (100) 
Note: Pearson Chi2 (6) = 23.9541   Pr = 0.001; (..) Column percentage in brackets 
 
Table 3.3 summarizes the number of GSs in which farmers are involved. As indicated, most 
respondents (80%) are simultaneously involved in at least two types of governance structure. If a 
farmer is involved in more than one type of governance structures, this implies more than one 
exchange relationship. One governance structure is taken as equivalent to one exchange 
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relationship. Farmers indicated that reasons for selecting multiple governance structures were to 
safeguard their investments and avoid post harvest loses of pineapple fruits rejected from the 
international market (through weighing and sorting), and also because some buyers (urban and 
regional markets wholesalers) do not fulfil they agreement or promises to buy the entire farmers 
products when reaching the maturity. 
 
Table 3.4 compares the farm size of respondents with the number of GS in which they are 
involved. This shows that most farmers with a low level of engagement with multiple GS (i.e. 
those involved in one or two GS) are small scale (< 1ha) producers (63% and 60% respectively) 
while those with more than two GS are mostly medium or large scale producers. The computed 
Pearson Chi2 (tested at six degrees of freedom) was used to test the differences between these 
farmers’ categories. It shows that farm size has a significant influence on the number of chains 
farmers’ participate in. Farmers with more land surface under pineapple production are most 
likely to be simultaneously engaged in 3 or 4 types of pineapple supply chain GS. 
 
 
3.5.2 Determinant of governance structure choices 
 
Prior to the regression of the multivariate probit model, a factor analysis was conducted to reduce 
the dimensions of the variables. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity determines whether each variable is 
independent, and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) determines the sampling adequacy (Chen & Fu, 
2011). KMO takes values between 0 and 1: low values mean that overall the variables have too 
little in common to warrant a factor analysis. Kaiser (1974) recommends accepting values greater 
than 0.5 as barely acceptable. Values between 0.5 and 0.7 are mediocre, values between 0.7 and 0.8 
good, values between 0.8 and 0.9 are great and values above 0.9 are superb (Field, 2009). According 
to the Kaiser criterion (1974), Eigenvalues is a good criterion for determining a factor. Factors 
with Eigenvalues of less than one should not be considered.  
 
The summary of computed factor loadings, the KMO and the Eigenvalues are presented in 
Appendix 1. With KMO values varying between 0.6 and 0.7 we can deduct that the sampling is 
fairly adequate. Bartlett's Test Chi2 is significant at 1 % (p<0.01) showing that the selected 
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dependant variables for factors analysis are not correlated. All the selected factors have 
Eigenvalues greater than one, with all factors having a variance superior to 0.7 responding to the 
variance extraction rule “Factors with Eigenvalues less than 0.7 should not be considered”. The 
factors analysis allowed generating the explanatory variables included in the regression model. 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables used 
in the multivariate probit regression.  
 
The result of this econometric regression is presented in Table 3.7. The Wald test is used to 
examine whether any of the parameters of the model that currently have non-zero values could 
be set to zero without any statistically significant loss in the model's overall fit to the data 
(ߚଵ௜ ൌ ߚଶ௜ ൌ ߚଷ௜ ൌ 0). This tests the overall significance of the variables we have included in the 
econometric model (McGeorge et al. 1997; Ryan and Watson, 2009). The results show that the 
Wald Chi2 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that the subset of 
coefficients of the model are jointly significant and that the explanatory power of the factors 
included in the model is satisfactory. 
 
Table 3.5: Summary statistic of variables included in the regression model 
Variable Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Farm and farmer’s characteristics 
 age Age of farmer 37.174 10.724 17 73
educ Education level 0.995 1.011 0 4
Experience Experience in pineapple farming  9.575 5.258 1 40
Dynamic capability Farmers Aptitude to change  0.689 0.464 0 1
Distance Geographical position to market  3.301 1.880 0 5
Trust Comit Trust and commitment 0.000 0.995 -2.31 1.10
FarmSize Farm size 1.603 0.692 1 3
bargPw Bargaining power 2.174 0.504 1 3.00
Transaction attributes 
 HumInvest Human specific investment 0.000 0.998 -0.63 4.44
PhysInvest Asset specificity investment 0.000 0.998 -1.45 4.50
UncertBehav Uncertain behaviour 0.000 0.995 -1.86 2.86
CertMark Market stability 0.000 0.995 -1.60 1.78
Connectdn Connectedness of transaction 0.000 0.995 -1.20 2.77
Market attributes 
 ArgmPredf Predefined marketing arrangement 0.000 1.000 -0.65 3.46
DeverPref Diversification of preferences 0.000 1.000 -1.69 1.46
PermantDem Permanente pineapple demand 0.000 1.000 -3.83 0.88
Institutional environment  
 InstitSup Institutional support 0.000 1.000 -0.91 2.16
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Table 3.6: Correlation matrix of the variables used in the model 
Variables  V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 
Age (V1) 1.00                 
Educ (V2) 0.18 1.00                
Experience (V3) 0.03 0.03 1.00               
chang_dyn (V4) 0.30 0.20 0.08 1.00              
Distanc (V5) -0.07 -0.16 -0.06 -0.20 1.00             
TrustComit (V6) -0.10 -0.14 -0.10 -0.28 0.27 1.00            
FarmSize (V7) 0.38 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.04 1.00           
bargPw (V8) -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.39 -0.12 0.00 1.00          
HumInvest (V9) 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.23 -0.33 -0.19 0.14 0.07 1.00         
PhysInvest (V10) -0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.08 0.62 0.19 0.14 -0.23 0.00 1.00        
UncertBehav (V11) 0.06 -0.06 -0.13 -0.02 0.36 0.27 0.12 -0.25 -0.05 0.33 1.00       
UncertMark (V12) 0.15 0.02 -0.02 0.17 -0.38 -0.12 0.06 0.18 0.29 -0.26 0.00 1.00      
Connectdn (V13) 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.17 -0.19 -0.07 0.11 0.04 0.37 -0.10 0.17 0.32 1.00     
ArgmPredf (V14) 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.12 -0.03 0.09 0.23 -0.08 0.31 0.11 0.20 0.06 0.32 1.00    
DeverPref (V15) 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.46 -0.17 -0.39 0.09 0.14 0.26 -0.07 -0.07 0.25 0.38 0.00 1.00   
PermantDem (V16) -0.04 -0.09 -0.03 -0.21 0.58 0.11 -0.02 -0.40 -0.10 0.41 0.30 -0.21 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00  
InstitSup (V17) 0.27 0.27 0.13 0.29 -0.14 -0.08 0.30 0.12 0.23 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.24 0.20 -0.12 1.00 
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Table 3.7: Multivariate probit estimation for governance structure choice 
 
Factors description  
Types of governance structures 
Spot 
Market
Relational Outgrow Association
Transaction 
attributes 
Human specific 
investment 
-0.28* 0.28* 0.19 -0,12 
Asset specificity 
investment 
0.12 0.61*** 0.16 0,16 
Uncertain behaviour 0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0,04 
Connectedness of 
transaction 
-0.26* -0.04 0.30** 0,31** 
Market stability -0.13 -0.10 0.23** -0,30* 
      
Institutional 
environment  
Institutional support -0.10 -0.22 -0.22* 1,62*** 
      
Market 
attributes 
Predefined marketing 
arrangement 
0.34** -0.17 0.02 0,48** 
Diversification of 
preferences 
-0.12 0.09 -0.24* 0,00 
Permanente pineapple 
demand 
0.14 -0.45*** 0.03 0,22 
      
Farm and 
farmer’s 
characteristics 
Farm size 0.08 -0.09 0.00 0,65** 
Ratio pineapple 
farm/total farm land 
-0.01 -0.51 1.38*** -0,81 
Geographical position to 
market  
-0.21 -0.07 0.05 0,09 
Trust and commitment -0.26* 1.69*** 0.02 0,00 
Age 0.01 0.001 0.01 0,01 
Experience in pineapple 
farming  
0.05* 0.01 -0.03 -0,02 
Education level 0.14 0.08 0.01 0,27 
Bargaining power 0.06 0.01 -0.30 0,08 
Dynamic capability  -0.29 0.18 0.06 1,36*** 
Constant 1.31 0.90 -1.31* -2.92** 
ρ21 -0.14 
ρ31 -0.33** 
ρ41 0.14 
ρ32 -0.25** 
ρ42 0.07 
ρ43 -0.36** 
Number of observations 219 
Wald chi2 (df) 373.68 (76)*** 
Likelihood ratio test Ho : ρ21 = ρ31 = ρ41 = ρ32 = ρ42 = ρ43 = 0;  chi2(6) =  11.5727* 
* P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, and *** P < 0.01. 
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The likelihood ratio test is also significant; leading us to reject the null hypothesis stating that all 
the ρ (Rho) values are jointly equal to zero. This is shows the goodness-of-fit of the model. 
Basically, the ρ-values explain the degree of correlation between each pair of dependant variable 
levels (each type of governance structure). Individually considered, we found three ρ-values to be 
statistically significant. The ρ31 (correlation between the outgrowing scheme GS and the spot 
market), the ρ32 (correlation between the outgrowing scheme and the relational based GS) and 
ρ43 (correlation between the farmers’ association and the outgrowing scheme) are negatively 
correlated and statistically significant at 5% critical level (P< 0.05). This generally implies that 
farmers involved in the outgrowing scheme governance structure are less likely to be involved in 
another type of governance as well. This shows the specificity and exclusivity of this type of 
transaction arrangement in the pineapple supply chain.  
 
Looking at the factors affecting the choice of each type of governance structure, we notice that 
different factors determine the farmer’s decision (see appendix 1 for more details on the 
description and the selection of methods of these factors). 
 
First, the human specific investment is significantly and negatively correlated with the spot 
market GS. This shows that there is no specific investment made in the transaction under this 
mode of market governance, neither in the knowledge acquisition and capacity building with 
respect to production practices, nor when shifting to another product or buyer. This result is in 
line with the transaction cost theory stating that the lower the human and asset specificity, the 
more likely the actors are to be involved in less constraining and less integrated arrangements. 
 
Also the specific human investment is found to be significantly and positively correlated with 
participation in the relational based GS. This implies that the choice of relational based 
governance structure, where farmers chose their buyers based on social relationships (familial 
and/or friendship), is determined by the farmers’ capacity to invest in human assets. This may be 
justified as in this kind of buyer-seller relationships there is high degree of trust between the 
parties involved. 
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Transaction connectedness refers to how transactions differ in how they are connected to other 
transactions in the chain (see appendix 1 for more details on the factor loading for transaction 
connectedness). Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argued that when transactions have a strong 
connection, this favours strongly coordinated governance. We find a negative and statistically 
significant correlation between the transaction connectedness and the spot market governance 
structure, and a positive and significant correlation with the outgrowing scheme and farmer 
association type of governance structure. Transaction connectedness was measured by the 
farmers’ awareness of the demand attributes of the customers of their buyers, which can be a 
trader, a processing company or an exporter. Transaction connectedness also considers the 
connection between a farmer’s production system and agronomic practices (floral induction 
treatment, Ethephon application and harvesting period) and the buyer’s demand attributes and 
quality requirements. We can infer from that result that the more farmers are engaged in a highly 
coordinated type of GS, the more likely they are aware of the end consumer’s quality 
requirements, and the more they adjust their production practices to fulfil these demands. It can 
be inferred that a more hierarchical GS is positively correlated with transaction connectedness. 
 
One positive and favourable indicator for choosing an outgrowing scheme is the stability and 
consistency of the buyer’s preferences. This factor positively and significantly correlates with 
outgrowing scheme GS choice and negatively with farmers’ association GS choice. Farmers 
involved in association based GS find that the quality demanded is less stable and less consistent 
than those involved in outgrowing schemes. 
 
Another construct that was considered to explain the farmers’ choice of a governance structure is 
the institutional environment in which transactions occur. Here, we considered the facilities and 
support received from private and public services to improve product quality and income. These 
include technical and financial support, training on good agronomical practices, quality norms 
and standards, market facilities, etc. Results show that the choice for a farmers’ association 
governance structure is positively and significantly influenced by differences in the form of 
institutional assistance received by farmers. Considering the social capital and collective actions 
that characterise associations, the public and private sectors are most likely to support groups and 
associations, rather than engage in bilateral transactions, such an outgrowing scheme or a 
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relational based GS. Also, national agricultural development policies give more priority to 
assisting collective actions (association, cooperatives) than individuals. 
 
Market attributes were also considered as a factor affecting the farmer’s choice of governance 
structure. The indicators we used to measure the market attributes included a pre-agreed market 
arrangement based on price and quality specifications, and the requirements of specific 
production practices and the quantity by the buyer. The results show a positive significant 
correlation with two types of governance structure: the spot market and the associative GS. For 
the first one, an unexpected correlation was found. The hypothesis was that when more pre-
agreements exist in market arrangements, farmers are more likely to go for an integrated type of 
governance structure to safeguard their investments (Williamson, 1985). However, the research 
findings show that within a spot market transaction arrangement, the quantity and price can be 
agreed at the moment and the place where the transaction takes place. It is important to note that 
in the pineapple supply chain, under a spot arrangement, the market agreements are generally 
informal (oral) without any formal written engagement. The drawback of this informal 
arrangement is that the transaction can unexpectedly be changed at any moment of the 
transaction, which generally is not the case within a farmer association GS. 
 
We also found that a farmer’s preference to be involved in several exchange relationship 
determines his or her choice of governance structure. The buyers in outgrowing scheme GS with 
farmers, show stable and less diversified requirement. This result is in line our previous result on 
the stability of buyer requirements over time. 
 
As a control variable, the farmers and the farm characteristics were included in a multivariate 
probit model. The results show that farmers involved in an association generally have more land 
planted with pineapple. As these farmers are generally not only producing pineapple, the 
importance of pineapple production was calculated calculating the land used for pineapple 
cultivation as a ration to the total acreage of cultivated land. We can infer from the regression 
model that the farmers under the outgrowing scheme arrangement devote more of their land to 
pineapple production than other categories of farmers. 
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It was previously demonstrated that the spot market GS is characterised by less human specific 
investments, while the reputation based GS is characterised by a high human specific investment. 
The argument used was based on the degree of trust between chain actors. We used trust and 
commitment as variables in order to test this assumption. The findings show that the choice of 
relational based GS is increased by a high and significant degree of trust and commitment 
between the buyer and seller involved in a transaction. By contrast, spot market arrangements are 
made by farmers with low trust and commitment to their buyers. 
 
Other control variables include the farmer’s age, experience in pineapple farming, education level 
(schooling), bargaining power with the buyer, and dynamic capacity. Among these factors, the 
farmers’ experience in pineapple production and dynamic capability (changing production 
practices in order to respond to the market demand) are shown to be positively significant at 10 
and 5 % critical levels (see Table 3.4), for the spot market and the farmers’ associations GS. This 
implies that the more dynamic farmers generally choose associative relationships and those with a 
lot of farming experience bargain under a spot market form of arrangement. 
 
 
3.6  Conclusion 
 
The transaction cost analysis provides many insights into the choice of governance structure. It 
suggests that all else being equal, a rational actor will chose a governance structure that 
performing best in minimising production and transaction costs. This study provides empirical 
evidence to transaction cost theory and develops Williamson’s attributes of transaction by 
emphasising connectedness as a transaction attribute that is worth considering when analysing 
the choice of governance structure in less developed counties. A new construct of ‘multiple-
governance’ structure is investigated to increase understanding of how and why farmers select 
among these governance structures and what guides their decisions. The multi-governance choice 
has been observed as a strategy of farmers for safeguarding their investments. This strategy was 
established to sell the different categories of product’s quality to different supply chains. Farmers 
involved in the outgrowing scheme GS are less likely to be involved in another type of 
governance; showing the specificity and exclusivity of this type of transaction arrangement in the 
pineapple supply chain. The results, showing factors underlying the choice of each type of GS, 
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have a potential to be used as a tool for defining intervention strategies for promoting contract 
enforcement in bi - or multilateral partnerships in agrifood chains. This study does not investigate 
the influence of the selected GS on pineapple quality or farmers’ income and created added value, 
which would also be important in devising policy recommendations. Further investigation should 
consider these aspects. 
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MARKETING CHANNEL SELECTION BY SMALLHOLDER PINEAPPLE 
FARMERS IN BENIN 
 
 
Chapter adapted from Arinloyé D.D.A.A., Hagelaar G., Linnemann A., Pascucci S., Coulibaly O., 
Omta S.W.F. Marketing channel selection by smallholder farmers: the case of the Beninese 
pineapple supply chain Marketing channel participation of smallholder farmers in agrifood 
chains. Accepted for publication in the Journal of food products marketing. 
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Chapter 4: Marketing channel selection by smallholder 
farmers in pineapple supply chain in Benin 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
According to the United Nation Millennium Development Goals, Benin, should, in common 
with other countries, achieve food security and reduce poverty by 50% by 2015. A key strategy to 
reaching this goal is to stimulate the development of new crops, such as pineapple. Over the past 
decade pineapple production in Benin has been growing rapidly (Adossou, 2012). Stringent 
quality requirements, however, mean that very little of this  (circa 2% of total production) is 
exported to Europe (Fassinou-Hotegni, Lommen, van der Vorst, Agbossou, & Struik, 2012). 
Low levels of participation in such high value market channels, is a serious challenge for the 
Beninese (and Sub-Saharan African) agricultural sector. If the factors that affect farmer selection 
of different market channels were better understood then managerial and policy interventions 
could be implemented to support it. 
 
Market channel selection is influenced by the nature, efficiency and costs of the processes 
involved in accessing markets (Obi, Pote, & Chianu, 2011). According to van Schalkwyk, et al. 
(2012), market access can be influenced by different factors. Firstly, it can be influenced by the 
quality, cost and timeliness of information about product availability, attributes and prices, 
Secondly, it can be influenced by information about transactions between different parties. A 
third factor is the confidence that suppliers in other actors’ market conduct. Finally, the physical 
costs of accessing a market (which is a function of the quality of infrastructure and the transport 
sector); and the actual price levels found in the markets where people transact, also play a role. 
These factors largely coincide with IFAD’s (2003) dimensions of market access: physical access 
to markets and distances; the structure of markets (asymmetry of power relations between 
farmers, market intermediaries and consumers); and the level of producers’ human capital (for 
example to understand market forces, prices, bargaining, etc.) (see also (Blandon, Henson, & 
Islam, 2009). Selection of different market channels is also influenced by product quality, 
especially where access to market channels requires compliance with stringent standards and 
regulations, there is a high risk and/or buyers have much bargaining power (Dolan & 
Humphrey, 2000). 
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The literature on market channel choice has a relatively long history, with most of the work 
dealing with the nature of the producer-distributor relationship (Artle & Berglund, 1959; 
Coughlan, 1985; van Tilburg & van Schalkwyk, 2012). However, these studies have not modelled 
simultaneous the selection of different market channels nor did they take into account the role of 
product quality and suppliers’ bargaining power as potential determining factors. 
 
Smallholder farmers generally lack vertical linkages and are rarely collectively organized which, 
many claim, results in their exclusion from marketing channels that supply international (export) 
markets (Delgado, 1999; Fenwick & Lyne, 1999; Jari & Fraser, 2012; van Tilburg & van 
Schalkwyk, 2012; Wynne & Lyne, 2004). These observations have been mainly drawn from the 
South African context, and this study tests these in a different economic contexts (Benin’s 
pineapple supply chain  see Figure 4.1) where most pineapples are sold into the national and 
regional markets - for example to neighbouring Nigeria) which have less stringent quality and 
standards requirements than European markets. 
 
In Bangladesh it has been found that the bargaining power of chain stakeholders in marketing 
channels can play important role in excluding smallholder farmers (Kabeer, 2002). This chapter 
seeks to explain the same question in the Beninese context and thereby, contribute to the 
literature that seeks to answer the following research question: 1) Whether or not small-scale 
farmers are rejected from the growing higher value and emerging regional and urban markets in 
Sub-Sahara Africa and the EU?, and 2) Which intrinsic and extrinsic factors affect the marketing 
channel selection? It thoroughly investigates the four main marketing channels for pineapples in 
Benin: the rural, urban, fresh export, and processing markets. Smallholder farmers struggle to get 
good prices for their products, and endeavour to find the best and most sustainable outlets for 
generating a high income. The study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence 
on pineapple farmers’ decisions about market channel choices. It provides policy 
recommendations and discusses the implications for sustainable production and market access 
by smallholder farmers. 
 
The chapter begins by describing the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of the study. We 
then present our data collection strategies and methods, followed by our empirical findings. The 
chapter ends with concluding remarks and highlights the implications for policy and 
practitioners. 
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Figure 4.1: Benin’s pineapple production zone, showing data collection areas and their distance to the 
main urban market in south Benin. 
 
 
 
4.2 Conceptual and theoretical frameworks  
 
4.2.1 Conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework showing the factors that were considered to affect the choice of 
marketing channel is presented in Figure 4.2. Marketing channels are defined as the downstream 
part of the value chain. They contain a number of chain actors at different outlets, through to the 
final point of sale to consumers. Coughlan et al (2001) see these chain actors as utility-creating 
parties that offer end-users a combination of products and services. The literature in the field of 
market participation (Boughton et al., 2007; de Janvry, Fafchamps, & Sadoulet, 1991; M. 
Fafchamps, 1992) has explained the reasons why smallholders have a low participation rate in 
high value markets. This has been shown to be largely a result of low crop productivity and 
market failures (Benfica, Tschirley, & Boughton, 2006; Boughton et al., 2007; Dijkstra, 
Meulenberg, & van Tilburg, 2001; Heltberg & Tarp, 2002; van Tilburg & van Schalkwyk, 2012). 
Other factors affecting market participation choices include farm size (per household worker), 
farm assets (animal, tractor, equipment, etc.), age (or farming experience) of household head, 
transport ownership and available infrastructure facilities (roads, storage and conditioning). 
Transactional incentives can also affect chain actors’ marketing decisions (Pascucci, 2010). 
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A recent study in South Africa, aimed at identifying strategies for unlocking market access to 
smallholders, showed that factors such as poor infrastructure, lack of market transport, lack of 
market information, insufficient knowledge and use of grades and standards,  an inability to 
conclude contractual agreements and poor organizational support were the main factors that led 
to an inefficient use of different market channels, and contributed to bottlenecks in 
commercialization (Jari & Fraser, 2012).  
 
In Costa Rica, an investigation into the determinants of market outlet choice for mango 
producers (Zuniga-Arias & Ruben, 2007) explored four major factors. The first was related to 
the farm household (including the farmer’s experience, trust and attitude to risk); the second 
concerned the production system (farm size and production scale); the third was related to price 
attributes; and the last was the market context (having a written contract or not, geographical 
location and distance to urban markets). (Blandon et al., 2009; Brewer, 2001) also found that 
physical distance is a main determinant of market channel selection. Producers often target 
nearby markets since their geographic proximity means they have more knowledge about these 
markets, easier access to information and lower travelling and transportation costs (Andersen & 
Buvik, 2002; Papadopoulos & Denis, 1988). It has also been shown that farmers’ bargaining 
power is an important factor when they make decisions about which marketing channel to use 
(Kabeer, 2002; Zuniga-Arias & Ruben, 2007). This study adds to the literature, not only by 
testing these observations in the different context of Benin, but also by investigating how 
produce quality attributes, rejection rates, and contractual arrangements affect marketing 
decisions and how these help to explain smallholder farmers’ choice of different market channels 
for a perishable tropical food product. 
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Figure 4.2: Conceptual framework of factors affecting choice of marketing channel in food chains 
(adapted from Zuniga-Arias & Ruben, 2007). 
 
 
4.2.2 Theoretical framework and modelling 
 
Since the 1980s many Sub-Saharan African countries have embarked on Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, which have aimed to open new liberalized market-oriented economic systems. 
Economic liberalization has given opportunities for smallholder farmers to diversify their 
production and take their surplus to nearby markets (Asfaw et al., 2010). Removing trade barriers 
and discouraging local monopolies has given smallholder farmers more choice about the best 
markets for inputs and their produce (B. A. Shiferaw & Teklewold, 2007). Our focus is to model 
smallholder farmers’ market decision making process, using utility maximization theory. 
Economic theories used for explaining farmers’ decision marking are generally rooted in utility 
or profit maximization theory (Griliches, 1957). Utility is explained in terms of the profits that 
chain actors can gain from their activities. Households can obtain different levels of profit from 
different contexts, and it is considered that their choice of what to produce and whom to supply 
is influenced by their profit prospects (Doll & Orazem, 1984). 
 
A farmer’s decision to sell in a given market is assumed to be derived from the maximization of 
the expected utility or profit he or she expects to gain from this market (R. H. Frank & Glass, 
1991; McFadden, 1986; Salvatore, 2003). This utility is a function of a vector of factors (ܺ௔஺), 
unknown parameters ߚ௔ and an error term ε, assumed to be independently N (0, ߪଶ) distributed 
(Equation 1). Farmers’ make decisions about whether or not to chose a given market by 
evaluating the gains in their expected utility, taking into account the related investments and 
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costs (Kelsey, 1994; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). It is expected that farmers’ will choose the market 
that shows the most positive utility. The expected difference in utility is expressed as follows: 
 
௝ܷ   ൌ   ൣߨ௜௝஺ െ ߨ௜௝଴ ൧ ൌ  ܺ௔஺ߚ௔ ൅ ߝ஺,                                                                                                  ሺ1ሻ 
 
where Uj  is the unobserved expectation operator representing the expected utility difference, ߨ௜஺ 
is the utility derived from market i if selected by farmer j, and ߨ௜଴ is stream of utility if market i is 
not selected. Farmers make a subjective comparison of market attributes and their own capacities 
to meet the markets’ demands. They only choose a market – rural, urban, processing or 
international – when it is perceived to offer a higher utility than the alternative options. From 
equation 1, we can infer the market selection decision model as being: 
 
௜ܻ௝஺ ൌ ቊ1  ݂݅   ሾߨ௜
஺ െ ߨ௜଴ሿ  ൒ 0       ܺ௔஺ߚ௔ ൒  െߝ஺
0  ݂݅   ሾߨ௜஺ െ ߨ௜଴ሿ ൏ 0       ܺ௔஺ߚ௔ ൏  െߝ஺                                                                       ሺ2ሻ 
 
The farmer j decision to select the market i is defined as Y୧୨୅ and the choice of farmer j to sell in 
market i ሺY୧୨୅ ൌ 1ሻ or not ሺY୧୨୅ ൌ 0ሻ is expressed as follows: 
 
௜ܻ௝஺ ൌ ቊ
1  ݂݅    ௜ܻ௝஺ ൌ ௜ܺ௝஺ߙ௜௝ ൅ ߝ஺  ൒ 0           ௜ܺ௝஺ߙ௜௝ ൒  െߝ஺
0  ݂݅    ௜ܻ௝஺ ൌ ௜ܺ௝஺ߙ௜௝ ൅ ߝ஺  ൏ 0           ௜ܺ௝஺ߙ௜௝ ൏  െߝ஺,                                                    ሺ3ሻ 
 
where αij is a vector of estimators, ߝ஺ is a vector of error terms under the assumption of normal 
distribution,   ௜ܻ௝஺ is the dependent variables, and ௜ܺ௝஺ is the combined effects of the explanatory 
variables. 
 
 
4.3  Data collection and methods 
 
Data were collected in 2009 with a pre-tested, semi-structured survey questionnaire consisting of 
a combination of closed questions, Likert scales with a 5 point format (Allen & Seaman, 2007; 
Jamieson, 2004) and open questions. More than 95% of Benin’s pineapples are produced in the 
south of the country, particularly in the Atlantic Department (Hotegni, Lommen, van der Vorst, 
Agbossou, & Struik, 2012). Respondents were selected from this area, using a randomly stratified 
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sampling scheme (StatPac, 2010), based a set of criteria. These criteria included; acreage under 
pineapple cultivation in 2009 (differentiated into small scale - less than 1 ha, medium scale - 
between 1 ha and 5 ha, and large scale - more than 5 ha), market channels supplied (rural, urban, 
regional, processing or EU markets), and location of the farm (distance from the main urban 
market in Cotonou). Farmers were contacted with the assistance of agricultural extension 
services agents, who provided the names and addresses of lead farmers in each commune. 
Secondary data were also collected from the Council of the Pineapple Farmers’ Association, 
other institutions, and libraries. This approach gave a sample of respondents from different 
villages across the Atlantic Department, as illustrated in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1. 
 
After data collection, incomplete questionnaires were discarded This resulted in a final list of 217 
respondents. Of these 217 farmers, 68 were selling through at least two market channels. The 
farmers were asked to name the two most important market channels for distributing pineapples. 
As data were independently collected for each market channel, these two one-sided data sets 
were merged into a combined data set with a total of 285 observations. 
 
Because of the low representation of pineapple farmers selling pineapples directly to regional 
market wholesalers (n=7), observations on regional markets was merged with those of 
international market channels (n=29) for the econometric regressions. These marketing channels 
were, however, separately analyzed in the descriptive results (Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5). 
 
 
Table 4.1: Sample sizes of each category of farmer per location 
Category of famers 
 
N (%) 
Locations/districts Total 
Abomey-
Calavi 
Zè Allada Tori-
Bossito 
Toffo 
 
Small-scale    [ <1ha]  7 (2.46) 10 (3.51) 8 (2.81) 6 (2.11) 7 (2.46) 38 (13.33)
Medium-scale  [1 - 5ha] 26 (9.12) 21 (7.37) 14 (4.91) 29 (10.18) 25 (8.77) 115 (40.35)
Large-scale    [ > 5ha ] 26 (9.12) 34 (11.93) 18 (6.32) 25 (8.77) 29(10.18) 132 (46.32)
 
Total 59 (20.7) 65 (22.81) 40 (14.04) 60 (21.05) 61 (21.4) 285 (100)
  
The sample includes both the first (217 farmers) and second marketing channels (68 farmers), as data was 
collected from both channels separately, making a total of 285 observations.  
 
 
Descriptive and econometric approaches were complementarily used in the data analysis. For the 
descriptive statistics, the independency between the explanatory factors for each selected market 
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channel was tested using Pearson chi squared (χ2). Since the results from the descriptive statistics 
did not allow for isolating the marginal effects of specific explanatory variables, we ran simple 
and multivariate probit regressions. Following empirical specification a model was deduced from 
Equation 3: 
 
ۖە
۔
ۖۓUrbMarket௝ ൌ ߙ଴௝ ൅ ߙ௝ܪܪܦܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ௝ ൅ ߙଵ௝ܲݎ݋݀ܵݕݏݐ݁݉௝ ൅ ߙଶ௝ܲݎ݋݀ܣݐݐݎ݅ ௝ܾ ൅ ߙଷ௝ܯܽݎ݇ܣݐݐݎ݅ ௝ܾ ൅  ߝ஺LocMarket௝  ൌ ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߙ௝ܪܪܦܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܲݎ݋݀ܵݕݏݐ݁݉௝ ൅ ߚଶ௝ܲݎ݋݀ܣݐݐݎ݅ ௝ܾ ൅  ߚଷ௝ܯܽݎ݇ܣݐݐݎ݅ ௝ܾ ൅  ߝ஻
ExpMarket௝  ൌ ߛ଴௝ ൅ ߙ௝ܪܪܦܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ௝ ൅ ߛଵ௝ܲݎ݋݀ܵݕݏݐ݁݉௝ ൅ ߜଶ௝ܲݎ݋݀ܣݐݐݎ݅ ௝ܾ ൅ ߜଷ௝ܯܽݎ݇ܣݐݐݎ݅ ௝ܾ ൅  ߝ஼
ProcMarket௝ ൌ ߠ଴௝ ൅ ߙ௝ܪܪܦܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ௝ ൅ ߠଵ௝ܲݎ݋݀ܵݕݏݐ݁݉௝ ൅ ߠଶ௝ܲݎ݋݀ܣݐݐݎ݅ ௝ܾ ൅ ߠଷ௝ܯܽݎ݇ܣݐݐݎ݅ ௝ܾ ൅  ߝ஽,
 
 (4) 
 
where ܷݎܾܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ௝, ܮ݋ܿܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ௝, ܧݔ݌ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ௝ ܽ݊݀ ܲݎ݋ܿܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ௝   are dummy variables taking 
value 1 when farmer j selects a rural, urban, export or processing market, and 0 otherwise; 
ܪܪܦܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ௝ represents a set of the household characteristics of farmer j; ܲݎ݋݀ܵݕݏݐ݁݉௝ 
represents the production systems of farmer j; ܲݎ݋݀ܣݐݐݎ݅ ௝ܾ is the set of pineapple quality 
attributes supplied by farmer j; ܯܽݎ݇ܣݐݐݎ݅ ௝ܾ is the set of market attribute factors perceived by 
farmer j; ߙ௜௝, ߚ௜௝, ߛ௜௝ and ߠ௜௝ are the coefficients to be estimated, and ߝ represents error terms. 
 
A correlation matrix of variables used in the regression models and a description of each variable 
can be found in Table 4.2. Pearson correlation coefficients were used to measure the strengths of 
linear association between the variables. The results show that these coefficients are globally less 
than 0.39, indicating weak relations, which suggest that variables are sufficiently independent to 
be modelled together without concerns about multicollinearity (Verbeek, 2008). 
 
Since farmers are able to choose more than one marketing channel, there was a need to test 
whether there is a correlation between their different market channel selection decisions. We 
therefore ran two econometric models: a simple probit model with the assumption of 
independency in market choice decisions, and a multivariate probit model assuming a correlation 
and interdependence in farmers’ market selection decisions. Standardized coefficients and t-tests 
of estimated regression models were computed for each explanatory variable using STATA SE 
which has a robust option to control for the models’ robustness. The robust standard errors are 
shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
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Table 4.2: Correlation matrix, mean and standard deviation of variables 
 
 Variables  Mean
Std.
Dev V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 
Dependent 
variables  
Urban market(V1) 0.53 0.50             
Rural market (V2) 0.27 0.45             
Export market (V3) 0.13 0.33             
Processing market (V4)  0.07 0.26             
Explanatory 
variables  
Age of HHD (V5)  38.1 10.5 1.00            
Education level HHD (V6) 1.05 1.04 0.20 1.00           
Farm size (V7) 2.33 0.70 -0.38 -0.11 1.00          
Number of varieties  (V8) 0.30 0.46 0.06 0.12 -0.03 1.00         
Quality required (V9) 1.94 0.84 0.15 -0.04 -0.10 -0.11 1.00        
Rejection (V10) 0.15 0.36 -0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.31 -0.09 1.00       
Distance (V11) 2.01 0.65 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.36 -0.10 0.19 1.00      
Incentive from buyers (V12) 2.18 1.02 0.39 0.26 -0.39 0.02 0.22 0.05 0.30 1.00     
Formality of transaction (V13) 1.33 0.68 0.13 0.07 -0.22 0.03 0.23 -0.10 0.17 0.29 1.00    
Relation duration (V14) 2.02 0.80 0.32 0.05 -0.23 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.28 0.15 1.00   
Bargaining power (V15) 2.16 0.51 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.36 -0.12 0.23 0.23 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 1.00  
Written contract (V16) 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.10 -0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.26 0.11 0.17 0.07 1.00 
The following values were attributed to each variable:  
(V1), (V2), (V3) and (V4) are dummy dependent variables representing market participation (1=participant, 0= non-participant) 
(V5): Age of surveyed household head (years)  
(V6): Education level of household head (HHD) where 0 = no education, 1 = primary school, 2 = middle school, 3 = high school, 4 = university level 
(V7): Farm Size (1 = large scale >5ha; 2 = medium scale 1-5ha; 3 = small scale <1ha) 
(V8): Number of varieties: (0 = one cultivar: Smooth Cayenne or Sugarloaf; 1 = both cultivars)  
(V9): Quality required: 1 = low quality or “Class C”; 2 = medium quality or “Class B”; 3 = high quality or “Class A” 
(V10): Having faced rejection by buyers (1 = yes) 
(V11): Distance (1 = <30 Km; 2= [30 - 60 Km]; 3= >60 Km)  
(V12): Incentive from buyers (1 = no incentive; 2 = low incentive; 3 = medium incentive; 4 = high incentive)  
(V13): Formality degree (1= no formal/spot market; 2=low formality/reputation based; 3 = formal) 
(V14): Relation duration with buyer (1 = short<5years; 2 = medium 5-10years; 3 = long-term>10years) 
(V15): Bargaining Power (1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high) 
(V16): Having a written contract with buyer (1 = yes) 
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4.4  Results and discussion 
 
4.4.1 Characteristics of the marketing channels 
 
The characteristics of the marketing channels (outlets) are shown in Figure 3. The international 
markets include regional (neighbouring countries) and European Union (EU) markets. These 
markets are characterized by higher quality and standards requirements and higher freighting 
costs, which increase the total transportation costs, compared to the domestic markets. The 
domestic markets include rural and urban markets for fresh and processed pineapple. They are 
mostly characterized by lower (or non-existent) quality and standards requirements, except for 
dried pineapples which are also targeted at EU markets. The processing factories in Benin are 
mostly traditional and only partly-industrialized, either processing pineapple into juice, packed in 
bottles (0.25 litre or 0.33 litre) or drying them. This market channel is less developed and is 
dominated by individual processors and farmers. The juice is mainly sold on domestic markets, 
while the dried pineapples are exported. 
 
Because of time and distance, the gap between harvesting the fruit and its consumption, and the 
risk for fruit deterioration is much higher in international markets than domestic markets. The 
lack of cold chain facilities also makes freighting pineapples by sea relatively unattractive. Finally, 
the international market has hierarchical forms of governance structure. This implies that the 
transaction costs – separate from the transportation costs (Blattberg, Buesing, Peacock, & Sen, 
1978; J. E. Hobbs, 1997; Teece, 1986; Williamson, 1983) in this supply chain are higher than in 
domestic markets. All these facts could explain the low participation rates of pineapple farmers in 
export markets.  
 
4.4.2 The influence of market context 
 
Farmers were asked to describe their bargaining powers in each of the market channels in which 
they participate. They were considered to have low bargaining power when the buyer is the 
dominant actor in price setting and a medium bargaining power when an average price is agreed 
after a period of bargaining between buyer and seller. When farmers have full control of the 
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price, they were considered to have high bargaining power in the transaction. Table 4.4 shows 
that more than 70% of the respondents have a medium bargaining power. Though they are not 
price makers in the marketing transactions, most have some opportunity to raise the prices 
initially proposed by the buyers. This applies to almost all the identified marketing channels – 
86% in regional market, 84% with wholesalers in the urban market, 72% for the processing 
market and 50% with urban retailers. In the rural market channel the majority of farmers (55%) 
have a high bargaining power. This can be explained by the farmers’ closeness to this market. In 
the other channels, the farmers may have to bear higher transportation costs and have to reduce 
their price if they cannot find buyers at the preferred price. This highlights problem of poor road 
infrastructure and the importance of physical distance in marketing decisions (Andersen & Buvik, 
2002). 
 
To assess the influence of physical distance on marketing channel decisions, we controlled for the 
farmers’ geographical distribution in our sampling strategies (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). Most of 
the farmers (58%) are located between 30 and 60 km from the main urban wholesale pineapple 
market (Dantopka Market in Cotonou). These farmers are from Allada (57.4 km), Zè (46.3 km) 
and Torri-Bossito (44.2 km) communes. 21% of the farmers were selected from Abomey-Calavi 
commune (17.9 km from downtown Cotonou) and 21% from Toffo (81.4 km). The 
differentiated distance from farm to the main urban market is assumed to the affect the farmer’s 
selection of marketing channel. 
 
Other market attributes such as trading incentives between buyers and sellers, the complexity of 
transactions, the duration of the buyer-seller relationship and the existence of written contracts in 
the market transaction are considered in the econometric models presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
Table 4.4 shows that more than 86% of farmers do not have a written contract with their buyers: 
those who have a binding contract arrangement are mostly selling to exporters (35%) and, to a 
lower extent, to wholesalers in urban (14%) and rural (8%) markets. Some processing factories 
have started to require written contracts with their supplying farmers. In most cases, these 
contracts state the quantity and quality of pineapples demanded and the risks and the duration of 
the contract. Almost all the contracts (93%) last for a maximum of 2 years (one pineapple 
cropping season) if the contract is signed before starting production, and for 1 year, if it is signed 
during the pineapple growing period. The contract is renewed if the previous one was satisfactory 
Chapter 4 
 
 
86 
to the parties involved. The renewals of such contracts can lead to a short (< 5 years), medium 
(5-10 years) and long-term (>10years) transaction relationships between farmers and buyers. The 
data show that most pineapple farmers have at least 5 years of trading experience with their 
buyers (70%). 
 
The results of the analysis show that market channel selection is significantly different between 
farmers, according to their bargaining power, the distance from central urban markets and the 
existence of contractual relationships. 
 
4.4.3 The influence of quality attributes 
 
The study also focuses on evaluating the influence of the (physical) quality of the pineapple on 
the selected marketing channel. To do this, farmers were asked to provide information about the 
different quality levels of their pineapples. They were asked to use the following three quality 
levels: class A: “high quality” or “extra” class, class B: “medium quality” and class C: “low 
quality”. Pineapples of class A meet the standards of Codex Alimentarius (Codex-Stan, 1993) and 
are eligible for the EU market and supermarkets. They are characterized by a weight between 1 
and 2.2 kg and are free from any physical damage and contamination (fungus attack). Class B 
pineapples have a medium size and weight (slightly < 1 kg) and can easily be fit in a packaging 
box for export. Slight defections in shape are accepted but the fruits should be free of any 
contamination, such as fungus. This pineapple class can also be eligible for EU markets, and can 
also be sold in domestic and regional markets. The last class is characterized by a very low weight 
(<0.7 kg), with significant defects in shape and may have some fungus attacks on the skin. Class 
C is mostly sold in domestic markets and to some traditional pineapple juice processing factories. 
This classification is mostly applicable to Smooth cayenne cultivar. For the Sugarloaf variety there are 
no official quality standards or norms for grading, since it is only sold to domestic and regional 
consumers. 
 
On average 33% of pineapples produced are class A, 26% class B and 41% class C pineapples. 
This heterogeneity in the quality of the harvested products may be a result of the prevailing 
weather conditions and/or the different production systems used by farmers. These figures 
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suggest that if one wishes to improve the quality of pineapple production and thereby improve 
access to high value markets, there is need in capacity building and providing technical supports. 
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Table 4.4: Market attributes by marketing channel 
Buyers in the pineapple supply chains Retailers  Wholesalers Exporters Processors Total 
Rural 
Market 
Urban market Rural 
market 
Urban market Regional 
market 
N=18 N=2 N=60 N=149 N=7 N=29 N=20 N=285 
1) Bargaining power of farmers (%) 
Low 
Medium 
High 
N=18  5.6 0 6.7 4.7 0  3.5 25  6.3 
N=202 83.3 50 38.3 83.9 85.7 72.4 55 70.9 
N=65 11.1 50 55 11.4 14.3 24.1 20 22.8 
 
2) Distance from farm to the central urban market (%) 
<30 Km 
[30 - 60 Km] 
>60 Km 
N=59 66.7 50 1.7 29.5 0  3.4 0 20.7 
N=165 27.8 50 56.7 64.4 71.4 55.2 40 57.9 
N=61  5.5 0 41.7 6.1 28.6 41.4 60 21.4 
 
3) Having a written contract with the buyer (%) 
No N=246 100 100 93.3 85.9 100 65.5 80 86.3 
Yes N=39 0 0 6.7 14.1 0 34.5 20 13.7 
 
4) Duration of relationship with the buyer (%) 
Short < 5Years N=87 38.89 50 35 31.54 14.29 17.24 25 30.53 
Medium [5-10Y] N=104 33.33 0 33.33 40.94 42.86 24.14 35 36.49 
Long term >10Y N=94 27.78 50 31.67 27.52 42.86 58.62 40 32.98 
1) Pearson Chi2 (df=12) = 64.27 Pr = 0.000.   
2) Pearson Chi2 (df=12) = 100.29 Pr = 0.000. 
3) Pearson Chi2 (df=6) = 18.09   Pr = 0.006.   
4) Pearson Chi2 (df=12) = 14.65   Pr = 0.262. 
 N = Number of observations.
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The results show that the class C pineapple is not accepted in the export market (Table 4.5). 
However – certainly because of the cheaper price – it is often preferred by wholesalers from the 
regional (71%), rural (55%) and urban (36%) markets. The export market remains the marketing 
channel with the highest quality requirements: 55.2% of class A and 44.8% of class B pineapples 
are sold there. Class A pineapples are also sold to some domestic and regional markets, including 
rural retailers (44%), urban wholesalers (39%), processing factories (30%) and some Nigerian 
wholesalers (14%). 
 
Table 4.5: Quality attributes and marketing channels 
Buyers in the 
pineapple  
supply chains 
Retailers Wholesalers Export
ers 
Processo
rs 
Tota
l 
 
Rural 
Market 
Urban 
market 
Rural 
mark
et 
Urban 
market 
Region
al 
market    
 N=18 N=2 N=60 N=149 N=7 N=29 N=20 N=2
85 
1) Quality requirement in each market channel (%) 
Low Quality  N=110 38.9 50.0 55.0 36.2 71.4 0.0 50.0 41.4 
Medium.Quality N= 82 16.7 50.0 38.3 24.8 14.3 44.8 20.0 26.0 
High Quality N= 93 44.4 0.0  6.7 38.9 14.3 55.2 30.0 32.6 
 
2) Farmer has experienced rejection of produce (%)  
No  N=243 94.4 50 65 90.6 100 89.7 90 94.4 
Yes N= 42 5.6 50 35  9.4 0 10.3 10 5.6 
1) Pearson Chi2 (df=12) =  46.77 Pr = 0.000.   
2) Pearson Chi2 (df=6) = 28.18 Pr=0.000. 
 N = Number of observations. 
 
Farmers were asked if they had experienced rejections in their selected marketing channels. Their 
answers are reported in the Table 4.5. The results indicate that only 6% of farmers have 
experienced rejection of their products. In general the buyers only reject pineapples that are of 
bad quality. This result confirms Nicklin et al.’s, (2006) study which found that a major barrier for 
sustainable market access and high income generation to smallholder farmers is their low capacity 
to supply uniform products (quality and quantity) as requested by foreign buyers. 
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4.4.4 Econometric findings on the determinants of market 
selection 
 
These descriptive statistics do not allow us to isolate the marginal impact of any particular 
variable to explain farmer’s selection of marketing channels.  To identify the influence of 
different factors we ran econometric regressions, the outputs of these regressions are shown in 
Table 4.6 (simple probit model) and Table 4.7 (multivariate probit model). 
 
Table 4.6: Simple Probit Model with the assumption of non-correlation between market channel 
choices 
  Market channels 
Factors description  
Urban 
Market 
(V1) 
Rural 
Market 
(V2) 
Export 
Market 
(V3) 
Process 
Market 
(V4) 
Household characteristics      
Age of HH (V5)  -0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 
Education level HHD(V6) -0.07 (0.09) 0.01 (0.10) 0.10 (0.10) -0.05 (0.14) 
Production system      
Farm size (V7) -0.01 (0.14) 0.33 (0.15)** -0.24 (0.18) -0.36 (0.23) 
Number of varieties (V8) -0.81 (0.22)*** 0.85 (0.21)*** 0.09 (0.28) -0.61 (0.37)* 
Product attributes     
Quality requirement(V9) 0.20 (0.11)* -0.29 (0.12)** 0.30 (0.15)*** -0.23 (0.19) 
Rejection (V10) -0.13 (0.27) 0.64 (0.26)** -0.48 (0.38)  -0.72 (0.52)  
Market context     
Distance (V11) -0.65 (0.16)*** 0.03 (0.16) 0.47 (0.22)**  1.23 (0.35)*** 
Incentive (V12) -0.13 (0.11) -0.05 (0.12) 0.16 (0.15) 0.48 (0.20)** 
Formality (V13) -0.50 (0.16)*** 0.03 (0.18) 0.42 (0.16)***  0.07 (0.24) 
Relation duration (V14) 0.01 (0.12) -0.17 (0.12)  0.20 (0.15) -0.17 (0.21)  
Bargaining power (V15) -0.19 (0.18) 0.40 (0.18)** 0.16 (0.24) -0.41 (0.25) 
Written contract (V16) 1.14 (0.30)*** -0.95 (0.34)*** -0.25 (0.32) -0.16 (0.46) 
Constant 3.68 (0.80)*** -3.01 (0.83)*** 
-4.24 
(1.13)*** -2.46 (1.31)** 
Number of observations 285 285 285 285 
LR Chi2 (degree of freedom) 104.89 (12)*** 80.96 (12)*** 54.51(12)*** 41.34 (12)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.24  0.25 0.29 
Correct prediction 78.60% 81.40% 88.42% 93.33% 
 (..) Robust standard errors in brackets 
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Looking at Table 4.6, the likelihood ratios Chi-squares (LR χ2) of 104.8, 80.9, 54.5 and 41.3, all 
with p-values of less than 0.0001, tell us that each of the four models is statistically significant, 
that is, it fits significantly better than a model with no predictors. Table 4.7, which shows correct 
prediction rates of 78.6%, 81.4%, 88.4% and 93.3% shows that the models have good predictive 
values. The Wald chi-square statistic that was used to test for the overall significance of the 
variables included in the model is significant at the 1% level. This result implies that the subsets 
of coefficients are jointly significant and that the explanatory power of the factors included in the 
model is satisfactory. 
 
The Likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis of independency between the market channel 
decision (ρ21 = ρ31 = ρ41 = ρ32 = ρ42 = ρ43 = 0) is significant at 1%. Therefore the null 
hypothesis that all the ρ (Rho) values are jointly equal to zero is rejected, indicating the goodness-
of-fit of the model. Hence, there are differences in market selection behaviour of the farmers, 
which are reflected in the likelihood ratio statistics. Separately considered, the ρ-values (ρ ij) 
indicate the degree of correlation between each pair of dependent variables – here each market 
channel. The results show that two ρ-values are statistically significant. The ρ21 (correlation 
between participation urban and rural markets) and ρ31 (correlation between participation in 
export and urban markets) are both negative and statistically significant at 1% level (Table 4.7). 
This finding leads us to the conclusion that farmers delivering to the urban market are less likely 
to deliver to the rural markets (ρ21). Equally those involved in export marketing channels are less 
likely to send their pineapples to the urban market (ρ31). Even though we can observe negative 
correlations between the other marketing channel alternatives, these correlations are not 
(statistically) significant. 
 
Farmers’ household characteristics also play a role in influencing participation in different market 
channels. The age of household head (V5) is negatively and significantly (p<0.01) correlated with 
urban market participation and positively and significantly correlated (p<0.01) with rural market 
participation. Young farmers have a preference for selling to the urban market, while the older 
farmers prefer rural market outlets. There are conflicting explanations about the relationship 
between age and decision making process in the literature. Old farmers may take their decisions 
more easily than young farmers, because the older farmers might have accumulated capital or a 
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long term relationship with their clients (in the rural market), or might have preferential access to 
credit due to their age, availability of land, or family size (Adegbola & Gardebroek, 2007; Sall, 
Norman, & Featherstone, 2000).  By contrast the young farmers might have a longer planning 
horizon or be more willing to take risks (Zegeye et al., 2001). Age can have both a positive or 
negative effect on farmers’ decisions, as reflected in our findings. The results also show that the 
age does not significantly affect the farmers’ decision to sell to other markets, such as export 
markets or processing factories. 
 
Another household characteristic that may affect a farmer’s decision is the education level of 
farmer (V6). Differences in education levels (no school attendance, and attendance at primary, 
secondary and high schools or university) did not influence farmers’ decision making. This, 
unexpected, result could be explained by the low number of farmers with a higher level of 
education. More than 70% of respondents did not reach primary school level, affecting their 
aptitude to access accurate and up-to-date market information and their capacity to participate in 
markets requiring a high level of knowledge and information on norms and standards. This result 
suggests a need to improve smallholder farmers’ capacity and skills to increase their access and 
use of up-to-date production and market information systems. In Benin such efforts should 
focus on using local dialects and employing traditional information channels (rural radio, 
extension service, etc.). 
 
The characteristics of the farmers’ production system are the second set of variables that could 
affect market channel participation. Here, two main variables were analyzed: farm size (V7) and 
the number of varieties of pineapples produced (V8). We found that a positive and significant 
correlation between both these variables and the likelihood of targeting rural markets (Tables 4.6 
and 4.7). This might be due to the high transportation costs of shipping pineapple to urban 
markets or the difficulty of complying with international market quality norms and standards.  
We found that most large scale farmers (>5ha) sold part (or all) of their harvest to rural markets. 
Another reason could be that in some periods of the year – especially in December and during 
Ramadan (the Muslim fasting period of one month) – pineapple prices on rural markets are high 
enough for farmers to make proper margins (and a significant income) without having to bear the 
high transportation costs to more remote markets. 
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The number of varieties produced also affected market channel participation. It significantly and 
negatively affected the choice of urban suppliers (at 1% critical significance) and processing 
factories (at 10%). This result implies that farmers who supplying these two marketing channels 
do not diversify their production systems but are mostly specialize in one pineapple variety, 
usually Sugarloaf (Table 4.3) since Smooth cayenne is mostly targeted for the international market. 
The results show that farmers grow both varieties for rural markets (p<0.01). 
 
The export market is the market channel with the highest quality requirements (V9) (p<0.05) and 
farmers who choose to supply international markets are those who are able to comply with high 
quality norms and standards. Farmers with certification (Fair Trade, Organic Production, 
GlobalGAP) are able to sell their produce at higher prices in EU markets. However, not all of the 
pineapples produced under these standards are sold to international markets, because very small 
and very big fruits do not fit in the available packaging boxes. This could explain the positive 
significant relation between high quality products and the urban market channel (p<0.1), as 
presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. We also found a negative and significant correlation between 
participation in rural markets and higher pineapple quality. Farmers with lower quality 
pineapples,, especially class C, often choose to supply the rural market. As these pineapples are 
the lowest quality, it is not surprising that some farmers experience rejection on this market 
(V10), which is shown to be a significant association. It may be that farmers targeting rural 
markets have already faced rejections in alternative markets.  
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Table 4.7: Multivariate Probit Model with the assumption of correlation between market channel 
choices 
  Market channels 
Factors description 
Urban 
Market 
(V1) 
Rural 
Market  
(V2) 
Export 
Market 
(V3) 
Process 
Market 
 (V4) 
Household characteristics      
Age of HHD (V5)  -0.03(0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Education level HHD 
(V6) -0.08 (0.09) 0.01 (0.10 ) 0.14 (0.11) -0.10 (0.11) 
Production system      
Farm size (V7) -0.01 (0.14) 0.30 (0.16)* -0.22 (0.19) -0.24 (0.21) 
Number of varieties (V8) -0.78(0.19)*** 0.80 (0.22)*** 0.19 (0.27) -0.60 (0.36)* 
Product attributes     
Quality requirement (V9) 0.20 (0.11)* -0.28 (0.12)** 0.30 (0.14)** -0.17 (0.19) 
Rejection (V10) -0.23 (0.24) 0.67 (0.29)** -0.42 (0.36)  -0.54 (0.43) 
Market context     
Distance (V11) -0.61(0.17)*** 0.07 (0.20) 0.41 (0.22)* 1.22 (0.31)*** 
Incentive (V12) -0.12 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12) 0.18 (0.13) 0.49 (0.19)** 
Formality (V13) -0.48(0.16)*** 0.02 (0.16) 0.43 (0.22)** 0.12 (0.19) 
Relation duration (V14) 0.03 (0.12) -0.16 (0.12) 0.17 (0.16)  -0.25 (0.20) 
Bargaining power (V15) -0.14 (0.17) 0.40 (0.20)** 0.14 (0.20)  -0.39 (0.26) 
Written contract (V16) 1.08 (0.31)*** -0.85 (0.32)** -0.31 (0.46)  -0.32 (0.39) 
Constant 3.46 (0.77)*** -3.14 (0.75)*** -4.25 (1.12)*** -2.76 (1.16)** 
ρ21 -0.80 (0.12)*** 
ρ31 -0.55 (0.18)*** 
ρ41 -0.14 (0.15) 
ρ32 0.12 (0.12) 
ρ42 -0.04 (0.13) 
ρ43 -0.08 (0.12) 
Number of observations 285 
Wald Chi2 (degree of freedom) 414.09 (44)*** 
Likelihood ratio test Ho : ρ21 = ρ31 = ρ41 = ρ32 = ρ42 = ρ43 = 0; Chi2 (6) =  141.359*** 
 (..) Robust standard errors in brackets 
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
The farmers explained these quality and rejection issues to be the result of their low awareness of 
the quality required by some markets, which they supply; they use production systems copied 
from the Ivory Coast, and not adjusting them to refelect the agro-pedological conditions 
(Fassinou-Hotegni et al., 2012). To successfully compete in international markets, farmers could 
benefit from exploring MD2 production systems, or –alternatively – or could be supported by 
promoting the Sugarloaf variety (a permanent green skinned traditional cultivar) with a high quality 
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and nutritional value that is still unknown in international markets. Within this process, there is a 
need to improve marketing services and provide up-to-date market information to enhance 
product quality, reduce information asymmetry and increase incomes for growers. 
 
The last factor affecting outlet choice is the market context in which the farmer is embedded. We 
found that the selection of the export and processing markets was positively and significantly 
affected by physical distance (V11), at a level of significance of 5% and 1%, respectively. This 
implies that those supplying the export (including the Nigerian) market and processing factories 
are generally further away from the urban markets. This finding could be explained by the lack of 
availability of logistical facilities to access urban markets. A negative correlation between urban 
market participation and physical distance was also found. This means that participation in urban 
market - point A on Figure 1 – is negatively related to the remoteness of the farm. It can be 
inferred that farmers who sell their products to this market are generally closer to it - all other 
parameters being constant. These are mainly the farmers located in Abomey-Calavi (peri-urban 
Cotonou). Farmers in other locations usually receive the buyers at their farm gate or sell their 
pineapples to alternative markets (rural or processing). 
 
We also investigated the effects of incentives (V12) received by farmers from their buyers in 
terms of gifts, financial support (in-kind or as a loan), or providing market information and 
technical training. These practices are common in pineapple supply chains, notably in outgrowing 
systems (or contract farming), where we assumed that customer loyalty may affect long-term 
relationships. The results show that the presence of incentives positively (p<0.05) affects 
participation in the processing market channel as well as in the export markets, but is not 
significant in the other two markets. The impact of the degree of formality (V13) in the buyer-
seller relationship on the marketing decision was also studied. This showed a positive (p<0.001) 
correlation with participation in the international market, which in other words, is characterized 
by a more hierarchical form of governance structure. In contrast, the urban markets are 
characterized by less formal market relationships. The results also revealed that farmers only have 
a high level of bargaining power (V15) with rural market buyers. Overall farmers’ bargaining 
power can only be improved if they have access to accurate marketing information, such as up-
to-date market prices and quality requirements, as well as access to new varieties that will allow 
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them to adapt their production systems to meet market demand. Reducing information 
asymmetry between buyers and sellers will improve the efficiency and transparency in market 
channel decision making. 
 
Unexpectedly, we noticed that buyers on urban markets are beginning to require formal written 
contracts (V16) similar to those used in outgrowing schemes (Arinloye et al., 2012) for export 
markets. The observed positive relationship (p <0.01) between formality and urban marketing 
may be due to the buyers’ attempts to safeguard their investments (credit and loans provided to 
the farmers) and reduce the uncertainty and possible opportunistic behaviour (cheating or free 
riding) that sometimes occurs among pineapple farmers who deal with several markets 
simultaneously.. Sometimes farmers default on agreements by selling their produce to other 
buyers who offer higher prices, a practice known as ’side-selling’ (Suzuki, Jarvis, & Sexton, 2011). 
This factor is negatively correlated with the decision to choose rural markets. Finally, the models 
did not show that the duration of the buyer-seller relationship (V14) (whether short, medium or 
long term) to have any significant influence on the farmers’ decision-making. 
 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has analyzed the influence of the characteristics of smallholder farmers their 
production systems, product quality and the marketing context on their participation in different 
marketing channels. The results lead us to reject the widespread assumption that smallholder 
famers are excluded from international markets, even though the emerging markets are mostly 
supplied by the medium and large-scale farmers. The results also show that some farmers 
diversify their production systems by growing two varieties simultaneously. This result is line with 
Wilson’s (1986) observation that farmers can use market diversification as a protective measure. 
Though farmers are mostly not price-makers in fresh pineapple markets, farmers do have some 
bargaining power when it comes to negotiating for better prices. The results of the two 
econometric models show that the dependency or independency of household level marketing 
decisions can be empirically tested.  
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The empirical results also shed some light on the contemporary issue of marketing channel 
participation in perishable agrifood chains in West Africa, helping us to disentangle the reasons 
why farmers (sequentially or simultaneously) choose different marking channels. It was found 
that those involved in export marketing channels are less likely to send their pineapples to the 
urban market. Even though we observed negative correlations between some choices of 
marketing channel, these correlations are not (statistically) significant. This result is consistent 
with a market participation study in African countries (Bellemare & Barrett, 2006), which found 
strong evidence to support the hypothesis that sellers make their market participation and selling 
volume decisions sequentially rather than simultaneously. Drawing on the theory of profit 
maximization, this study supports the line of argument that the farmers do not actually decide 
about which market they sell to, but they choose to supply the market channel in which their 
product attributes fit in. 
 
One important result of our analysis is that the produce of pineapple farmers, who participate in 
rural market channels, is mostly characterized by low quality. This is strongly related to their poor 
access to market information (about quality and prices), their low education levels and weak 
capacity to comply with international market requirements. The low level of international market 
participation by Benin’s smallholder famers is also the result of competition – particularly with 
Ghana and the Ivory Coast – where farmers make more use of the newly introduced MD2 
variety, developed by Fresh Del Monte in Costa Rica in 1994, (only grown experimentally in 
Benin). MD2 is sweeter, yellower, more consistent in quality, and smaller than the traditional 
varieties produced in Benin. It has rapidly become popular among western consumers and its 
introduction has reduced demand for the Smooth cayenne variety in EU markets (Suzuki et al., 2011; 
Vagneron, Faure, & Loeillet, 2009).  
 
Farmers’ bargaining power and their physical distance from markets were identified as major 
determinants of marketing channel selection. Improving the present infrastructure may help to 
overcome the later issue. Equally, farmer’s bargaining power could be improved if they had better 
access affordable production and marketing information, concerning techniques for improving 
quality, new varieties and information on market demand and current market prices. Such 
information would reduce information asymmetry between chain actors and enhance efficiency 
Chapter 4 
 
 
98 
and transparency in the markets. The gaps (in time and distance) between harvesting fruit and its 
consumption in the international markets, are significant, especially given the lack (or inadequacy) 
of cold chain facilities prior to sea or air freighting. This means that fruit destined for regional 
and international markets is at greater risk of deterioration, compared to national markets. Policy 
makers and practitioners could play a useful role here by creating conducive institutional 
environments and implementing strategies to increase farmer’s awareness and access to market 
information and infrastructure that could reduce post-harvest losses. 
 
As in most less-developed countries in SSA,, Benin’s smallholder farmers struggle to get good 
prices for their products. One way to do this is through looking for the best and the most 
sustainable outlets for generating a high income. This study contributes to the literature by 
providing empirical evidence on farmers’ market channel selection decisions. We found that 
smallholder farmers select multiple marketing channels as a strategy to safeguard their 
investments and maximize their incomes in the long term. This strategy also helps them to reduce 
the uncertainties associated with rejections from the export markets and guarantees them market 
access. Smallholder farmers’ ability to participate in any market channel shows that they have 
potential, which should be reinforced. This could be achieved through providing technical and 
organizational assistance and support in capacity building, access to inputs, markets, and credit, 
the establishment of export logistics (e.g. cold chain facilities for sea freighting). Such support 
would improve the sustainability of pineapple production among smallholder farmers in Benin 
and improve their market access. Such measures would have a similar effect in other less 
developed pineapple growing countries. 
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REDUCING PRICE AND QUALITY INFORMATION ASYMMETRIC: A 
MOBILE PHONE-BASED CONTINGENT VALUATION APPROACH 
 
Chapter adapted from Arinloyé D.D.A.A., Hagelaar G., Linnemann A. and Coulibaly O., Omta 
S.W.F. Taking profit from the growing use of mobile phone in Benin: An ex ante co-innovative 
approach for pineapple market access, submitted to Information Technology for Development. 
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Chapter 5: Reducing price and quality information 
asymmetric: a mobile phone-based contingent valuation 
approach 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Recent trends towards higher food safety standards and stricter traceability requirements in key 
importing countries of agricultural products increase the information asymmetry between buyers 
and producers, thereby raising the bar for smallholders entering such markets due to high 
compliance costs (Suzuki et al., 2011). Information asymmetry refers to the fact that many 
transactions are characterized by incomplete, imperfect or unbalanced information among the 
transacting parties (Claro, Zylbersztajn, & Omta, 2004; Williamson, 1985). The quality and safety 
attributes of agricultural produce depend on how they were grown in the field, for instance, by 
organic farming or by conventional farming using chemical fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides. 
Such information is obviously known to the farmers (male or female) but not to third parties, 
because the cultivation practices cannot be determined simply by looking at the final product 
(Mikami & Tanaka, 2008). In contrast, buyers in the markets are much better informed about 
market prices and their fluctuations than farmers. 
 
This issue of information asymmetry becomes more important when there are more 
intermediaries (collectors, middlemen, wholesalers, and retailers) along the supply chain. If price 
information is distributed asymmetrically between farmers and buyers, the market for agricultural 
products may fail to achieve an efficient resource allocation because of moral hazard or adverse 
selection (Akerlof, 1970; Holmstrom, 1979; Özer & Wei, 2006; Resende-Filho & Hurley, 2012). 
These informational problems could be avoided if farmers had the possibility to access accurate 
market information, such as the current price (Mikami, 2007). Reducing the information 
asymmetry between farmers and buyers implies a more informed trade outcome, which in turn 
will increase the impact on buyers’ income. When there is high information asymmetry between 
farmers and buyers, this generally results in low profits for the farmers (Mendelson & Tunca, 
2007). 
 
The introduction of mobile phones has brought new possibilities for people to communicate and 
share information, for instance, on markets and services. The impact of this development is 
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helping to break down the urban-rural divide in African countries. For example, in Ghana, 
farmers in Tamale are able to send a text message to learn about maize, pineapple and tomato 
prices in Accra, over 433 kilometres away. In Niger, day labourers are able to call acquaintances 
in Benin to find out about job opportunities without making the US$40 trip (Aker & Mbiti, 
2010). In Kenya, those affected by HIV and AIDS can receive daily text messages, reminding 
them to take their medicines on time (Pop-Eleches et al., 2011). Citizens in countries as diverse as 
Kenya, Nigeria and Mozambique are able to report on violent confrontations via text messages 
to a centralised server that is viewable, in real time, by the entire world (Aker & Mbiti, 2010). 
 
Although the increased flow of information can potentially benefit the marketing of all kinds of 
crops, it has been proved that it has a larger impact on reducing information asymmetry on 
market prices for perishable products, the quality of which is strongly related to the freshness at 
the time of exchange (Kalyebara, Nkub, Byabachwezi, Kikulwe, & Edmeades, 2007; Muto & 
Yamano, 2009). The new flow of information made available by mobile phones in African 
countries can help farmers and traders by providing accurate market information, allowing them 
to transport and trade their perishable products quickly and to avoid spoilage. Access to 
information by mobile phone can also help farmers to decide whether to accept the price offered 
by traders by obtaining price information from other sources. 
 
In most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, the mobile phone service that provides accurate 
and up-to-date market information is financially supported by government, development 
projects, investment programs and international partners for development (Donner, 2009; 
Donner & Escobari, 2010; Kizito, 2011). In Mali, for instance, contracting for the provision of 
market information is at the national level, but with a mix of funding sources from public and 
private sectors (Kizito, 2011). In most cases, these services are not sustained after the 
development and investment programmes finish. 
 
There is a lack of empirical evidence in the literature regarding the following questions: (1) How 
to overcome the market information asymmetry issue in the pineapple supply chain?, and (2) to 
what extent are smallholder farmers able and willing to pay a premium to get these market 
information services (excluding external subsidies). The answers to these questions could inform 
the design and viability of a Short Message Service-based (SMS) framework for efficient market 
information systems (MISs) that are easily accessible for smallholder farmers in less developed 
countries. 
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Much has been written on the role of information and communication technologies in Africa, 
with a special focus on factors that affect the spread of mobile coverage and the impact of the 
mobile phone use on pro-poor labour market access, employment creation and health care 
(Aker, 2008; Bosch, 2009; Brouwer & Brito, 2012; Buys et al., 2009; Lawson-Body et al., 2011; 
Maranto & Phang, 2010; Porter, 2012; Porter et al., 2012). However, most of these studies have 
not investigated the perceptions of subscribers and the premiums they are able and willing to pay 
for a mobile phone service that can supply market information to rural and peri-urban areas. 
 
Donner (2008) and Aker and Mbiti (2010) argue that economic research on smallholders’ 
adoption and use of mobile phones in less developed countries has been limited. The present 
study aims to assess farmers’ willingness to use a mobile phone to supply and receive market and 
quality information on agricultural products, as well as to investigate the premium that they are 
able and willing to pay for these services. 
 
This chapter firstly draws on an exploratory case study undertaken in Ghana – a country with 
many years of experience of mobile phone-based MIS management – to gain insights into 
smallholders’ perceptions on an SMS-based MIS. The lessons learnt from Ghana were used to 
design a survey to investigate the premium that pineapple farmers in Benin would be willing to 
pay for receiving an SMS-based service detailing price (hereafter called price-SMS) and product 
quality information, such as standards, input and disease (hereafter called quality-SMS). The 
outcome of this study is used to formulate policy and development recommendations for 
improving smallholder pineapple farmers’ market access. 
 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First it contrasts radical and incremental 
innovations in the context of mobile phone use. Second it explains the shift from traditional to 
modern communication systems (emphasizing the use of mobile phones as market information 
tools) as the population’s dynamic capability. Third it presents the analytical framework, models 
and hypothesis, and explain the methods used for data collection and analysis. Fourth, it presents 
the major findings and lessons learnt from Ghana and the major findings of the econometric 
analysis of farmers’ willingness to pay for price-SMS and quality-SMS in Benin. Finally the last 
section discusses implementation strategies and the implications for policy and practitioners. 
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5.2 Theoretical framework 
 
5.2.1 Innovation theory: incremental vs. radical innovations 
 
Radical innovations are related to discontinuous events or major changes at the level of applied 
knowledge. Such innovations can turn out to be extremely important in creating new products or 
expansions into new markets. By contrast, incremental innovations are characterized by the 
improvement and continuous adaption of existing knowledge or practices (Bhaskaran, 2006; 
Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Ettlie, Bridges, & O'keefe, 1984; Nord & Tucker, 1987; Stefik & Stefik, 
2004). Although innovations, such as communication technologies sometimes involve a 
discontinuous shift, most of the time such innovations occur incrementally (Tidd, Bessant, & 
Pavitt, 2005). Technological innovations are rarely based on radical discoveries. Many of the 
innovations relevant to African agriculture derive from incremental improvements in processes, 
products, inputs, or equipment that adapt existing technologies to the local environment in ways 
that enhance productivity and lower costs. 
 
The ability to adapt involves technological empowerment and upgrading, which can lead to 
demand-driven knowledge generation amongst actors, as opposed to replicating the successes of 
other regions without taking local conditions into account. Process innovation is mainly about 
optimizing and getting more out of already-existing practices. The literature on innovations 
suggests that cumulative gains in efficiency are often much greater and more sustainable than 
those that come from occasional radical changes (Bunduchi & Berar, 2007; Humphrey, 2003; 
Raymond, Bergeron, & Rivard, 1998; Tidd & Hull, 2006). The aptitude of the agricultural 
innovation system to access, apply and diffuse knowledge about improved agricultural 
technologies is largely reliant on the presence of an enabling framework and institutional 
environment that supports strengthens technological capabilities by linking and promoting new 
income generating practices. 
 
It is obvious that a certain degree of technological effort and investments are needed in order to 
sustain technology. The cost and effort involved may be substantial, and generally requires some 
degree of existing technologies and innovation capabilities on the part of the recipients or 
beneficiaries, including a basic ability to learn and understand the technology. There is also a risk 
involved in adopting a technology that requires an investment before the return on the 
investment is known, and that the user may prove unable to successfully apply the technology 
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(Xia & Xia, 2008). The innovation addressed in the present study, mobile phones, are already 
used by many farmers in rural areas, and this has cost benefits and may increase farmers’ 
willingness to use it as a channel to access market information at a reasonable and affordable 
price. An adaption of mobile phone use could help solving the persistent problem of market 
information asymmetry in rural and peri-urban areas. This could be considered as an incremental 
innovation, with the possibility of increasing the incomes of farmers in SSA through using an 
already widespread communication tool. 
 
 
5.2.2 Dynamic capabilities: from traditional to modern 
communication systems 
 
Dynamic capabilities are defined as the ability to sense and seize new opportunities, to 
reconfigure and protect knowledge assets, competencies and complementary assets and 
technologies to achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997). This ability 
involves continuous adaptation, integrating and reconfiguring internal and external skills, 
resources and functional competencies to match the requirements of a changing environment 
and consumers’ needs (Helfat & Peteraf, 2009; Wang & Ahmed, 2007). 
 
In the area of information and communication technologies, there are observable changes in 
generational behaviour in developing countries, showing a potential for the acceptance and 
adaption of new market information diffusion systems such as price-SMS and quality-SMS. From 
the literature, we can distinguish three generations of communication systems: the traditional, the 
contemporary and the modern. Studies on traditional communication systems in African 
countries mostly characterize them as dominated by illiteracy and a strong reliance on unwritten 
communication (D. Wilson, 1987; Yankah, 1989). Generally the traditional communication 
systems involve news reporters, correspondents, newsagents, messengers (emissaries), 
spokesmen (or women), envoys (ambassadors), contact-men, couriers, postmen, broadcasters, 
heralds, town criers, traditional emissary newsmen and theatre workshops (D. Wilson, 1987). 
These traditional communication systems still today provide many of the information needs of 
rural areas, which represent over 70% of the population. In SSA, traditional communication 
systems remain a trusted source of information, which is being complemented with newly 
introduced information and communication technologies. They remain a continuous source of 
Chapter 5 
 
 
106 
information, entertainment and education, used in societies that have not been seriously 
dislocated by western culture or other external influences, as is the case in many parts of the 
world. 
 
The second generation of communication systems has played a major role in diffusing 
information to rural communities, and has much more potential. This generation includes 
communication media such as television, radio, printed material, video, films, slides, pictures, 
drama, dance, folklore, group discussions, meetings, exhibitions and demonstrations. These 
media have been (and still are) used to speed up the flow of information, not only in African 
countries but over the whole word. This generation of communication media has been used very 
successfully in less developed countries, and rural radio has played a particularly important role in 
delivering agricultural messages, weather and market information (Munyua, 2000a, 2000b). 
 
The latest generation of communication systems includes e-business, the mobile phone and 
computer-based information and communication technologies (ICT) (Anandaraja, Sriram, 
Kathiresan, Sebastian, & Vadivel, 2009; Horikawa, Takeno, & Sugawara, 2008; Krishna Reddy & 
Ankaiah, 2005; Parikh, Patel, & Schwartzman, 2007; Teoh, Low, & Raphael, 2008). Access to, 
and use of, mobile telephony in SSA has increased dramatically over the past decade. From 2000 
to 2010, the proportion of inhabitants having a mobile phone subscription rose from 0.8% to 
79.9% in Benin, and 0.7% to 71.5% in Ghana. Mobile phone subscriptions in SSA increased by 
49% annually between 2002 and 2007, compared with 17% per year in Europe. The population 
covered by a mobile phone network reached almost 77% in Ghana, and 90% in Benin in 2010 
(World Bank, 2010b; World Bank & ITU, 2012). This spread of mobile phones has significantly 
contributed to a reduction in communication costs, allowing individuals and firms to send and 
obtain information on a variety of economic, social and political topics very quickly and cheaply. 
Several studies have shown that the reduction in communication costs associated with mobile 
phones has induced significant economic benefits, by improving agricultural and labour market 
efficiency and producer and consumer welfare in (Aker, 2008; Jensen, 2007; Klonner, Goethe, & 
Nolen, 2008). Mobile phones are evolving from simple first generation communication tools into 
service delivery platforms. This is changing perceptions about the development potential of 
mobile phones: from a technology that simply reduces communication and coordination costs to 
one that can transform lives through innovative applications and services. 
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5.3  Data collection and methods 
 
5.3.1 Analytical framework 
 
Contingent valuation (CV) is a survey method generally used to place monetary values on 
products or services for which market prices do not exist or do not reflect their social value. 
Respondents are presented with a hypothetical but realistic scenario and questions are asked 
about the maximum amount of money they would be willing to pay (WTP) for an amelioration 
of the status quo, or the minimum amount they would be willing to accept to compensate for a 
deterioration of the status quo (Carson et al., 2003; Ouma, Obare, & Staal, 2003). According to 
economic theory, when confronted with a possible choice between two or more bundles of 
goods, agents have preferences for one bundle over another (Carson, Flores, & Mitchell, 1999; 
Mitchell & Carson, 1993). This is because economic agents seek to maximize their overall level 
of satisfaction or utility (Carson et al., 2003; Ouma et al., 2003). These assumptions have 
important implications for the CV approach. From the utility function, the probability that a 
respondent will give a positive answer to a proposed change – i.e. start using his or her mobile 
phone for receiving and sending market information – is based on the probability that their 
utility will be greater than at present. This can be summarized using the following equation: 
 
Piሺ௙௨௟௟௬ ௔௚௥௘௘ሻ ൌ PrሼUഥ୧ଵ ൅ ε୧ଵ ൒  Uഥ୧଴ ൅ ε୧଴ሽ                     (1) 
                           ൌ PrሼUഥ୧ଵ െ Uഥ୧଴ ൒   ε୧଴ െ ε୧ଵሽ 
 
Alternatively, the probability that the respondent will disagree (and prefer the status quo) is 
represented as follows: 
 Piሺ௤௨௢ሻ            ൌ PrሼUഥ୧ଵ ൅ ε୧ଵ ൏  Uഥ୧଴ ൅ ε୧଴ሽ                      (2) 
                           ൌ PrሼUഥ୧ଵ െ Uഥ୧଴ ൏   ε୧଴ െ ε୧ଵሽ ,      
 
where Pi(fully agree) stands for the probability that the respondent i fully agrees to pay for the 
proposed change and Pi(quo) the probability that he will prefer the status quo. Uഥi0, represents the 
respondent’s total utility at the reference level (i.e., status quo where he has not started using the 
offered service). Uഥi1 stands for the ex-ante (foreseen) utility of the respondent if he accepts the 
proposed change. ε୧଴ ε୧ଵ are error terms.  
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The CV method was initially developed in the environmental economics to assess the value of 
intangible items. It has subsequently been used in a variety of situations to provide a guideline 
for setting a price for an intangible good or service (Carson, 2000; Carson et al., 1999; Carson et 
al., 2003). Drawing from the existing literature, CV was found appropriate to addressing the 
multiple level ordered responses of pineapple farmers willing to pay for mobile phone-based 
market information. Such a multiple level CV, using an ordered approach, has been used in 
different fields of research. Very few applications (Caspary & O'Connor, 2003; Oduh, 2012) 
were found in the domain of MIS applied to modern communication technologies – such as by 
mobile phone – in agrifood sectors in less developed countries where there is strong information 
asymmetry. The present research contributes to filling this gap. 
 
 
5.3.2 Research models 
 
The analytical framework used in the present study is built around three complementary methods 
of econometric modelling. We first estimated the determinants of mobile use (using a probit 
model to take selection bias into account). In the second stage the factors relevant to explaining 
farmers’ willingness to pay for MIS were assessed, using an Ordered Probit model. Finally the 
extent to which farmers are ready to pay an affordable price for this service was estimated using 
a Censured Tobit model approach. This section presents a detailed explanation of each of these 
analytical approaches. 
 
In general, the endogeneity issue related to the difficulty of disentangling the effect of using a 
mobile phone (or not) on the willingness to pay for a MIS is a key determinant in the analytical 
framework. Hence, rejecting the null hypothesis by observing the significance of the explanatory 
variables in the model may not imply any causality in terms of farmers’ effective WTP. A third 
driver – the use of a mobile phone – may also affect the dependent variables, inducing a spurious 
correlation and a selection bias that may lead to erroneous conclusions. The presence of this bias 
can be tested for by including a sample selection term in the regression. To take account of a 
possible sample bias that may be related to the inclusion or not of mobile phone users in the 
model, we first ran a Probit model to generate the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) (Greene, 2008; 
Verbeek, 2008), which was later on included in the Ordered Probit and Tobit models. 
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For the Probit model, we define the dependent variable as a dummy with a value of 1 if the 
farmer has an operating mobile phone and 0 if not. Following White (2004) this leads to a 
‘selection equation’ presented as follows: 
 
ܼ௜௝∗ ൌ ߛ଴௜ ൅ ߛ௜௝෍ ௜ܹ௝  ൅  ߤ௝ ,                    ሺ3ሻ 
 
where ܼ௜௝∗  is a variable defining whether the farmer has already access to (and uses) a mobile 
phone or not, and ௜ܹ௝ presents a set of explanatory variables. The Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) is 
then generated from the parameter estimates of the probit regression of equation (3).  
 
In the second step, using only the observations of farmers who have and use this technology, 
and including the IMR as a dependent variable, we estimated the WTP Ordered Probit (equation 
6) and the Tobit (equation 7) models. 
 
For the WTP Ordered Probit, the general analytical framework consists of the following 
equation: 
 
Y୧୨ ൌ α଴୧ ൅෍ α୧୨ X୧୨  ൅  ε୨ ,                      ሺ4ሻ 
 
where Yij is the target dependent variable (with 5 level Likert scale responses), Xij is a set of 
control and dependent variables and ε୨ is a vector of error terms. More specifically, the null 
hypothesis is that all the slope coefficients of the explanatory factors (Xij) are equal to zero (H0: 
α୧୨= 0). The basic assumption is that a farmer will only express a WTP if he has an operational 
mobile phone. 
 
While Yij = s (with s = 1-5) implies that the equation has been precisely measured, there exists an 
unobservable (latent) variable Y୧୨∗ , such that ηୱିଵ ൑ Y୧୨ ൏  ηୱ with s = 1-5. Following Verbeke 
and Ward (2006), farmers’ WTP for the mobile phone-based MIS is expressed as follows: 
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௜ܻ௝ ൌ
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ 1 ⇒ strongly disagree    ⇒ if η଴ ൌ െ∞  ൑   Y୧୨
∗ ൏  ηଵ       
 2 ⇒ disagree                     ⇒ if ηଵ ൑  Y୧୨∗ ൏  ηଶ                      
3 ⇒ indifferent                 ⇒ if ηଶ ൑  Y୧୨∗ ൏  ηଷ                             
4 ⇒ agree                          ⇒ if ηଷ ൑  Y୧୨∗ ൏  ηସ                      
5 ⇒ strongly agree         ⇒ if ηସ ൑  Y୧୨∗ ൏  ηହ                     
   (5) 
 
The variable ௜ܻ௝ is observed only when ܼ௜௝∗  is larger than zero (equation 3). Hence, the expected 
farmers’ WTP, premised upon the possession of a working mobile phone in the Ordered Probit 
model is expressed as: 
 
EሺY୧୨หZ୧୨∗ ൐ 0൯ ൌ α଴୧ ൅ α୧୨ ∑ X୧୨ ൅ ߪ௜௝ ∅ሺ ௑೔
ುఈ೔ሻ
Фሺ ௑೔ುఈ೔ሻ
 ൅   ε୨ ,                            ሺ6ሻ 
 
Where ∅ is the probability density function of a univariate normal distribution and Ф is the 
cumulative distribution function. The term ∅ሺ  ௜ܺ௉ߙ௜ሻ/Фሺ  ௜ܺ௉ߙ௜ሻ is the IMR. 
 
To assess if the WTP for mobile-based MIS was sufficiently, high farmers were asked the 
amount of money they would  be willing to spend to get that service. If they did not express a 
WTP of any premium, the measure of desire is zero (Paolisso, Hallman, Haddad, & Regmi, 
2001). Following Maddala and Lahiri (2006), the estimated Tobit model is expressed as follows: 
 
Eሺ π୧୨ห Z୧୨∗ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ β୧୨ ∑ X୧୨ + ߪ௜௝ ∅ሺ ௑೔
ುఈ೔ሻ
Фሺ ௑೔ುఈ೔ሻ
  ൅ ε୨ ,                                      ሺ7ሻ 
 
 
where π୧୨ is the amount of money i that farmer j is ready to pay to get or supply market 
information using a mobile phone (assuming current possession of an operational mobile phone) 
(Z୧୨∗ ൐ 0), Xij is the set of explanatory variables that are hypothesized to affect the amount that 
farmer j is willing to pay, β୧୨ is the parameter to be estimated and ε୨ the error terms’ vector. 
 
If the IMR has a significant coefficient in both equations 6 and 7, this means that running the 
regression models without differentiating between farmers who are using a mobile phone from 
those who are not – as a basic condition – would have led to selection bias. Before running the 
econometric models, each variable was checked for normality using Skewness and Kurtosis tests 
D'agostino et al., 1990). 
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From the literature, several factors (Xij) are hypothesized as affecting farmers’ willingness to 
adopt innovations (Adegbola & Gardebroek, 2007; Adesina, Mbila, Nkamleu, & Endamana, 
2000; Adesina & Zinnah, 1993; Binam, Tonyè, Nyambi, & Akoa, 2004; Feder, Just, & Zilberman, 
1985; Herath & Takeya, 2003; Sall et al., 2000). These factors include socio-economic 
characteristics, such as age, farming experience and income or profit (Adegbola & Gardebroek, 
2007; Adesina & Zinnah, 1993; Arinloye, Adegbola, Biaou, & Coulibaly, 2010). The farmers’ 
dynamic capability, i.e. their aptitude to be flexible in response to the market and environment 
changes, is also a determinant (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Wang & Ahmed, 2007; Woiceshyn & 
Daellenbach, 2005). The awareness level, which is determined by contact frequency with 
extension agents and support received or membership of an association, has also been found to 
significantly affect farmers’ willingness to change (Adegbola & Gardebroek, 2007). The 
institutional environment and market context in which farmers are embedded, also determine 
their decisions about whether or not to adopt a new technology (Adegbola & Gardebroek, 2007; 
Thangata & Alavalapati, 2003). Detailed descriptions of these variables as included in the models 
and the hypothesized coefficient signs are presented in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Description of variables and hypothesized signs 
a Expected correlation with dependent variables. 
b Price in FCFA/month is generated by asking farmers the amount they are willing to pay per SMS times the frequency 
of sending/receiving SMS in a month. The threshold of total amount per month is fixed during the survey at a 
maximum of 4000 FCFA ($US 7.96) following World Bank (2010). 
c $US1= 502 FCFA during data collection in 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Description  Value Hypothesis a
Dependent variables   
Use mobile phone Do you have/use a mobile phone? 1 = yes; 0 =no  
WTP price info 
SMS 
Are you willing to pay for sending/receiving marketing 
information (price, offers) via SMS? 
1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 
3=indifferent; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree
 
WTP quality info 
SMS 
Are you willing to pay for sending/receiving quality 
information (standards, input and disease) via SMS?  
1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 
3=indifferent; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree 
 
Premium for 
quality info 
How much are you willing to pay for quality 
information (standards, input and disease) via SMS?
Continue (FCFA/month )b  
Premium for price 
info 
How much are willing to pay to send/receive 
pineapple information (price, offers) via SMS? 
 
Continue (FCFA/month) b  
Independent variables 
Socio-economic and farm characteristics 
Age Farmer’s age Continuous +
/
-
Education Education level of farmer 0= no (in)formal education; 1=primary 
school/informal literacy; 2=middle 
school, 3=high school, 4=university level
+
Experience Years in pineapple farming Continue +
Dynamic 
capability  
Have you ever changed your farming practices in 
response to market or environment changes to satisfy 
your buyers? 
1 = yes; 0 =no +
Profit margin What was your pineapple production profit margin for 
the last cropping campaign (000 FCFA)c ? 
0= < 0 FCFA; 1=]0-100[; 2=[100-500[; 
3=[500-1000[; 4=[1000-5000[;5= > 5000 
+
Farm size Pineapple farm size in hectare 1= large scale (>5ha); 2=medium scale 
(1-5)ha; 3=small scale (<1ha) 
+
Pineapple ratio Proportion of pineapple land over the total covered 
land size – farm specialization 
Continue [0-1] +
/
-
Market Attributes  +
Info-time Time spent to get reliable market information Number of days +
Distance Distance from farm to the central urban market 1 = <30 km; 2= [30 - 60 km]; 3= >60 
Km 
-
Bargaining 
power 
Bargaining power of the farmer with buyers 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High -
Market channel  
Local market  Selling pineapple to local markets 1 = Local market; 0 = Otherwise -
Export market  Selling pineapple to export markets 1 = Export market; 0 = Otherwise +
Institutional support  
Public support Contact with public extension agents 1 = Yes; 0 =No +
Market support Receiving support to access market (selling) 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 
3=indifferent; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree 
+
Quality support Receiving support for pineapple quality improvement 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 
3=indifferent; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree 
+
Farming 
support  
Receiving support for farming systems improvement 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 
3=indifferent; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree 
+
Input support  Receiving support to access inputs 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 
3=indifferent; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree 
+
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5.3.3 Data collection 
 
Data used in this study were collected in two phases. First, an exploratory case study (Yin, 1994) 
was undertaken in Ghana, predominantly to understand Ghanaian experiences in managing 
market information with smallholder farmers using mobile phone SMS, and to learn how 
subscribers perceive and appreciate this innovation in the agrifood sector. During this case study, 
45 key informants were interviewed using a non-structured protocol. Those key informants 
included farmers and farmers’ organization leaders (25), as well as 20 market support and quality 
control services agents. Lessons leant from Ghana were used to design a survey in Benin on 
price-SMS and quality-SMS willingness to pay. 
 
In Benin, data were collected with a pre-tested, semi-structured survey questionnaire, which 
consisted of a combination of closed questions, Likert scales with a 5 point format (Allen & 
Seaman, 2007; Jamieson, 2004) and open questions. Figure 5.1 shows the mobile phone network 
of one mobile phone operator (MTN©) in Benin in 2012. It shows that most of the subscribers 
are located in southern Benin where our study was undertaken. From the literature (Arinloye, 
Hagelaar et al., 2010; Arinloye et al., 2012) we know that more than 95% of pineapples produced 
in Benin are from southern Benin, in particular the Atlantique Department. Respondents were 
selected from this area, using a randomly stratified sampling scheme (StatPac, 2010). The criteria 
used were the acreage under pineapple cultivation in 2009, (differentiated into small scale (<1 
ha), medium scale (between 1 ha-5 ha) and large scale (>5 ha)), the supplied market channels 
(local or export markets), the location of the pineapple farm (i.e. distance to the main market 
centre in Cotonou, see Figure 5.1) and the support of extension agents. Farmers were contacted 
with the assistance of the agricultural extension services agents, who provided the names and 
addresses of lead farmers in the villages where they intervene. The second source of information 
on pineapple farmers was the pineapple producers’ association and councils. 
 
After data collection, incomplete questionnaires and non-qualifying respondents (i.e. farmers 
who did not provide accurate information) were eliminated, resulting in a final list of 285 
observations. For data analysis we combined both descriptive and econometric approaches. 
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Figure 5.1: Mobile phone network in Benin with study areas, and distance to the main urban market in 
the south of the country (Adapted from (MTN-Benin, 2012). 
 
To design the WTP questions and assess the premium that farmers are willing to pay, we set a 
maximum affordable amount in order to avoid exaggerated and uncontrolled answers from 
respondents. The amount that was fixed, was based on a World Bank survey (World Bank, 
2010b), that estimated the affordable tariff for a prepaid mobile phone to be $US 8 per month in 
the sub-region. This served as a reference to fix the maximum premium threshold at 4000 FCFA 
($US 7.96) per month. 
 
A correlation matrix and the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the models are 
presented in Table 5.2. The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients, which measure the 
strengths of the linear association between variables. According to the results, the correlation 
coefficients are less than 0.4, generally indicating weak relations (Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 
1997). This clearly shows that the variables are sufficiently independent to be modelled without 
multicollinearity problems (Verbeek, 2008). We used STATA SE software, which also controlled 
for the models’ robustness – using the robust option. The Robust standard errors are reported in 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4. 
Reducing price and quality information asymmetric 
 
 
 
115 
Table 5.2: Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Unit Min Max Mean
Std. 
Dev. V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16
Dependent variables                  
Use mobile phone  (0-1)a 0 1 0.87 0.34                 
WTP price info SMS  (1-5)b 1 5 4.4 1.22                 
WTP quality info SMS  (1-5)b 1 5 4.27 1.28                 
Premium for quality info Number 0 4000 1268 1137                 
Premium for price info Number 0 4000 1200 1109                 
Independent variables                  
Age (V1) Number 2.83 4.29 3.6 0.28 1                
Education (V2) (0-4)b 0 4 1.05 1.04 0.21 1               
Experience (V3) Year 2 40 9.99 5.08 0.46 0.03 1              
Dynamic capability (V4) (0-1) 0 1 0.72 0.45 0.33 0.23 0.3 1             
Profit margin (V5) FCFAc 0 5 2.29 1.07 0.33 0.28 0.37 0.31 1            
Farm size (V6) Ha 1 3 2.33 0.7 -0.4 -0.11 -0.26 -0.16 -0.4 1           
Pineapple farm ratio (V7) Number 0.02 1 0.46 0.27 -0.04 -0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.24 -0.4 1          
Info-time (V8) Number 1 30 1.66 2.39 0.03 -0.07 0.08 0.12 0 -0.07 -0.07 1         
Distance (V9) Number 17.9 81.4 49.98 21.1 0.07 0.22 0.05 0.27 0.26 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 1        
Bargaining power (V10) (0-1)a 0 1 0.13 0.33 -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.13 -0.01 0.09 0.01 0.18 1       
Local market (V11) (0-1)a 0 1 0.27 0.45 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.12 -0.02 0.08 -0.15 -0.04 0.09 0.26 1      
Public support (V12) (0-1)a 0 1 0.3 0.46 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.23 -0.17 0.02 -0.02 0.32 0.16 0.25 1     
Market support (V13) (1-5)b 1 5 2.37 1.31 -0.25 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.13 0.2 -0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.08 -0.46 1    
Quality support (V14) (1-5)b 1 5 3.6 1.26 0.17 0.08 0.2 0.13 0.34 -0.19 0.07 -0.1 0.16 -0.03 -0.08 0 0.06 1   
Farming support (V15) (1-5)b 1 5 3.96 1.11 0.32 0.16 0.29 0.22 0.38 -0.34 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.12 0.01 0.38 -0.35 0.43 1  
Input support (V16) (1-5)b 1 5 2.4 1.25 -0.22 -0.08 -0.11 -0.19 -0.18 0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.14 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.34 -0.26 -0.24 1 
a Dummy variables. 
b Categorial variable. 
c $US1= 502 FCFA during data collection period. 
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5.4  Results and discussion 
 
5.4.1 Mobile phone-based MIS experiences in Ghana: Esoko case 
study 
 
The exploratory case study in Ghana was aimed at gaining insights into smallholders’ perceptions 
about an existing SMS-based market information system. Esoko – formerly known as TradeNet 
– is an agricultural market information platform created in 2006 with the objective to disseminate 
useful market information to smallholder farmers in less developed countries. The organization is 
active in 16 East and West African countries including Ghana (Esoko, 2012). It is a response to 
the explosive growth of mobile services in Africa. Esoko is a private initiative based in Accra, 
Ghana, supported by a team of over 60 local developers and support staff. Although the 
knowledge that farmers have is often underestimated, there exists an asymmetry of information 
throughout agriculture, which unfairly rewards some and excludes others. To overcome this 
situation, Esoko assists smallholder farmers by providing them with a package of weekly advisory 
services including current market prices, matching bids and offers, weather forecasts, and news 
and tips (Figure 5.2). 
 
How does the Esoko platform help Ghanaian farmers? When questioned, farmers answered that 
the SMS services help them to improve their price negotiation capacities, find alternative markets, 
and enable them to sell timely at better prices. The platform provides automatic and personalized 
price alerts, buy and sell offers, bulk SMS messaging and stock counts. Transaction costs for 
farmers and traders have decreased by $ 2 – $ 150 per transaction by significantly reducing the 
role of middlemen to the most necessary ones or cutting them out of the transactions. This 
service has transformed mobile phones into a market bulletins and increased their utilities beyond 
voice and text. It has succeeded mainly because it allows text messages to be sent and received in 
several languages, including local languages, and provides real-time commodity prices. Mobile 
phone applications include the provision of market information and electronic trading platforms, 
where farmers and traders can access information on commodities being (or to be) sold, their 
prices, the identity of their buyers and extension service messages. 
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Like all businesses, farming is based on having the right information at the right time. Farmers 
need to know what crops to plant to obtain the best return on their investment of time and 
money. Ghanaian farmers have shown interest in using their mobile phones to get a good yield, 
and in accessing the appropriate fertilizers and pesticides to apply to their crops. SMS-based 
market information is also helpful for buyers who sometimes have no information about what is 
growing where and in what quantity. Esoko has been able to respond to this demand by 
providing accurate and updated prices, offers and profiles. This data can be accessed by any 
mobile phone user anywhere in the country covered by the mobile phone network. SMS alerts 
are sent out either as-they-happen (offers to buy and sell) or on specific days of the week (prices), 
depending on the subscriber’s preference. For farmers, text messages by phone were helpful in 
reducing costs for searching for information and significantly reduced information asymmetry 
and misunderstandings with their buyers. 
 
However, the major challenge expressed by illiterate farmers was that they always have to ask the 
assistance of their children or neighbours to help them to read or send messages. In rural areas 
this is sometimes coupled with a lack of infrastructure, such as electricity to charge phones.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Market price reception and offer in Ghana (Adapted from Esoko, 2012). 
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5.4.2 Information asymmetry and importance of mobile phone use 
by smallholder pineapple farmers in Benin 
 
As stated in the introduction, market information asymmetry is a major factor affecting farmers’ 
income in agri-food chains. Information asymmetry refers to transactions that are characterized 
by incomplete, imperfect or unbalanced information among the transacting parties (Claro et al., 
2004; Williamson, 1985). As evidence, the price of pineapple at the farm gate is generally very low 
compared to the price at which it is sold to consumers, even in the same area. For example, our 
investigation shows that the price of forty medium-sized pineapples of the Smooth cayenne variety 
(i.e., about 50 kg) varies between 2500 FCFA ($US 5) and 9000 FCFA ($US 18) at different 
periods on the local market, and can even reach 10,000 FCFA ($US 20) during the Ramadan, the 
fasting period of Muslims, when demand is high. Farmers on average only receive 3500 FCFA 
($US 7) of this. Medium and large-sized pineapples of the second variety, Sugarloaf, were sold to 
consumers on local markets for prices between 1500 FCFA ($US 3) and 4500 FCFA ($US 9) and 
this can reach 8000 FCFA ($US 16) during Ramadan, while the average farm-gate price is 2200 
FCFA ($US 4.3) for about 40 kg. This shows how variable and unstable the market price can be 
in the same location. Farmers confessed not to being aware of the prices at which traders resell 
their products. For instance, in the survey area, more than 86% of farmers have no knowledge of 
the third buyer’s price of their products. According to them, the market prices remain an 
unrevealed confidential secret of the traders. The other 14% of famers who are (indirectly) 
informed about traders’ market prices, either get the information by travelling to these markets to 
sell other agricultural products, such as maize, cowpea, cassava, etc., or by calling their relatives 
on these markets. This information asymmetry issue is reinforced by their low bargaining power 
in pineapple transactions (Arinloye et al., 2012). The consequence is that farmers do not know 
what pineapple farmers in other villages were paid.  
 
As witnessed in Ghana, an SMS-based platform that provides farmers with up-to-date market 
prices and also asks questions and receives answers from a remote computer-based platform 
could be a solution to these problems. This will allow farmers to have more information and 
therefore more bargaining power in their transactions with traders. This platform can match 
farmers' queries with a database of information about prices in local, urban and regional markets 
and send answers back to the farmers. Critical market information, such as price, offers, 
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inventories, questions and answers about diseases, can be uploaded and shared through SMS by 
anyone with a mobile phone. The present study in Benin has shed light on farmers’ 
responsiveness to a mobile phone based MIS. 
 
First of all, it is important to know the proportion of smallholder farmers who have and are 
currently using a mobile phone as a communication tool in the study area. Our result shows that 
the use of mobile phone is widespread in the rural areas in Benin as reflected by the sample of 
pineapple farmers. On average, 87% of the sample use a mobile phone (Table 2), a value which 
does not differ much from the subscription proportion (80%) in SSA (World Bank & ITU, 
2012). This can be explained by the increasing network coverage in rural areas. As shown in 
Figure 5.1, the population covered by Benin’s five service providers (MTN©, Moov©, BBCom©, 
Libercom©, and Glo©), in 2010 was estimated to be 90%, much higher than in SSA in 2009 when 
it was estimated at 53% (World Bank, 2011; World Bank & ITU, 2012). Several factors can 
explain this high mobile phone adoption rate: falling communication costs (Sey, 2010), 
population density, increasing per capita income, and, especially, competition among mobile 
phone operators (as demonstrated by several authors (Aker, 2008; Aker & Mbiti, 2010; 
Demirhan, Jacob, & Raghunathan, 2006; Lin, Li, & Whinston, 2011). 
 
In general, most pineapple farmers were positive about using their mobile phone to access and 
supply market information (4.4 on a 5 point scale). In other words, farmers (strongly) agreed 
about using their mobile for receiving and supplying market prices, and offering their products to 
potential buyers all over SSA (at least in the countries covered by Esoko). Farmers also expressed 
a high level of interest (4.3 on a 5 point scale) in using this tool to get information that could help 
them improving their product quality and meeting market standards, such as information on 
agricultural practices, input supply, quality control and questions/answers on disease control. 
 
The descriptive statistics (Table 5.2) show that farmers are generally willing to pay an average 
premium of 1268 FCFA ($US 2.5) per month to get price-SMS and almost the same average 
price (1200 FCFA ~ $US 2.4) to receive quality-SMS. This shows that farmers are equally 
interested in both product price and product quality information. 
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5.4.3 Farmers’ willingness to pay for a mobile-based MIS in Benin 
 
As presented in Table 5.3, the inverse Mills’ ratio was not significant for the WTP for either the 
price-SMS, or quality-SMS. This implies that there was no need to consider selection bias issues 
by including users and non-users of mobile phone in the models. In other words, both current 
and potential mobile phone users were highly interested in paying to get and supply information 
via SMS. The Wald test examines whether any of the parameters of the model that currently have 
non-zero values could be set to zero without any statistically significant loss in the model's overall 
goodness of fit (αଵ୨ ൌ αଶ୨ ൌ αଷ୨ ൌ ⋯ ൌ α୧୨ ൌ 0). It tests the overall significance of the variables 
included in the econometric models (McGeorge, Crawford, & Kelly, 1997; Ryan & Watson, 
2009). Results show that the Wald Chi2 is statistically significant at the 1% level, which indicates 
that the set of coefficients of the model are jointly significant and that the explanatory power of 
the factors included in the model is satisfactory. 
 
 
Determinants of mobile phone use 
 
The Probit model of the determinants of mobile use shows that farmers’ age, education level, 
profit margin, farm size, distance to the urban centre and contact frequency with public extension 
service agents, are significantly correlated with the mobile phone usage in Benin. Among these 
factors, education level, profit, and contact frequency with extension service agents showed a 
positive correlation with the adoption at a 1% significance level. In other words, farmers who use 
a mobile phone are mostly have a higher education level, higher farming profit margins and more 
frequent contact with the extension service. 
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Table 5.3:  Probit and Ordered Probit models output. 
Variables Use of Phone 
(PROBIT) 
WTP quality-SMS 
(OPRIBIT) 
WTP price-SMS 
(OPRIBIT) 
Socio-economic and 
farm characteristics 
Age -0.03 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)* 
Education level  0.78 (0.19)*** 0.05 (0.08) 0.08 (0.09) 
Farming 
experience 
0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 
Dynamic 
capability  
0.32 (0.28) 0.27 (0.29) 0.01 (0.30) 
Profit margin 0.46 (0.18)*** -0.20 (0.13) -0.28 (0.15)** 
Farm size -0.99 (0.34) *** -0.31 (0.18)* -0.40 (0.20** 
Ratio pineapple 
farm 
-1.12 (0.55) -0.25 (0.42) -0.43 (0.46) 
Market attributes Information 
Time 
0.01 (0.05) 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
Distance -0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.01) 
Market channels Export market  0.25 (0.54) 0.15 (0.31) 0.23 (0.35) 
Local market  -0.06 (0.30) -0.60 (0.18)*** -0.48 (0.19)** 
Institutional support Public support 1.63 (0.55)*** -0.57 (0.21)*** -0.55 (0.22)** 
Market support 0.16 (0.14) -0.06 (0.07) -0.04 (0.08) 
Quality support 0.35 (0.16) 0.24 (0.06)*** 0.23 (0.08)*** 
Farming support -0.29 (0.19) 0.02 (0.08) 0.06 (0.09) 
Input support  -0.28 (0.14) 0.08 (0.07) -0.04 (0.08) 
 Constant 4.10 (1.59) - - 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) - -0.85 (1.81) -1.59 (1.98) 
Observations 285 247 247  
Wald chi2(df) 53.4(16)*** 90.51 (17)*** 53.46 (17)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.38 0.14 0.12 
Log pseudolikelihood -69.14 -212.93 -181.32 
(..) Robust standard errors are in bracket. 
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
The results also show that mobile phone users are mostly younger, located close to the main 
roads and urban centres and produce on small-sized farms. These findings are in line with our 
hypothesis and add to the existing literature, especially the publications of Buys et al. (2009) and 
Aker and Mbiti (2010), who have found that the mobile network coverage probability is 
positively related to income per capita, closeness to the main urban centres and to the main road. 
Most of the mobile phone users are smallholder farmers, which does not come as a surprise since 
88% of the farmers produce pineapple on less than 5 hectares (Arinloye et al., 2012). 
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Determinants of farmers’ WTP for quality-SMS and price-SMS 
 
The results of the econometric model of the factors that affect farmers’ WTP for SMS based-
quality showed that farmers who are most likely to pay for these services are smallholder famers, 
located far from the urban centre (Cotonou), mostly trading with buyers coming from urban 
markets, and having little contact with the agricultural extension service (Table 5.3). In most of 
the cases these farmers have either received technical support for on-farm quality improvement 
from their buyers or from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). In fact, most farmers 
selling to exporters and some urban wholesalers have specific contracting farming arrangements 
with their buyers (the outgrowing scheme, Arinloye et al., 2012), who provide technical or 
financial assistance in terms of training, input supply and loans  to support the outgrowers and 
help them to meet their specific quality requirements. We can therefore conclude that those who 
are highly interested in quality-SMS, are farmers with past experiences of having received capacity 
building or training on product quality improvement and who are aware of the importance of 
product quality in the supply chain. 
 
Apart from the distance to the urban centre, all the factors that affect farmers’ WTP for quality-
SMS also significantly affect the WTP to pay for price-SMS, with the same coefficient signs. This 
implies that farmers who are willing to pay for these services are also smallholder famers, located 
far from the urban centre, not trading with local market traders but with those coming from 
urban or regional areas, having little contact with agricultural extension services and receiving 
technical support for on-farm quality improvement from their buyers. Additionally, they are 
mostly smallholder farmers with lower farming profit margins (p <.05) than the average 
pineapple profit in the study area, which is estimated at 400,000 FCFA ($US 795) per cropping 
campaign. 
 
 
Premium to be paid for quality-SMS and price-SMS 
 
Since the results from the Probit and Ordered Probit models presented so far do not allow 
isolating the marginal effects of each explanatory variable associated with the expected premium 
(amount) to be paid for both services, we ran a Censored Tobit regression. The goal was to 
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determine how much each set of regressors, such as socio-economic characteristics, market 
attributes, marketing channels and intuitional support received, accounts for farmers’ WTP 
(Table 4). 
 
Here also, the IMR are not significant, implying that there was no need to consider selection bias 
issues in the Tobit models. Results show that the F statistics are statically significant at the 1% 
level indicating that the subsets of coefficients of the model are jointly significant and the 
explanatory power of the factors included in the model is satisfactory. 
 
The marginal effect of the factors included in both Tobit models and their significance level are 
presented in Table 5.4. In terms of socio-economic characteristics, an increase in farmers’ age by 
one year would decrease the premium they are ready to pay by 28 FCFA ($US 0.05) per month 
for quality-SMS and by 36 FCFA ($US 0.07) per month for price-SMS. This confirms the result 
of the ordered probit model of WTP, which indicated that younger farmers are more willing to 
pay a higher price than older and experienced farmers. Apparently they are also inclined to pay a 
higher price for price-SMS than for quality-SMS. This can be explained by young farmers having 
a longer planning horizon and being more willing to take risks (Zegeye et al., 2001). Moreover, 
farmers who showed a dynamic capability (e.g. having changed their farming practices in response 
to market and environmental changes to meet their buyers’ requirements in the last five years) are 
willing to pay an additional premium of 371 FCFA ($US 0.74) per month for quality-SMS and 
even more (394 FCFA ~ $US 0.78 per month) for price-SMS than farmers who showed less 
dynamic capability. As for the farm size, we found that a reduction of the covered land by one 
hectare led to an increase of the accepted premium of 183 FCFA ($US 0.36) per month for 
quality-SMS. The pineapple farm ratio indicates farmers’ cropping diversification (or 
specialization). The results showed that an increase of diversity by 1% leads to an increase of the 
acceptable premium of 867 FCFA ($US 1.73) per month for quality-SMS.  
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Table 5.4: Marginal effects after Tobit models for expected premium to be paid (in FCFA) for 
quality and price SMS. 
Variables Premium for quality-SMS Premium for price-SMS 
Socio-economic and firm 
characteristics 
Age -28.0 (8.5)*** -35.8 (8.9)*** 
Education level  -6.7 (65.8) -44.8 (63.9) 
Farming experience 1.2 (15.6) 18.1 (17.1) 
Dynamic capability  370.9 (166.7)** 394.2 (166.4)** 
Profit margin -183.3 (90.5)** -80.5 (83.4) 
Farm size -183.3 (155.9)*** -181.8 (150.1) 
Pineapple farm ratio -867.1 (282.7)*** -187.2 (332.1) 
Market attributes Information Time 22.4 (26.2) 25.5(19.4) 
Distance -5.1 (3.7) -14.8 (3.2)*** 
Market channels Export market  43.9 (232.7) 403.9 (213.4) 
Local market  12.5 (157.2) 44.1 (167.9) 
Institutional support Public support 536.1 (179.6)*** 256.9 (153.4)* 
Market support 58.2 (49.8) 73.6 (48.5) 
Quality support 330.1 (68.2)*** 131.7 (65.4)** 
Farming support  -23.7 (90.9) 75.2 (66.7) 
Input support  -3.1 (57.8) 25.5(55.1) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) 1523.1 (1297.6) 2747.1 (1750.9) 
Observations 247 234 
F statistic (df1; df2) 4.9 (17; 230)*** 4.13 (17;217)*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -1849.1 -1730.6 
(..) Robust standard errors are in bracket. 
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
When looking at the market attribute factors, an increase of the distance between farm and main 
market centre by 1 km, decreases the premium that farmers would be willing to pay for price-
SMS by 15 FCFA ($US 0.03) per month. As far as the institutional support factors are concerned, 
farmers having regular contact with extension agents showed an interest in paying a higher 
premium of 536 FCFA ($US 1.06) per month for quality-SMS and 257 FCFA ($US 0.51) per 
month for price-SMS compared to those who do not have this contact. Moreover, farmers who 
have received support for quality improvement of their products would pay an additional 
premium of 330 FCFA ($US 0.65) per month for quality-SMS and 132 FCFA ($US 0.26) per 
month for price and offer SMS compared to those without any quality support experience. 
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5.4.4 Towards a successful and sustainable mobile-based MIS in 
Benin 
 
Even when mobile phones can enhance access to resources and information, they cannot replace 
investments in public goods such as roads, power and water. In the absence of a proper 
infrastructure, smallholder farmers will face problems with efficiency and competitiveness 
(Roberts & Grover, 2012). As such, it is unrealistic to rely on improved access to market 
information access as the only strategy for improving chain performance by smallholder farmers. 
Such an approach needs to be embedded in an enabling political and institutional environment. 
Poor infrastructure remains an obstacle to the development of many, communities. Markets with 
a surplus are often unaware of where there is a deficit (and vice versa). Over the last twenty years 
the Beninese government -through ONASA (Office National d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire) 
and INSAE (Institut National de Statisque et de l'Analyse Economique du Bénin) - has been 
collecting information from markets, but has not created the channels to deliver this information 
to the public in general and farmers, particularly not at a speed to make it commercially valuable. 
Implementing this mobile-based MIS, while simultaneously improving related infrastructures, 
may significantly contribute to helping rural communities to improve their livelihoods by 
achieving a better product quality and facilitating market access at national and continental levels. 
 
Such recommendations have been made by several authors (Cavatassi et al., 2011; Mwesige, 2010; 
Thiele et al., 2011; Thiele et al., 2009), who call for a multi-stakeholder platform (Figure 5.3) that 
will strengthen public and private actors’ partnerships and enable smallholders to gain sustainable 
access to high income markets. The private sector should provide platform coordination and 
management staff (like Esoko), important value chain actors (such as representatives of farmers’ 
organizations) and a mobile phone operator to serve as the intermediary between subscribers and 
the computer-based platform. The public sector could provide support through existing national 
statistical and market information management institutes (for monitoring the collection of and 
profiling market information) and research institutes and quality control services (to provide 
reliable answers to chain actors’ requests on quality, inputs, and diseases). It should also provide 
support services that monitor and build the capacity of smallholders and the infrastructure 
facilities that they need – such as rural roads, packaging and cooling facilities, finance, etc. As 
suggested by White (2004), this would create an enabling environment for innovation and help 
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deliver the resources required to build a complex multidimensional and dynamic range of 
knowledge, skills, actors, institutions and policy within specific political-policy structures capable 
of transforming knowledge into useful processes, products and services for agriculture. These 
recommendations should serve as a guideline for policy-makers and practitioners. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Multi-stakeholder platform for ICT-based co-innovation and market access (Adapted from 
(CORAF/WECARD, 2011). 
 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
 
The present study assesses the determinants of farmers’ willingness to use a mobile phone to 
supply and receive market and quality information on agricultural products, and the premium 
they are able and willing to pay for these services. This would be a useful strategy for overcoming 
information asymmetry in the pineapple supply chain. Using an exploratory case study in Ghana 
to gain insights into smallholders’ perceptions about SMS-based market information systems, 
followed by an in-depth survey in Benin, the results showed that the high potential of mobile 
phones to improve smallholder agriculture in rural areas of SSA. In Ghana, and other countries 
were Esoko is active, such a system allows farmers to get market information at the right time. 
This study provides a better understand of the direct value of ICT in facilitating trading networks, 
and, most importantly, the maintenance of product quality by saving transport and market search 
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time. It shows how this reduces the number of unnecessary intermediaries. A proper MIS based 
on the use of mobile phones can also contribute to significantly reduce market information 
asymmetry among value chain actors. Lessons learnt from this case study may be of great 
importance in developing and promoting agri-food quality conservation and market access, not 
only in Benin but also across SSA countries that face the same challenges. 
 
Even though farmers in the survey have shown a high willingness to pay for a mobile phone-
based MIS, it remains important to assess how the existing infrastructure and institutional 
organizations can support such a process. This offers opportunities for future development and 
policy-oriented research. 
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Chapter 6: General discussion and implications 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the introduction chapter, this 
study is already presented as one of 
the studies within the Benin part of 
the Co-innovation for Quality in 
Africa (CoQA) program. The 
central aim of the Benin part of the 
CoQa program is to be able to 
design interventions which 
contribute to streamlining the 
supply chain and ultimately 
improving pine apple quality, by 
executing an integral analysis of co-
innovation and quality management in the pineapple supply chain in Benin. Thus, the three PhD 
projects encompassed the whole supply chain, from farm level up to and including the consumer.  
The analysis of constraints and the design of solutions were drawn at three domains: agronomy 
and logistics (PhD1), processing technology and consumers preferences (PhD2), and 
management, marketing and innovation (PhD3).  PhD1 aimed at using agronomical and logistical 
tools to improve the flowering synchronisation, quality and uniformity of pineapple in Benin 
produced for local and international markets. PhD2 aimed at processing and marketing of 
pineapple from the perspective of quality performance in the pineapple chain. This study (PhD3) 
aimed at contributing to create value-adding co-innovations for improving access to local-, 
regional- and export markets. The basic idea behind this integrative approach is the 
acknowledgement that the quality of certain food is the result of the efforts and decisions made 
by all involved supply chain actors. So, when quality problems are to be addressed they need to 
studied and dealt with from a supply chain perspective. A quality improvement e.g. downstream 
can have an influence on activities upstream the supply chain.  As problems cut right across the 
borders of any subject matter or discipline (Popper, 1963), the idea behind this integrative and 
 
Figure 6.1: CoQA PhDs’ interlinks and overall 
achievement 
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multidisciplinary research was to insure that problems are approached from different angles and 
to avoid one-sided solutions to the issues related to quality and market access along the supply 
chain. To reach these goals, the Beninese CoQA PhDs have intensively cooperated to align data 
collection strategies to increase consistency and reliability of the data and developed a joint 
understanding of the whole supply chain. Although the PhDs have different disciplinary 
backgrounds, the chain mapping was realized by continuous information and data flow on quality 
criteria and metrics, resulting in a shared language and combined results. More specifically, PhD1 
and PhD2 exchanged information related to quality and consumer preferences which resulted in 
the design of a field experiment in order to incorporate consumers’ quality preferences into 
farmers’ agronomic practices. Information related to logistics, organizational structures and 
facilities, market information and ultimately smallholders’ agronomic practices and production 
systems, were shared between PhD1 and PhD3. Pineapple quality attributes, processing 
techniques and market norms and standards were shared between PhD2 and PhD3 (see Figure 
6.1). This integrated supply chain approach to quality of pineapples materialized in the linkage 
between the different PhD projects as well as in the framing of the object of study within each 
research project itself.  
 
The objective of the present study was to identify and characterize the governance structure (GS) 
of the pineapple supply chain in Benin, smallholder farmers’ participation in different marketing 
channels and to explore innovative mechanisms to overcome market information asymmetry in 
this supply chain. The study has used a transaction cost theory perspective to examine the 
relationships between the different chain actors, the constraints and opportunities they face and 
their strategies for improving their product quality and market access. This chapter discusses the 
main results and draws the main conclusions of this study. The key findings and answers to 
research questions are discussed in section 6.2. The theoretical contributions and implications to 
generalized knowledge are presented in section 6.3, while the section 6.4 presents the 
methodological contributions of the study. The limitations of the study and suggestions for 
further research are described in section 6.5. The final section discusses the policy and managerial 
implications. 
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6.2  Key findings and answers to the research questions 
 
The organization of this thesis follows the line of reasoning derived from the main goal of the 
study, which was to identify an innovative approach that could help smallholder farmers to 
overcome market quality and price information asymmetry and improve market access. First of 
all, there is a need to understand the whole supply chain organisation. In order to do so the 
following two research questions are answered. 
 
1) What linkages exist in Benin’s pineapple supply chain (technical advice, access to finance, gifts, knowledge and 
information) and how do these affect pineapple quality and farmers’ access to more profitable markets? 
2) What are the barriers to smallholder farmers’ access to profitable markets and which endogenous governance 
structure(s) is/are established by actors to overcome these barriers?  
 
To answer these questions a cartography of the supply chain was drawn and it was found that 
pineapple quality and thereby farmers’ potential access to high income markets are significantly 
constrained by several factors. Financial access for investment is one of the major constraints. 
Pineapple production follows a two-year cycle and it requires an initial investment of around $US 
4,500 to produce one hectare of pineapple, far above the financial capacity of most of small-scale 
farmers. Personal savings, familial or friend relationships are the main financial sources used. 
There is lack of incentive for collective actions and group selling. The study suggests that 
smallholder farmers can realize scale efficiencies through collective actions, which can help them 
to produce according to international standards, providing them with access to new markets and 
potentially substantial premiums. Most small-scale producers remain unaware of these 
institutional standards or how to comply with them. In the domestic and regional markets 
consumer’s appreciation of quality is taste related, while on the international market, it is more 
focused on physical attributes and there are stringent quality standard requirements. Exporters 
face difficulties in complying with these standards. As a result, the majority of Benin’s fresh 
pineapple is sold either on national or regional markets. The low access to financial support leads 
many farmers to become embedded in different transaction governance structures that allow 
them to get pre-financing in-cash (for labour payments) or in-kind (fertilizers, pesticides and 
planting materials) from pineapple traders and exporters, together with some technical assistance 
such as training and capacity building on farming systems. This form of contract, known as 
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outgrowing (Brüntrup & Peltzer, 2006; Key & Runsten, 1999; B. Shiferaw, Hellin, & Muricho, 
2011; USAID, 2009) helps individual small-scale farmers to access a premium market. 
Thereafter, in order to fill the gap in scientific evidence on the determining factors affecting 
simple or multiple choices of governance structures in agrifood supply chains (Dyer, 1996; 
Grandori, 1997; Ordóñez Héctor & Palau, 2006; Raynaud, Sauvee, & Valceschini, 2002; 
Sabidussi, 2009; Zaharieva et al., 2003), the following two research questions were investigated. 
 
3) Faced with a context of different governance structures (GS) and alternative choices, are farmers’ selections 
independent or related? 
4) What are the intrinsic (farm and farmers’ socioeconomic characteristics) and extrinsic (enabling institutional 
support, market and transaction attributes) factors that affect the choices about governance structure in the 
pineapple supply chain?  
 
Theory adopted in this study suggests that, all else being equal, a rational actor will chose a 
governance structure that performs best in minimising production and transaction costs. This 
study provides empirical evidence to transaction cost theory and develops Williamson’s attributes 
of transaction by emphasising connectedness as a transaction attribute that is worth considering 
when analysing the choice of governance structure not only in Benin but also in other developing 
counties. The connectedness also known as relatedness, or interdependence (Bahli & Rivard, 
2002) refers to the interconnections and functional links between tasks or business units (Lowry, 
Wall, & Selfridge, 2011) and the willingness of chain actors to developing and maintaining 
relationships and information flows with up-stream and down-stream chain partners (Cheng & 
Sheu, 2012). Applied to transactions, it is assumed that characteristics of transactions have an 
impact on connectedness of transactions. E.g. those involving investments which are highly 
specific and some transactions are largely dependent on others giving rise to hold-up problems 
and locked-in effects (Slangen et al., 2008). When transactions have a strong connection, a strong 
coordination mechanism is favourable. The adoption of such mechanisms influences the 
transaction costs and the type of governance chosen by the actor (Meyer et al., 1992). Our 
research found that the stronger the ties between the buyer-seller, the higher the transaction 
connectedness will be preferred, confirming the assertion of Wong and Chan, (1999). As far as 
food products are concerned because of their perishable attributes, if an upstream chain actor is 
aware of the quality required and price offered by a downstream actor, this can significantly 
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influence the upstream actor’s preference for a more coordinated type of governance structure 
(i.e. outgrowing or association). Such a result can be used as scientific evidence and guide by 
policy to reinforce the nation extension system in order to assist smallholder farmers in quality 
and price knowledge and information sharing (in local languages) and stimulate collective actions 
through outgrowing schemes and association. In the context of less developed countries 
characterized by low income and low instruction/education level, this finding can contribute to 
increasing sellers’ awareness of the required quality norms and standards (and offered prices) by 
buyers of their direct buyers in the chain, and thereafter improve smallholders high income 
markets access.  
 
A new construct of ‘multiple-governance’ structure is investigated to increase understanding of 
how and why farmers select among these governance structures and what guides their decisions. 
The multi-governance choice has been observed as a strategy of farmers for safeguarding their 
investments. This strategy is established by farmers to sell the different categories of their 
product quality to different supply chains. Farmers involved in the outgrowing scheme GS are 
less likely to be involved in another type of governance; showing the specificity and exclusivity of 
this type of transaction arrangement in the pineapple supply chain. This study, showing factors 
underlying the choice of each type of GS, has a potential to be used as a tool for defining 
intervention strategies for promoting contract enforcement in bi- or multilateral partnerships in 
agrifood supply chains. 
 
Research questions 5 and 6 are drawn to test whether or not smallholder farmers have been 
excluded from high income markets, such as EU markets. 
 
5) Whether or not small-scale farmers are rejected from the growing higher value and emerging regional and urban 
markets in Sub-Sahara Africa and the EU? 
6) Which intrinsic and extrinsic factors affect the marketing channel selection? 
 
The results lead us to reject the widespread assumption that smallholder famers are excluded 
from international markets, even though the emerging markets are mostly supplied by the 
medium and large-scale farmers. The results also show that some farmers diversify their 
production systems by growing two varieties simultaneously. This result is in line with Wilson’s 
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(1986) observation that farmers can use market diversification as a protective measure. Though 
farmers are mostly not price-makers in fresh pineapple markets, farmers do have some bargaining 
power when it comes to negotiating for better prices. The empirical results also shed some light 
on the contemporary issue of marketing channel participation in perishable agrifood chains in 
West Africa, helping us to disentangle the reasons why farmers (sequentially or simultaneously) 
choose different marketing channels. It was found that those involved in export marketing 
channels are less likely to send their pineapples to the urban market. Even though we observed 
negative correlations between some choices of marketing channel, these correlations are not 
(statistically) significant. This result is consistent with a market participation study in African 
countries (Bellemare & Barrett, 2006), which found strong evidence to support the hypothesis 
that sellers make their market participation and selling volume decisions sequentially rather than 
simultaneously. Farmers’ bargaining power and their physical distance from markets were 
identified as major determinants of marketing channel selection. Improving the present 
infrastructure such as roads to access rural area and cooling and handling facilities, may help to 
overcome this issue. Implementing such long-term investments are beyond individual 
smallholder farmers’ capacity, and therefore request a joint intervention of actors from public and 
private sectors. For example key actors such as government, NGOs, local community, and 
technical and financial partners have an important role to play. 
 
Equally, farmers’ bargaining power could be improved if they had better access to affordable 
production and marketing information, concerning techniques for improving quality, new 
varieties and information on market demand and current market prices. It was also found that the 
costs of coordinating small-scale producers to ensure that they comply with the stringent 
requirements of international markets may actually make them less profitable. The study suggests 
that solutions could be found in focusing on alternative markets such as regional markets and/or 
less demanding export markets. The study found for farmers to make the optimal decision about 
where to sell their produce they need information about market requirements in terms of quality, 
norms, quantity and price. However, smallholder farmers do not have access to such information 
when they need it. This lack of access to information, coupled with their low education levels, 
increases their vulnerability to information asymmetries when negotiating with buyers. 
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Drawing on theories related to the actors’ dynamic capabilities and incremental innovations 
research question 7 examines whether modern information technology can alter smallholder 
farmers’ decision making and overcome information asymmetry issues in pineapple supply 
chains. Research question 7 reads as follows. 
 
7) How to overcome the market information asymmetry issue in the pineapple supply chain? 
 
Based on lessons learnt from a case study on mobile phone use in Ghana, Beninese pineapple 
farmers’ willingness to use (and pay for) a mobile phone service that provides market and quality 
information on pineapples was investigated. Request conditions and partnerships among value 
chain actors to timely access market information were addressed by suggesting a multi-
stakeholder platform that may involve public and private sectors to facilitate smallholder actors’ 
access to high income markets (Cavatassi et al., 2011; Mwesige, 2010; Thiele et al., 2011; Thiele et 
al., 2009). To make this a lasting solution, the platform needs to involve actors from throughout 
the value chain. Apart from the staff who coordinate and manage the platform (such as Esoko in 
Ghana), results suggest the need to include representatives of farmers’ organizations, the mobile 
phone operator, national statistics and market information management institutes, research 
institutes and quality control services. 
 
 
6.3 Theoretical contributions 
 
The present study introduces the concept of multi-governance in the agri-food chain. Under 
transaction cost theory economists reasoning, the connectedness of the transactions is a key 
determinant attribute. Traditional economic theories on how suppliers search for a comparative 
advantage when selecting the optimal governance structure have significantly contributed to 
understanding trade at local and international levels (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; van de Vrande et 
al., 2009; Williamson, 1985). However they did not explain chain actors multiple choices of 
governance structures. Focus was on explaining one-to-one governance choice in transactions. 
The study in Chapter 3 draws on empirical evidence to fill this gap, taking transaction 
connectedness into account as a key factor for explaining the choice of governance structure. 
Despite the growing literature on governance structure in food chains (Altenburg, 2006; 
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Armando, Humphrey, & Fischmann, 2007; De Jong, 1997; Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; P. 
Gibbon, 2003; Grandori, 1997; Gunsueva, 2010; Liu, 2006; Sauvee, 2002; J. H. Trienekens, 2011), 
this study contributes to the science by establishing support for a new construct, namely ‘multi-
governance’. It was demonstrated that actors can simultaneously choose for more than one 
governance structure in transaction with a main purpose to safeguard investments and reduce risk 
(Heide & John, 1992; Ritchie & Brindley, 2006). The study helps to identify the reasons guiding 
the choice of chain governance structure, drawing on a broader range of explanatory factors 
including intrinsic and extrinsic constructs. The major transaction attributes, which affect the 
multiple governance choice, are specific investment, transaction connectedness and market 
stability (price & quantity). This implies that market stabilisation policy will need focus in those 
key factors. As farmers have self-developed these systems in the context of lack of institutional 
assistance, any support (from extension services or NGOs) of transaction mechanism could 
contribute to sustain it over the time. This support can be in forms of promoting contract 
enforcement in bi - or multilateral partnerships in agrifood chains, finding alternative partnership 
regarding market demand (attributes) and diversified fruit quality. 
 
The study found that the attributes of transactions should not be considered as one-size-fits-all 
concepts. One of the transaction attributes that did not apply to the pineapple supply chain is the 
frequency of the transaction, which was excluded from our models. This is because the 
production cycle of pineapple is long (14-18 months), implying that a pineapple crop can be 
harvested only twice in three years. This leads to a low transaction frequency over time. 
 
Adding to the growing literature on market channels selection (Abatekassa & Peterson, 2011; 
Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Becchetti, Conzo, & Gianfreda, 2011; Boughton et al., 2007; 
Brewer, 2001; Coughlan et al., 2001; Moreno-Monroy, 2010; Obi et al., 2011; Thiele et al., 2009), 
Chapter 4 investigates whether smallholder farmers participate in or are rejected from high 
income market channels. Unlike most of the work dealing with the nature of the producer-
distributor relationship (Artle & Berglund, 1959; Coughlan, 1985; van Tilburg & van Schalkwyk, 
2012), the study models simultaneous participation in different market channels, with product 
quality and suppliers’ bargaining power being the factors that determine which channels are 
selected. Williamson (1975, 1979, 1989, 1998) already explained the importance of connectedness 
of transaction as key determinant attribute in explaining the governance structures. What the 
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transaction cost theory so far falls short to explain is (1) the generalization of this construct in 
less developed countries contexts and, (2) the application of this attribute in a context of 
simultaneous choice of multiple governance structure. The present study therefore contributes to 
the theory by filling this gap. 
 
 
6.4  Methodological contributions  
 
The complementary use of probit and multivariate probit models allowed for the validation of 
the hypothesis that smallholder farmer’s decision making processes are inter-related or 
independent. Use of the probit model showed the determinants of governance choice (chapter 3) 
and market channel selection (chapter 4), while the multivariate analysis provided further insights 
into the factors underpinning farmers’ choice of multiple governance structures in their 
transactions and multiple channels for their (differentiated) pineapple products. These two levels 
of the econometric model provided an empirical basis for describing household-level marketing 
behaviour, by testing the (in) dependency of choice over marketing channel participation and 
governance.  
 
6.5 Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research 
 
Despite the interesting findings from our research, there are some limitations that need to be 
emphasized and reconsidered for further research. 
 
First of all, due to time restrictions the study did not investigate the market prices and cost 
variations across the different marketing channels. Even though the market selection heavily 
relies on relative costs and prices, empirical data would have added to the understanding of the 
marketing selection process. Further research may focus on this limitation and clarify the 
influence of investment and operational costs (information searching, product collecting and 
transportation costs, cooling facilities, informal sunk costs, etc.) and market price variations (in 
local, urban, regional and EU markets) on smallholder farmers’ marketing channel selection. 
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We used a cross-sectional design, thus preventing the investigation of the dynamic effects of 
downstream information and the collaborative relationship. Further work can consider a 
longitudinal study to investigate the framework at different points in time. 
 
The limited geographical scope of the study (Atlantique department in Benin), and the used 
sample size might also prevent the generalisation of our conclusion. Further research may 
replicate the study in a different setting with different socio-economic structures as well as 
environmental and ecological contexts. 
 
The in-depth surveys on marketing channel selection and governance structure choices were 
focused on the production side of the value chain. Analyses were concentrated on some elements 
of collaboration between farmers and buyers without taking into account other chain segments 
(traders, processors and exporters). If this kind of study can be carried out in further research, its 
findings will be very interesting and useful, because that will provide a complete picture of the 
situation of the whole chain by investigating both upstream and downstream relationships 
throughout the value chain. 
 
The present study did not investigate the implications and impacts of the marketing channel and 
governance structure selections on market performance. This would have informed on certain 
performance indicators such as income, generated added value, trust, and quality, not only at 
farm level, but also along the chain. Future research can investigate those aspects. 
 
We were able to model the intrinsic and extrinsic patterns (transaction attributes, institutional 
environment, market attributes, and farm characteristics) that determine the multiple governance 
choice. The major question that remains unanswered is which kind of a combination of type of 
governance structures can add up to farmers risk and uncertainty attenuation. Even though 
farmers explained that they choose multiple governance structures to safeguard risks and reduce 
uncertainties, the study did not investigate which combination of governance structures could 
lead to the highest risks and uncertainty attenuation. This limitation can be further investigated in 
the future research has been added as important limitation and recommendation for further 
research. 
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The study has investigated the influence of pineapple quality attributes (Grade A-B-C) on 
marketing channel selection (chapter 4). We did not assess the impact of multi-governance 
structures choices and the selected marketing channel on the fruit quality performance especially 
for processing factories. This limitation came be considered in further research. 
 
Finally, this study is carried out for a limited number of pineapple farmers in Atlantique 
department in South Benin. This might also prevent the generalisation of our conclusion. Further 
research could replicate this study in different settings and different agro-ecological zones with a 
larger sample size. 
 
 
6.6  Policy and managerial implications 
 
 
Based on the research findings, several recommendations can be made. 
 
Findings on barriers for smallholder farmers’ access to high income markets showed that farmers 
are facing tremendous constraints to get specific inputs (fertilizers and planting materials) that led 
them to the development of an outgrowing form of governance structure. Government through 
his National Research and Extension Services could contribute to overcome this issue by 
reinforcing interventions on building capacities to develop nurseries and appropriate fertilizer 
formulas as the one that is being used is adopted from Ivory-Coast without considering the soil 
fertility and the agro-pedological conditions in Benin. 
 
As found in chapters 2 and 5, there is an important issue related to farmers’ access to updated 
market and quality information to guide them in their decision making processes. The 
government and supporting partners (such as national and international NGOs) can assist 
farmers in providing information access on where to get these materials if available, market 
opportunities and strategies to improved intensive production rather than extensive, as the yield 
remained stable over the last decade. 
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Despite the existence of national institutes and support services involved in quality control and in 
building the capacity of producers to comply with quality standards, it was found that only 2% of 
national fresh production is exported to EU and Asian markets because of high handling and air 
freighting costs. To increase the quantity sold to international markets, the government learn 
from the Ghanaian experience by supporting chain actors in developing cooling chain facilities, 
which are indispensable for sea freighting. Alternatively, solutions may be found by the 
government in promoting outgrowing schemes and seizing the opportunity of the available 
Nigerian markets (consuming more than 40% of pineapple production) after formalizing the 
trading arrangements (by involving a third party in contracting to safeguard the investments). 
This arrangement will be helpful in reducing the transaction costs related to informal costs paid 
by actors because of market information asymmetry along the pineapple supply chain. It will also 
help to reduce bounded human rationality and opportunistic behaviour as the governance 
structure will shift from the spot market (most dominant now) to a more integrated one. Also, 
further research could investigate strategies to change international and regional consumers’ 
orientation towards produce taste instead of physical (colour) appearance. This will help to 
promote local varieties such as sugarloaf – which has a permanent green colour when mature – 
instead of introducing new varieties or applying the plant growth regulator Ethephon to 
artificially induce ripeness in the smooth cayenne cultivar. 
 
The pineapple supply chain in Benin is recognized as having a huge potential with an highest 
yield in West-African sub-region (FAOSTAT, 2012), and increasing demand. It is gaining an 
increased international orientation, despite the low adaptive capacities of smallholder farmers to 
comply with required norms and quality standards. Although the governance and marketing 
issues examined in this study are within national and sub-regional boundaries, both buyers and 
sellers are willing to engage in international markets. Achieving a long-term market access and 
sustainable chain performance requires establishing a win-win relationship between buyer and 
seller. 
 
Although the knowledge that farmers have is often underestimated, there exists an asymmetry of 
information along the supply chain, which unfairly rewards some and excludes others. To 
overcome this, government can assist smallholder actors in accessing information using their 
commonly used communication means (mobile telephone) as an appropriate tool to provide a 
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package of advisory services (current market prices, bids and offers, advice for disease control, 
quality information, etc). As indicated in Chapter 5, this assistance could be provided through 
SMS (texting services) preferably in the native language of the farmer. The study has provided a 
better understanding of the direct impact of ICT in facilitating trading networks, and, most 
importantly, maintaining product quality by saving on transport and market search time. 
Moreover, the number of intermediaries involved can be reduced, as can information asymmetry 
among value chain actors. The establishment of a multi-stakeholder platform, involving actors at 
different stages of the chain from private and public sectors could make an important 
contribution to promoting food quality conservation and market access by small-scale actors. 
 
 
 
  
  
144 
  
References 
 
 
 
 
7 
REFERENCES 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
146 
References 
 
Abatekassa, G., & Peterson, H. C. (2011). Market access for local food through the conventional 
food supply chain. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 14(1), 63-82.  
Adegbola, Patrice, & Gardebroek, Cornelis. (2007). The effect of information sources on 
technology adoption and modification decisions. Agricultural Economics, 37(1), 55-65. doi: 
10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00222.x 
Adesina, A.A., Mbila, D., Nkamleu, G.B., & Endamana, D. (2000). Econometric analysis of the 
determinants of adoption of alley farming by farmers in the forest zone of southwest 
Cameroon. Agriculture, Ecosystems &amp; Environment, 80(3), 255-265.  
Adesina, A.A., & Zinnah, M.M. (1993). Technology characteristics, farmers' perceptions and 
adoption decisions: A Tobit model application in Sierra Leone. Agricultural Economics, 9(4), 
297-311.  
Adossou, F.T. (2012). Introduction to Pineapple Industry in Benin. In ISHS (Ed.), Pineapple New: 
Newsletter of the Pineapple Working Group (pp. 6-14): International Society for Horticultural 
Science. 
Agarwal, S, & Ramaswami, SN. (1992). Choice of foreign market entry mode: Impact of 
ownership, location and internalization factors. Journal of International Business Studies, 1-27.  
Agbo, B., Agbota, G., E., Sissinto, & Akele, O. (2008). Atelier de validation de la stratégie et de 
l’évaluation de plan d’action de la filière ananas au Bénin Working paper (pp. 119). 
Cotonou. 
Aker, J. (2008). Does digital divide or provide? The impact of cell phones on grain markets in 
Niger: BREAD. 
Aker, J., & Mbiti, I. (2010). Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 24(3), 207-232.  
Akerlof, G.A. (1970). The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.  
Akinola, A.A. (1987). An application of Peobit analysis to the adoption of tractor hiring service 
scheme in Nigeria. Oxford Development Studies, 16(1), 70-82.  
Allen, I.E., & Seaman, C.A. (2007). Likert scales and data analyses. Quality Progress, 40(7), 64-65.  
Altenburg, T. (2006). Governance patterns in value chains and their development impact. The 
European Journal of Development Research, 18(4), 498-521.  
Anandaraja, N., Sriram, N., Kathiresan, C., Sebastian, S., & Vadivel, E. (2009). Web cum mobile 
based dynamic market information support for agri-horti produces: Linking the farmers with market. 
Paper presented at the International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured 
Transactions, ICITST 2009. 
Andersen, O., & Buvik, A. (2002). Firms' internationalization and alternative approaches to the 
international customer/market selection. International Business Review, 11(3), 347-363.  
Arinloye, D.D.A.A., Adegbola, P.Y., Biaou, G., & Coulibaly, O. (2010, September 19-23, 2010). 
Evaluation des Strategies Optimales de Production et de Transformation du riz a Travers Une Analyse 
References 
 
 
147 
du Consentement Des Consommateurs au Benin: Application du Model Hedonique. Paper presented 
at the Contributed Paper presented at the Joint 3rd African Association of Agricultural 
Economists (AAAE) and 48 th Agricultural Economists Association of South Africa 
(AEASA) Conference, Cape Town, South Africa. 
Arinloye, D.D.A.A., Hagelaar, G., Linnemann, A.R. , Royer, A., Coulibaly, O., Omta, S.W.F. 
(2010). Constraints and challenges in governance and channel choice in tropical agri-food chains: 
Evidences from pineapple supply chains in Benin. Paper presented at the 2nd Agricultural 
Science week of West and Central Africa (CORAF/WECARD), Cotonou, Benin. 
Arinloye, D.D.A.A., Hagelaar, G., Linnemann, A.R., Pascucci, S., Coulibaly, O., Omta, O.S.F.W. 
(2012). Multi-governance choices by smallholder farmers in the pineapple supply chain in 
Benin: An application of transaction cost theory. African Journal of Business Management, 
6(38), 10320-10331.  
Armando, E., Humphrey, J, & Fischmann, A. A. (2007). Firm Strategy, Governance and Economic 
Rents in Global Value  
Chains: A Proposal for Classifying  Studies Cases. Paper presented at the International PENSA 
Conference. 24-26th, 2007 retrieved from  
Artle, R., & Berglund, S. (1959). A note on manufacturers' choice of distribution channels. 
Management Science, 5(4), 460-471.  
Artz, Kendall W., & Brush, Thomas H. (2000). Asset specificity, uncertainty and relational 
norms: an examination of coordination costs in collaborative strategic alliances. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 41(4), 337-362.  
Asfaw, S., Shiferaw, B., Simtowe, F., Muricho, G., Abate, T., & Ferede, S. (2010). Socio-
economic Assessment of Legume Production, Farmer Technology Choice, Market 
Linkages, Institutions and Poverty in Rural Ethiopia. Field Crops Research, 36(2), 103-111.  
Bahli, B., & Rivard, S. (2002). Information Technology Outsourcing Risk: A Scenario-Based 
Conceptualisation (pp. 22). 
Barney, J., & Hesterly, W. (2006). Organizational Economics: Understanding the Relationship 
between Organizations and Economic Analysis. In S. R. Clegg & C. Hardy (Eds.), 
Studying Organisation (pp. 109-141). London: Sage Publication. 
Baumann, P. (2000). Equity and Efficiency in Contract Farming Schemes: The Experience of 
Agricultural tree Crops (pp. 1-48). London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Becchetti, L., Conzo, P., & Gianfreda, G. (2011). Market access, organic farming and 
productivity: The effects of Fair Trade affiliation on Thai farmer producer groups. 
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 56(1), 117-140.  
Bellemare, M. F., & Barrett, C. B. (2006). An ordered tobit model of market participation: 
Evidence from Kenya and Ethiopia. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(2), 324-
337.  
Bello, D.C., Dant, S.P., & Lohtia, R. (1997). Hybrid governance: the role of transaction costs, 
production costs and strategic considerations. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 
12(2), 118-133.  
Chapter 7 
 
 
148 
Benfica, R.M.S., Tschirley, D.L., & Boughton, D. (2006). Interlinked transactions in cash cropping 
economies: the determinants of farmer participation and performance in the Zambezi river valley of 
Mozambique. Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of International Association of 
Agricultural Economists, 12-18 August 2006 Gold Coast Australia.  
Berg, C., & Fiege, K. (2006). Poverty Orientation of Value Chains for Domestic and Export Markets in 
Ghana   Retrieved from http://www.sle-
berlin.de/files/sle/auslandsprojekte/2006/Ghana_2006_Final_Report_(Ebook).pdf  
Bhaskaran, S. (2006). Incremental Innovation and Business Performance: Small and Medium-Size 
Food Enterprises in a Concentrated Industry Environment. Journal of Small Business 
Management, 44(1), 64-80.  
Bijman, J., & Wollni, M. (2008). Producer Organisations and vertical coordination: an economic organization 
perspective. Paper presented at the International Conference on Cooperative Studies - ICCS 
16th, Koln, Germany. 
Binam, J.N., Tonyè, J., Nyambi, G., & Akoa, M. (2004). Factors affecting the technical efficiency 
among smallholder farmers in the slash and burn agriculture zone of Cameroon. Food 
Policy, 29(5), 531-545.  
Blandon, Jose, Henson, Spencer, & Islam, Towhidul. (2009). Marketing preferences of small-scale 
farmers in the context of new agrifood systems: a stated choice model. Agribusiness, 25(2), 
251-267. doi: 10.1002/agr.20195 
Blattberg, R., Buesing, T., Peacock, P., & Sen, S. (1978). Identifying the deal prone segment. 
Journal of marketing research, 369-377.  
Boger, S. (2001). Quality and contractual choice: a transaction cost approach to the Polish hog 
market. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 28(3), 22.  
Bogetoft, P, & Olesen, HB. (2004). Design of Production Contracts: Lessons from theory and agriculture: 
Copenhagen Business School Pr. 
Bosch, T.E. (2009). Cell Phones for Health in South Africa. In H. Wels (Ed.), Health communication 
in Southern Africa: engaging with social and cultural diversity (Vol. 11, pp. 279). Amsterdam: 
SAVUSA/Rozenberg/UNISA Press Series. 
Boughton, D., Mather, D., Barrett, C.B., Benfica, R., Abdula, D., Tschirley, D. (2007). Market 
participation by rural households in a low-income country: An asset-based approach 
applied to Mozambique. Faith and Economics, 50(1), 64-101.  
Bradach, J.L., & Eccles, R.G. (1989). Price, authority, and trust: From ideal types to plural forms. 
Annual review of sociology, 15, 97-118.  
Brewer, P. (2001). International market selection: developing a model from Australian case 
studies. International Business Review, 10(2), 155-174.  
Brouwer, R., & Brito, L. (2012). Cellular phones in Mozambique: Who has them and who 
doesn't? Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 79(2), 231-243.  
Brüntrup, M., & Peltzer, R. (2006). Outgrowers - a key to the development of rural areas in Sub-
Saharan Africa and to poverty reduction (pp. 1-74). Bonn: DEG and DIE. 
Bunduchi, R., & Berar, S. (2007). Innovation Strategies in Digital Convergence: Nokia and the 
Digital Home. Strategies and Policies in Digital Convergence, 102.  
References 
 
 
149 
Burg, S.P., & Burg, E.A. (1966). Auxin-induced ethylene formation: its relation to flowering in 
the pineapple. Science, 152(726), 1269-1269.  
Buys, P., Dasgupta, S., Thomas, T.S., & Wheeler, D. (2009). Determinants of a digital divide in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: A spatial econometric analysis of cell phone coverage. World 
Development, 37(9), 1494-1505.  
Carson, R.T. (2000). Contingent valuation: a user's guide. Environmental science & technology, 34(8), 
1413-1418.  
Carson, R.T., Flores, N.E., & Mitchell, R.C. (1999). The Theory and Measurement of Passive-Use 
Value. S. 97-130 in: Ian J. Bateman und Kenneth G. Willis (Hg.): Valuing Environmental 
Preferences. Theory and Practice of the Contingent Valuation in the US, EU, and 
Developing Countries: Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Carson, R.T., Mitchell, R.C., Hanemann, M., Kopp, R.J., Presser, S., & Ruud, P.A. (2003). 
Contingent Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Damages from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 25(3), 257-286. doi: 10.1023/a:1024486702104 
Caspary, G., & O'Connor, D. (2003). Providing low-cost information technology access to rural communities 
in developing countries: What works? What pays? : Citeseer. 
Cavatassi, R., Gonzàlez-Flores, M., Winters, P., Andrade-Piedra, J., Espinosa, P., & Thiele, G. 
(2011). Linking smallholders to the new agricultural economy: The case of the 
plataformas de concertación in Ecuador. Journal of Development Studies, 47(10), 1545-1573.  
Chen, W., & Fu, J. (2011). The operating performance evaluation of retail industry listed companies based on 
factor analysis. Paper presented at the 2nd International Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC). 
Cheng, Jao-Hong, & Sheu, Jiuh-Biing. (2012). Inter-organizational relationships and strategy 
quality in green supply chains-Moderated by opportunistic behavior and dysfunctional 
conflict. Industrial Marketing Management.  
Clark, K.B., & Fujimoto, T. (1991). Product development performance: Strategy, organization, and 
management in the world auto industry: Harvard Business Press. 
Claro, D.P., Zylbersztajn, D., & Omta, S.W.F. (2004). How to manage a long-term buyer-supplier 
relationship successfully? The impact of network information on long-term buyer-
supplier relationships in the Dutch potted plant and flower industry. Journal on Chain and 
Network Science, 4(1), 7-24.  
Clemons, EK, Reddi, SP, & Row, MC. (1993). The impact of information technology on the 
organization of economic activity: The move to the middle hypothesis. Journal of 
Management Information Systems, 10(2), 9-35.  
Coase, R.H. . (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386-405.  
Codex-Stan. (1993). Codex Standard for Pineapple. 13 September 2012, from 
http://www.codexalimentarius.org/download/standards/313/CXS_182e.pdf 
Collier, P. (2000). How to reduce corruption. African Development Review, 12(2), 191-205.  
Cook, Karen S. (1977). Exchange and Power in Networks of Interorganizational Relations. 
Sociological Quarterly, 18(1), 62-82. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1977.tb02162.x 
Chapter 7 
 
 
150 
CORAF/WECARD. (2011). Integrated Agricultural Research for Development (IAR4D) 
Brochure.   Retrieved 28 September 2012, from 
http://www.coraf.org/database/publication/detail.php?id=81 
Coughlan, A.T. (1985). Competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice: Theory and 
application. Marketing science, 110-129.  
Coughlan, A.T., Anderson, E., Stern, L., & El-Ansary, A.I. (2001). Marketing Channels: New 
Jersey, Prentice Hall. 
Davis, L.E., & North, D.C. (1971). Institutional change and American economic growth. London: 
University Press. 
de Janvry, A., Fafchamps, M., & Sadoulet, E. (1991). Peasant household behaviour with missing 
markets: some paradoxes explained. The Economic Journal, 101(409), 1400-1417.  
De Jong, HW. (1997). The governance structure and performance of large European 
corporations. Journal of Management and Governance, 1(1), 5-27.  
Delgado, C. L. (1999). Sources of growth in smallholder agriculture integration of smallholders 
with processors in Sub-Saharan Africa: the role of vertical and marketers of high value-
added items. Agrekon, 38(sup001), 165-189. doi: 10.1080/03031853.1999.9524913 
Demirhan, D., Jacob, V.S., & Raghunathan, S. (2006). Information Technology Investment 
Strategies Under Declining Technology Cost. Journal of Management Information Systems, 
22(3), 321-350. doi: 10.2753/mis0742-1222220311 
Dewar, R.D., & Dutton, J.E. (1986). The adoption of radical and incremental innovations: an 
empirical analysis. Management Science, 1422-1433.  
Dijkstra, Tjalling, Meulenberg, Matthew, & van Tilburg, Aad. (2001). Applying marketing channel 
theory to food marketing in developing countries: Vertical disintegration model for 
horticultural marketing channels in kenya. Agribusiness, 17(2), 227-241. doi: 
10.1002/agr.1013 
Dixit, A.K. (2007). Lawlessness and economics: alternative modes of governance: Princeton Univ Pr. 
Dolan, C., & Humphrey, J. (2000). Governance and trade in fresh vegetables: the impact of UK 
supermarkets on the African horticulture industry. Journal of Development Studies, 37(2), 147-
176.  
Doll, J.P., & Orazem, F. (1984). Production Economics: Theory with Applications (2 ed.). New York: 
Wiley. 
Donner, J. (2008). Research approaches to mobile use in the developing world: A review of the 
literature. The Information Society, 24(3), 140-159.  
Donner, J. (2009). Mobile-based livelihood services in Africa: pilots and early deployments. 
Communication technologies in Latin America and Africa: A multidisciplinary perspective, 37-58.  
Donner, J., & Escobari, M.X. (2010). A review of evidence on mobile use by micro and small 
enterprises in developing countries. Journal of International Development, 22(5), 641-658.  
Douma, S.W., & Schreuder, H. (2002). Economic approaches to organizations. Harlow: Prentice Hall. 
Dyer, Jeffrey H. (1996). Does Governance Matter? Keiretsu Alliances and Asset Specificity As 
Sources of Japanese Competitive Advantage. Organization Science, 7(6), 649-666.  
References 
 
 
151 
Esoko. (2012). What is Esoko?   , 30 July 2012, from 
http://www.esoko.com/about/clients.html#countries 
Ettlie, J.E., Bridges, W.P., & O'keefe, R.D. (1984). Organization strategy and structural 
differences for radical versus incremental innovation. Management Science, 682-695.  
Faber, G., & Roelfsema, H. (2001). Trade, standards, and regional integration.  
Fafchamps, M, Hill, RV, & Minten, B. (2008). Quality control in non-staple food markets: 
evidence from India. Agricultural Economics, 38, 251-266.  
Fafchamps, M. (1992). Cash crop production, food price volatility, and rural market integration in 
the third world. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74(1), 90-99.  
Fafchamps, M. (2006). Development and social capital. The journal of Development Studies, 42(7), 
1180-1198.  
FAOSTAT. (2012). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Crop and 
Livestock ProductsTrade. 13 September 2012, from 
http://faostat3.fao.org/home/index.html#VISUALIZE_BY_DOMAIN 
Fassinou-Hotegni, VN, Lommen, WJM, van der Vorst, J., Agbossou, EK, & Struik, PC. (2012). 
Analysis of Pineapple Production Systems in Benin. Paper presented at the XXVIII International 
Horticultural Congress on Science and Horticulture for People (IHC2010):International 
Symposium on Citrus, Bananas and other Tropical Fruits under Subtropical Conditions. 
Feder, G., Just, R.E., & Zilberman, D. (1985). Adoption of agricultural innovations in developing 
countries: A survey. Economic development and cultural change, 33(2), 255-298.  
Fenwick, L.J., & Lyne, M.C. (1999). The relative importance of liquidity and other constraints 
inhibiting the growth of small-scale farming in KwaZulu-Natal. Development Southern 
Africa, 16(1), 141-155.  
Ferber, R. (1977). Research by convenience. Journal of Consumer Research, 57-58.  
Ferto, I., & Szabo, G.G. (2002). The choice of supply channels in Hungarian fruit and vegetable sector. 
Paper presented at the Economics of Contracts in Agriculture, 2nd Annual Workshop, 
Long Beach. 
Field, A.P. (2009). Discovering statistics using SPSS: SAGE publications Ltd. 
Frank, R.H., & Glass, A.J. (1991). Microeconomics and behavior: McGraw-Hill. 
Frank, S.D., & Henderson, D.R. (1992). Transaction Costs as Determinants of Vertical 
Coordination in the U.S. Food Industries. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74(4), 
941-950.  
Furubotn, E.G., & Richter, R. (2005). Institutions and economic theory: The contribution of the new 
institutional economics. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 
Garbutt, N., & Coetzer, E. (2005). Options for the development of national/subregional codes 
of good agricultural practice for horticultural products benchmarked to EurepGAP 
Working paper. 
Garnier, C.L. (1997). Ananas : la « Queen Tahiti », Note technique du département de la 
recherche agronomique appliqué’, Tahiti, Polynésie française., 1-14.  
Chapter 7 
 
 
152 
Gibbon, P. (2003). Value-chain Governance, Public Regulation And Entry Barriers in The Global 
Fresh fruit and Vegetable Chain into the EU. Development Policy Review, 21, 615-625.  
Gibbon, Peter. (2003). Value-chain Governance, Public Regulation and Entry Barriers in the 
Global Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Chain into the EU. Development Policy Review, 21(5-6), 
615-625. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8659.2003.00227.x 
Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S.S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). The 
new production of knowledge. London: Sage Publications. 
Glover, D, & Kusterer, K. (1990). Small farmers, big business: contract farming and rural development. 
United Kingdom: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Grandori, A. (1997). Governance structures, coordination mechanisms and cognitive models. 
Journal of Management and Governance, 1(1), 29-47.  
Greene, W.H. (2008). Econometric Analysis: Pearson/Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
Griliches, Z. (1957). Hybrid corn: An exploration in the economics of technological change. 
Econometrica, Journal of the Econometric Society, 501-522.  
Grover, V, & Malhotra, MK. (2003). Transaction cost framework in operations and supply chain 
management research: theory and measurement. Journal of Operations management, 21(4), 
457-473.  
GTZ, & MAEP. (2008). Analysis of economic profitability of added value in pineapple supply 
chains in Benin (pp. 1-76). Cotonou, Benin: GTZ, MAEP. 
Gulati, R., & Singh, H. (1998). The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and 
appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 781-814.  
Gunsueva, T. (2010). Comparing the governance systems of the Russian and European banking sectors. [S.l.: 
s.n.]. 
Heide, Jan B., & John, George. (1992). Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships? The Journal 
of Marketing, 56(2), 32-44.  
Helfat, CE, & Peteraf, MA. (2009). Understanding dynamic capabilities: progress along a 
developmental path. Strategic Organization, 7(1), 91.  
Heltberg, R., & Tarp, F. (2002). Agricultural supply response and poverty in Mozambique. Food 
Policy, 27(2), 103-124.  
Herath, P., & Takeya, H. (2003). Factors determining intercropping by rubber smallholders in Sri 
Lanka: a logit analysis. Agricultural Economics, 29(2), 159-168.  
Hobbs, J.E. (1997). Measuring the importance of transaction costs in cattle marketing. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79(4), 1083-1095.  
Hobbs, JE. (1996). A transaction cost approach to supply chain management. Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal, 1(2), 15-27.  
Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 74-91.  
Horikawa, M., Takeno, T., & Sugawara, M. (2008). Information system for farmers' markets. 
Journal of Japan Industrial Management Association, 59(1), 94-100.  
References 
 
 
153 
Hotegni, V.N.F., Lommen, WJM, van der Vorst, J., Agbossou, EK, & Struik, PC. (2012). 
Analysis of Pineapple Production Systems in Benin.  
Hueth, B., Ligon, E., Wolf, S., & Wu, S. (1999). Incentive instruments in fruit and vegetable 
contracts: input control, monitoring, measuring, and price risk. Review of Agricultural 
Economics, 374-389.  
Humphrey, J. (2003). Commodities, Diversification and Poverty Reduction. Paper presented at the FAO 
Syposium on the State  of Agricultural Commodity Market Researh, Rome.  
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). (2003). Promoting market access for 
the rural poor in order to achieve the Millenium Development Goals. Roundtable 
Discussion Paper for the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Session of IFAD’s Governing 
Council. 13 September 2012, from http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/gc/26/e/markets.pdf 
Jamieson, S. (2004). Likert scales: how to (ab) use them. Medical Education, 38(12), 1217-1218.  
Jari, B., & Fraser, G. (2012). Influence of institutional and technical factors on market choices of 
smallholder farmers in the Kat River Valley. In H. D. Van Schalkwyk, G. C. G. Fraser, A. 
Obi & A. van Tilburg (Eds.), Unlocking markets for smallholders. Lessons from South Africa 
(Vol. 10, pp. 59-89). Wageningen, the Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
Jensen, R. (2007). The digital provide: Information (technology), market performance, and 
welfare in the South Indian fisheries sector. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 879-
924.  
Jones, G.R., & Butler, J.E. (1988). Costs, revenue, and business-level strategy. Academy of 
Management Review, 202-213.  
Kabeer, N. (2002). The power to choose: Bangladeshi women and labour market decisions in London and 
Dhaka: Verso Books. 
Kaiser, H.F. (1974). An index of factorial simplicity. Psychometrika, 39(1), 31-36.  
Kalyebara, R., Nkub, J.M., Byabachwezi, M.S.R., Kikulwe, E.M., & Edmeades, S. (2007). 
Overview of Banana Economy in the Lake Victoria Regions of Uganda. In M. Smale & 
W. Tushemereirwe (Eds.), An economic assessment of banana genetic improvement and innovation in 
the Lake Victoria region of Uganda and Tanzania (Vol. 155, pp. 25-36). Washington, DC: 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
Kelsey, D. (1994). Maxmin expected utility and weight of evidence. Oxford Economic Papers, 425-
444.  
Key, Nigel, & Runsten, David. (1999). Contract farming, smallholders, and rural development in 
Latin America: The organization of agroprocessing firms and the scale of outgrower 
production. World Development, 27(2), 381-401.  
Kizito, A.M. (2011). The Structure, Conduct, and Performance of Agricultural Market Information Systems in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Michigan State University.    
Kleih, U., Ssango, F., Kyazze, F., Graffham, A., & MacGregor, J. (2007) Impact of EurepGAP 
on small-scale fruit and vegetable growers in Uganda.  (pp. 1-65). 
Klonner, S., Goethe, J.W., & Nolen, P. (2008). Does ICT Benefit the Poor? Evidence from South 
Africa. 17 July 2012, from 
Chapter 7 
 
 
154 
http://chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/research/research_calendar_attachments/se
minars_2009/sem_nolen101509.pdf 
Krishna Reddy, P., & Ankaiah, R. (2005). A framework of information technology-based 
agriculture information dissemination system to improve crop productivity. Current Science, 
88(12), 1905-1913.  
Lawson-Body, A., Willoughby, L., Keengwe, J., & Mukankusi, L. (2011). Cultural factors 
influencing cell phone adoption in developing countries: A qualitative study. Issues in 
Information Systems, 12(1), 9.  
Lazear, E.P., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts: National 
Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
Lebeau, F. (2009). Efficiency of the Ananas comosus (L.) Merr. flower induction treatment based 
on ethylene enriched activated carbon (TIFBio). Biotechnology, Agronomy, Society and 
Environment, 3.  
Levacic, R., Mitchell, J., Thompson, G., & Frances, J. (1991). Markets, hierarchies and networks: The 
coordination of social life: Sage Publications Limited. 
Lin, M., Li, S., & Whinston, A. (2011). Innovation and Price Competition in a Two-Sided Market. 
Journal of Management Information Systems, 28(2), 171-202. doi: 10.2753/mis0742-
1222280207 
Lindblom, C.E. (1977). Politics and markets: The world's political economic systems. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Liu, Q. (2006). Corporate governance in China: Current practices, economic effects and 
institutional determinants. CESifo Economic Studies, 52(2), 415-453.  
Lowry, P.B., Wall, J. D., & Selfridge, J. (2011). Why do Healthcare Organizations Choose to Violate 
Information Technology Privacy Regulations? Proposing the Selective Information Privacy Violations in 
Healthcare Organizations Model (SIPVHOM). Paper presented at the Working Papers on 
Information Systems, Sprouts. 
Lu, H. (2007). The role of guanxi in buyer-seller relationships in China : a survey of vegetable supply chains in 
Jiangsu Province. (PhD thesis, Wagenigen University.). Retrieved from 
http://library.wur.nl/wda/dissertations/dis4199.pdf   
Maddala, G.S., & Lahiri, K. (2006). Introduction to econometrics (Vol. 67). New York: Wiley. 
Maertens, M., Dries, L., Dedehouanou, F.A., & Swinnen, J.F.M. (2007). High-value supply 
chains, food standards and rural households in Senegal. In J. F. M. Swinnen (Ed.), Global 
Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor: How the Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affect 
Rural Development and Poverty (pp. 159-172): CAB International Publisher. 
Maranto, T., & Phang, S. (2010). Mobile Phone Access in Sub-Saharan Africa: Research and A Library 
Proposal. Paper presented at the Seminar in International and Comparative Librarianship.  
March, James G. (1988). Decisions and Organizations: Oxford, Inglaterra : Basil Blackwell. 
Marshall, M.N. (1996). Sampling for qualitative research. Family practice, 13(6), 522-526.  
McFadden, D. (1986). The choice theory approach to market research. Marketing science, 275-297.  
References 
 
 
155 
McGeorge, P., Crawford, J.R., & Kelly, S.W. (1997). The relationships between psychometric 
intelligence and learning in an explicit and an implicit task. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 23(1), 239.  
Ménard, C. (2004). The economics of hybrid organizations. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, 160(3), 345-376.  
Mendelson, H., & Tunca, T. I. (2007). Strategic spot trading in supply chains. Management Science, 
53(5), 742-759.  
Meyer, M., Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1992). Organizational prospects, influence costs, and 
ownership changes. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1(1), 9-35.  
Mikami, K. (2007). Asymmetric information and the form of enterprise: Capitalist firms and 
consumer cooperatives. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 163(2), 297-312.  
Mikami, K., & Tanaka, S. (2008). Food processing business and agriculture cooperatives in Japan: 
Market power and asymmetric information. Asian Economic Journal, 22(1), 83-107.  
Milgrom, Paul R., & Roberts, John. (1992). Economics, organization, and management. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
Minten, B., Randrianarison, L., & Swinnen, J.F.M. (2007). Global Supply Chains, Poverty and the 
Environment: Evidence from Madagascar. In J. F. M. Swinnen (Ed.), Global Supply Chains, 
Standards and the Poor: How the Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affects Rural 
Development and Poverty (pp. 147-158). London, UK & Washington, DC: CAB International  
Mitchell, R.C., & Carson, R.T. (1993). Using surveys to value public goods: the contingent valuation method: 
Resources for the Future. 
Mongbo, R., & Floquet, A. (2006). Pineapple Against Poverty?: Market Opportunities, Technological 
Development and Social Stratification in Southern Benin. Paper presented at the Prosperity and 
Poverty in a Globalized World: Challenges for Agricultural Research, Tropentag 2006, 
October 11 - 13, Bonn, Germany.  
Moreno-Monroy, A. I. (2010). Market access and the heterogeneous effect of shocks on wages: 
Evidence from Chinese cities. Papers in Regional Science, 90(1), 9-25.  
Mpuga, P. (2010). Constraints in access to and demand for rural credit: Evidence from Uganda. 
African Development Review, 22(1), 115-148.  
MTN-Benin. (2012). Couvernature Nationale. 13 September 2012, from 
http://www.mtn.bj/index.php?item=241 
Munyua, H. (2000a). Application of ICTs in Africa's agricultural sector: A gender perspective. In 
E. Rathgeber & E. Adera (Eds.), Gender and the information revolution in Africa (pp. 85-124). 
Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Center. 
Munyua, H. (2000b). Information and communication technologies for rural development and 
food security: Lessons from field experiences in developing countries: Sustainable 
Development Department, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(FAO). 
Muto, M., & Yamano, T. (2009). The impact of mobile phone coverage expansion on market 
participation: Panel data evidence from Uganda. World Development, 37(12), 1887-1896.  
Chapter 7 
 
 
156 
Mwesige, D. (2010). Working with Value Chains, Using Multi-Stakeholder Processes for Capacity 
Development in anAgricultural Value Chain in Uganda. In J. Ubels, N. A. Baddoo & A. 
Fowle (Eds.), Capacity Development in Practice (pp. 181-193). London- Washigton, DC: 
Earthscan. 
Nelson, R.R., & Sampat, B.N. (2001). Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping economic 
performance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 44(1), 31-54.  
Nord, W.R., & Tucker, S. (1987). Implementing routine and radical innovations: Lexington Books. 
North, D.C. (1981). Structure and change in economic history: Norton New York. 
North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. New York: Cambridge 
university press. 
North, D.C. (1991). Institutions. The journal of economic perspectives, 5(1), 97-112.  
Obi, A., Pote, P., & Chianu, J. (2011). Market Access: Components, Interactions, and 
Implications in Smallholder Agriculture in the Former Homeland Area of South Africa. 
Innovations as Key to the Green Revolution in Africa, 1161-1167.  
Oduh, M.O. (2012). Determinants of Willingness to Pay for Mobile Telecommunications 
Services in Nigeria. Journal of Information Engineering and Applications, 2(6), 33-43.  
Ordóñez Héctor, ZP, & Palau, H. (2006). Do food quality assurance systems demand complex 
governance structures? ORGANICOS. HEREFORD BEEF. BPA. ARGENTINA. Total 
de registros: 1 BD BIBLIO Ayuda Agri2000 MegaBase SIDALC.  
Ouchi, W.G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25, 129-141.  
Ouma, E.A., Obare, G.A., & Staal, S.J. (2003). Cattle as Assets: Assessment of Non-market Benefits from 
Cattle in Smallholder Kenyan Crop Livestock Systems. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
25th International Conference of Agricultural Economists (IAAE), 16-22 August, 
Durban, South Africa.  
Oxley, JE. (1999). Institutional environment and the mechanisms of governance: the impact of 
intellectual property protection on the structure of inter-firm alliances. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 38(3), 283-309.  
Ozer, O., & Wei, W. (2006). Strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under 
asymmetric forecast information. Management Science, 52(8), 1238-1257.  
Özer, Ö., & Wei, W. (2006). Strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under 
asymmetric forecast information. Management Science, 1238-1257.  
Paolisso, M.J., Hallman, K., Haddad, L.J., & Regmi, S. (2001). Does cash crop adoption detract 
from childcare provision? evidence from rural Nepal. 13 September 2012, from 
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/fcnbr109.pdf 
Papadopoulos, N., & Denis, J.E. (1988). Inventory, taxonomy and assessment of methods for 
international market selection. International Marketing Review, 5(3), 38-51.  
Parikh, T.S., Patel, N., & Schwartzman, Y. (2007). A survey of information systems reaching small 
producers in global agricultural value chains. Paper presented at the 2007 International 
Conference on Information and Communication Technologies and Development, ICTD 
2007. 
References 
 
 
157 
Pascucci, S. (2010). Governance Structure, Perception, and Innovation in Credence Food 
Transactions: The Role of Food Community Networks. International Journal on Food System 
Dynamics, 1(3), 224-236.  
Peters, R.G., Covello, V.T., & McCallum, D.B. (1997). The determinants of trust and credibility 
in environmental risk communication: An empirical study. Risk analysis, 17(1), 43-54.  
Podolny, Joel M. (1994). Market Uncertainty and the Social Character of Economic Exchange. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3), 458-483.  
Polson, R.A., & Spencer, D.S.C. (1991). The technology adoption process in subsistence 
agriculture: The case of cassava in Southwestern Nigeria. Agricultural Systems, 36(1), 65-78.  
Pop-Eleches, C., Thirumurthy, H., Habyarimana, J.P., Zivin, J.G., Goldstein, M.P., De Walque, 
D. (2011). Mobile phone technologies improve adherence to antiretroviral treatment in a 
resource-limited setting: a randomized controlled trial of text message reminders. Aids, 
25(6), 825.  
Popper, K.R. (1963). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
Porter, G. (2012). Mobile Phones, Livelihoods and the Poor in Sub-Saharan Africa: Review and 
Prospect. Geography Compass, 6(5), 241-259. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2012.00484.x 
Porter, G., Hampshire, K., Abane, A., Munthali, A., Robson, E., Mashiri, M. (2012). Youth, 
mobility and mobile phones in Africa: findings from a three-country study. Information 
Technology for Development, 18(2), 145-162. doi: 10.1080/02681102.2011.643210 
Powell, Walter W., & DiMaggio, Paul J. (1991). The New institutionalism in organizational analysis. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Provan, Keith G. (1993). Embeddedness, interdependence, and opportunism in organizational 
supplier-buyer networks. Journal of Management, 19(4), 841-856.  
Qu, L., Wang, X., Yang, J., Hood, E., & Scalzo, R. (2004). Ethephon promotes germination of 
Echinacea angustifolia and E. pallida in darkness. HortScience, 39(5), 1101-1103.  
Rao, P. (2003). The Economics of Transaction Costs: Theory Methods, and Application Palgrave 
Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Raymond, L., Bergeron, F., & Rivard, S. (1998). Determinants of business process reengineering 
success in small and large enterprises: an empirical study in the Canadian context. Journal 
of Small Business Management, 36, 72-85.  
Raynaud, E., Sauvee, L., & Valceschini, E. (2002). Governance of the Agri-food Chains as a 
Vector of Credibility for Quality Signalization in Europe. Papier de travail présenté au 
séminaire “Agroalimentaire”, Centre ATOM, Université de Paris I.  
Resende-Filho, M.A., & Hurley, T.M. (2012). Information asymmetry and traceability incentives 
for food safety. International Journal of Production economics(0).  
Rindfleisch, Aric, & Heide, Jan B. (1997). Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future 
Applications. The Journal of Marketing, 61(4), 30-54.  
Ritchie, B., & Brindley, C. (2006). Supply chain risk management and performance 
Chapter 7 
 
 
158 
A guiding framework for future development. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, 27, 303-322.  
Roberts, Nicholas, & Grover, Varun. (2012). Leveraging Information Technology Infrastructure 
to Facilitate a Firm's Customer Agility and Competitive Activity: An Empirical 
Investigation. Journal of Management Information Systems, 28(4), 231-270. doi: 
10.2753/mis0742-1222280409 
Ruben, R, Tilburg, A, Trienekens, J, & Boekel, M. (2007). Linking market integration, supply 
chain governance, quality and value added in tropical food chains. In R. Ruben, M. A. J. 
S. Boekel, A. van Tilburg & J. van Trienekens (Eds.), Tropical food chains : governance regimes 
for quality management (pp. 13-45). Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
Ryan, M., & Watson, V. (2009). Comparing welfare estimates from payment card contingent 
valuation and discrete choice experiments. Health economics, 18(4), 389-401.  
Sabel, C.F. (1993). Constitutional ordering in historical context. In F. W. Scharpf (Ed.), Games in 
hierarchies and networks: Analytical and empirical approaches to the study of governance institutions 
(pp. 65-123). Frankfurt: Camputs Verlag. 
Sabidussi, A. (2009). Governance choices for external sourcing in innovation : towards a portfolio of strategic 
alliances and mergers & acquisitions. (Ph.D. Thesis), Wageningen University and Research 
Center, Wageningen. Retrieved from http://edepot.wur.nl/15182   
Sah, R., & Stiglitz, J.E. (1986). The architecture of economic systems: Hierarchies and 
polyarchies. American economic review, 76, 716-727.  
Sall, S., Norman, D., & Featherstone, AM. (2000). Quantitative assessment of improved rice 
variety adoption: the farmer's perspective. Agricultural Systems, 66(2), 129-144.  
Salvatore, D. (2003). Microeconomics: theory and applications. Recherche, 67, 02.  
Sauvee, L. (2000). Managing a brand in the tomato sector: authority and enforcement mechanisms in a collective 
organization. 
Sauvee, L. (2002). Governance in Strategic Networks (pp. 1-19). ISAB Beauvais. 
Sey, A. (2010). Managing the cost of mobile communications in Ghana. Communication Technologies 
in Latin America and Africa, 143-166.  
Shiferaw, B., Hellin, J., & Muricho, G. (2011). Improving market access and agricultural 
productivity growth in Africa: What role for producer organizations and collective action 
institutions? Food Security, 3(4), 475-489.  
Shiferaw, B.A., & Teklewold, H. (2007). Structure and Functioning of Chickpea Markets in 
Ethiopia: Evidence Based on Analysis of Value Chains Linking Smallholders and Markets 
Improving productivity and Market Success (IPMS) of Ethiopia Farmers Project, International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). Working Paper, 6. Nairobi, Kenya. 
Slangen, LHG, Loucks, LA, & Slangen, AHL. (2008). Institutional Economics and Economic 
Organisation Theory: An Integrated Approach. Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
StatPac. (2010). Surveys Designing Tutorial: Survey Sampling Methods. 13 September 2012, from 
http://www.statpac.com/surveys/sampling.htm 
Stefik, M., & Stefik, B. (2004). Breakthrough: stories and strategies of radical innovation: The MIT Press. 
References 
 
 
159 
Stockbridge, M, Dorward, A, Kydd, J, Morrison, J, & Poole, N. (2003). Farmer organization for 
market access: International review. Briefing paper. 22 November 2012, from 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/R8275_040518_IntlRev_FO_MktAccss.pdf 
Suzuki, A., Jarvis, L.S., & Sexton, R.J. (2011). Partial Vertical Integration, Risk Shifting, and 
Product Rejection in the High-Value Export Supply Chain: The Ghana Pineapple Sector. 
World Development, 39(9), 1611-1623.  
Teece, D.J. (1986). Transactions cost economics and the multinational enterprise An Assessment. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 7(1), 21-45.  
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 509-533.  
Teoh, M.C., Low, S.P., & Raphael, B. (2008). Computer-based cartography: A marketing information 
system tool for the EU construction industry. Paper presented at the Association of Researchers 
in Construction Management, ARCOM 2008 - Proceedings of the 24th Annual 
Conference. 
Thangata, P.H., & Alavalapati, JRR. (2003). Agroforestry adoption in southern Malawi: the case 
of mixed intercropping of Gliricidia sepium and maize. Agricultural Systems, 78(1), 57-72.  
Thiele, G., Devaux, A., Reinoso, I., Pico, H., Montesdeoca, F., Pumisacho, M. (2011). Multi-
stakeholder platforms for linking small farmers to value chains: evidence from the Andes. 
International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability, 9(3), 423-433.  
Thiele, G., Devaux, A., Reinoso, I., Pico, H., Montesdeoca, F., Pumisacho, M. (2009). Multi-
stakeholder platforms for innovation and coordination in market chains. 
Tidd, J., Bessant, J.R., & Pavitt, K. (2005). Managing innovation: integrating technological, market and 
organizational change: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Tidd, J., & Hull, F.M. (2006). Managing service innovation: the need for selectivity rather than 
‘best practice’. New Technology, Work and Employment, 21(2), 139-161. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
005X.2006.00169.x 
Tidjani-Serpos, A. (2004). Contribution de la production d’ananas à l’amélioration des conditions 
de vie des producteurs : Cas des communes d’Abomey-Calavi et d’Allada dans le 
Département de l’Atlantique (Sud-BENIN). Thèse d’Ingénieur Agronome, Université d’Abomey-
Calavi. Bénin, 116.  
Trienekens, J. H. (2011). Agricultural value chains in developing countries a framework for 
analysis. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 14(2), 51-82.  
Trienekens, Jacques, & Zuurbier, Peter. (2008). Quality and safety standards in the food industry, 
developments and challenges. International Journal of Production economics, 113(1), 107-122.  
United Nations. (2008). Private-Sector Standards and National Schemes for Good Agricultural Practices: 
Implications for Exports of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables from sub-Saharan Africa Experiences of 
Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda. New York and Geneva: United Nations Publication. 
USAID. (2009). Facilitating the development of outgrowing operations: A manual. 22 November 
2012, from http://www.actionforenterprise.org/paper-usaid.pdf 
Chapter 7 
 
 
160 
Vagneron, I., Faure, G., & Loeillet, D. (2009). Is there a pilot in the chain? Identifying the key 
drivers of change in the fresh pineapple sector. Food Policy, 34(5), 437-446.  
van de Vrande, Vareska, Vanhaverbeke, Wim, & Duysters, Geert. (2009). External technology 
sourcing: The effect of uncertainty on governance mode choice. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 24(1), 62-80.  
Van Der Meer, C.L.J. (2006). Exclusion of small-scale farmers from coordinated supply chains. 
In R. Ruben, M. Slingerland & H. Nijhoff (Eds.), The agro-food chains and networks for 
developement (pp. 209-217). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Springer. 
van Schalkwyk, H.D., Groenewald, J.A., Fraser, G.C.G., Obi, A., & van Tilburg, A. (2012). 
Unlocking markets for smallholders, Lessons from South Africa (Vol. 10). Wageningen, the 
Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
van Tilburg, A., & van Schalkwyk, H.D. (2012). Strategies to improve smallholders’ market 
access. In H. D. Van Schalkwyk, G. C. G. Fraser, A. Obi & A. van Tilburg (Eds.), 
Unlocking markets for smallholders. Lessons from South Africa (Vol. 10, pp. 35-58). Wageningen, 
the Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
Verbeek, M. (2008). A guide to modern econometrics (3 ed.): Wiley. 
Verbeke, W., & Ward, R.W. (2006). Consumer interest in information cues denoting quality, 
traceability and origin: An application of ordered probit models to beef labels. Food 
Quality and Preference, 17(6), 453-467.  
Verkerk, R., Linnemann, A. , & van Boekel, M. (2007). Quality Analysis Critical control Points in 
consumer-oriented agro-food chains. In R. Ruben, M. van Boekel, A. van Tilburg & J. 
Trienekens (Eds.), Tropical Food chains, Governance regimes for quality management (pp. 241-
255). Wageningen: Academic Publishers, Wageningen. 
Vorst van der, J.G.A.J. (2000). Effective food supply chains: Generating, modelling and evaluating supply 
chain scenarios show extra info. (Ph.D. Thesis), Wageningen University and Research Center, 
Wageningen.    
Wang, C.L., & Ahmed, P.K. (2007). Dynamic capabilities: A review and research agenda. 
International Journal of Management Reviews, 9(1), 31-51.  
Wennink, B., & Heemskerk, W. (2006). Farmers' Organizations and Agricultural Innovation: Case 
Studies from Benin, Rwanda and Tanzania. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute (KIT). 
White, H. (2004). Books, buildings, and learning outcomes: An impact evaluation of World Bank support to 
basic education in ghana: World Bank Publications. 
White, S., & Fortune, P. (2004). Review of DFID Activities in the Enabling Environment. Final 
Report ICEE Team, Policy Division, DFID. United Kingdom. 
Williamson, O.E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: Free 
Press. 
Williamson, O.E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations. 
The journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233.  
Williamson, O.E. (1983). Credible commitments: Using hostages to support exchange. The 
American Economic Review, 73(4), 519-540.  
References 
 
 
161 
Williamson, O.E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting. 
New York: Free press. 
Williamson, O.E. (1989). Transaction cost economics. In R. Schnalense & R. Willig (Eds.), 
Handbook of Industrial Organization. New York: Elsevier Science. 
Williamson, O.E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural 
alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 269-296.  
Williamson, O.E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance: Oxford University Press, USA. 
Williamson, O.E. (1998). Transaction cost economics: how it works; where it is headed. De 
Economist, 146(1), 23-58.  
Wilson, D. (1987). Traditional systems of communication in modern African development: An 
analytical viewpoint. Africa Media Review, 1(2), 87-104.  
Wilson, J. (1986). The political economy of contract farming. Review of Radical Political Economics, 
18(4), 47-70.  
Woiceshyn, J., & Daellenbach, U. (2005). Integrative capability and technology adoption: 
evidence from oil firms. Industrial and Corporate Change, 14(2), 307-342.  
Wong, Y. H., & Chan, Ricky Yee-kwong. (1999). Relationship Marketing in China: Guanxi, 
Favouritism and Adaptation. Journal of Business Ethics, 22(2), 107-118. doi: 
10.1023/a:1006077210425 
Wood, GA, & Parr, JB. (2005). Transaction Costs, Agglomeration Economies, and Industrial 
Location*. Growth and Change, 36(1), 1-15.  
World Bank. (2010a). Benin - Agricultural Productivity and Diversification Project Project 
Appraisal Document (pp. 1-200). Washington D.C.: The Worldbank. 
World Bank. (2010b). The little data book on information and communication technology, 
Development Data Group. 22 November 2012, from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATION
ANDTECHNOLOGIES/Resources/LittleDataBook2010.pdf 
World Bank. (2011). The little data book on information and communication technology, 
Development Data Group. 22 November 2012, from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONAND
TECHNOLOGIES/Resources/ICT_Little_Data2011.pdf 
World Bank. (2012). Word Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Finance 
(GDF). Word bank databank. 10 October 2012, from 
<http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do> 
World Bank, & ITU. (2012). The little data book on information and communication technology, 
Development Data Group. 17 July 2012, from 
http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/little-data-book-on-info-comm-tech-
2012.pdf 
Wynne, A.T., & Lyne, M.C. (2004). Rural economic growth linkages and small scale poultry 
production: A survey of producers in KwaZulu-Natal. Agrekon: Agricultural Economics 
Research, Policy and Practice in Southern Africa, 43(1), 1-21.  
Chapter 7 
 
 
162 
Xia, M., & Xia, N. (2008). The Complementary Effects of E-Markets on Existing Supplier-Buyer 
Relationships in a Supply Chain. Journal of Management Information Systems, 25(3), 9-64. doi: 
10.2753/mis0742-1222250301 
Yankah, K. (1989). Proverbs: The aesthetics of traditional communication. Research in African 
Literatures, 20(3), 325-346.  
Yin, R.K. (1994). Case study research. Design and methods, 2.  
Zaharieva, Elissaveta, Gorton, Matthew, & Lingard, John. (2003). Procurement mechanisms and 
the emergence of new governance structures in the CEECs: evidence from the Bulgarian 
wine industry. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 9(5-6), 235-245.  
Zegeye, T., Tadesse, B., Tesfaye, S., Nigussie, M., Tanner, D., & Twumasi-Afriyie, S. (2001, 12-16 
November 2001). Determinants of adoption of improved maize technologies in major maize growing 
regions of Ethiopia. Paper presented at the Enhancing the contribution of maize to food 
security in Ethiopia. Proceedings of the Second National Maize Workshop of Ethiopia, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Ziggers, G.W., & Trienekens, J. (1999). Quality assurance in food and agribusiness supply chains: 
developing successful partnerships. International Journal of Production economics, 60, 271-279.  
Zucker, L.G. (1986). Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure, 
1840â€“1920. Research in organizational behavior, 8, 53-111.  
Zuniga-Arias, G., & Ruben, R. (2007). Determinants of market outlet choice for mango 
producers in Costa Rica. In R. Ruben, M. A. J. S. van Boekel, A. van Tilburg & J. 
Trienekens (Eds.), Tropical food chains : governance regimes for quality management. (pp. 49-67). 
Wageningen, Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 
163 
 
 
8 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 8 
 
 
164 
  
Appendices 
 
 
165 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary results of principal component analysis 
Specificity of investment (Eigenvalues> 2.12; KMO=0.6; Bartlett's Test Chi-Square 210.692***)
 Mean Stand. 
dev. 
Factors’ Loading 
Human asset 
specificity 
Physical asset 
specificity  
If I stop working with this market, I will lose a lot of knowledge 
regarding the method of operation in this market 
1.28 .887 0.841 0.214
Losing investments made in production if switching to another 
product 
1.27 .827 0.808 0.011 
If my principal client doesn’t come on time I lose an important 
investment 
2.10 1.513 0.752 -0.227
We made high investments for pineapple production 3.64 1.861 -0.351 0.755
We made high investments for upgrading pineapple quality 1.07 .512 0.318 0.690 
Uncertainty (Eigenvalues> 1.5; KMO=0.6; Bartlett's Test Chi-Square 35.641***)
 Mean Stand.dev
. 
Market 
Uncertainty 
Behaviour 
Uncertainty 
The price we arrange with our most important buyers is stable 3.00 1.409 0.701 -0.288 
The quality required by our most important buyers is always 
stable 
3.55 1.312 0.695 -0.053
The amount of product bought by our most important buyers is 
always stable 
1.45 1.092 0.691 0.219 
Connectedness (Eigenvalues> 1.7; KMO=0.7; Bartlett's Test Chi-Square 67.766***) 
 Mean Stand.dev
. 
Factors’ Loading
Connectedness 
We are aware of the required quality by the customers of our 
direct customers 
2.59 1.719 0.742 
The harvesting period is determined by the demands of the 
customers to our direct customers 
2.51 1.519 0.719 
We receive a command from our buyer before we apply FIT 
and Ethephon 
2.15 1.633 0.629 
We are aware of the price paid by the customers to our direct 
customers 
1.55 1.213 0.522 
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Market Attributes (Eigenvalues> 2.9; KMO=0.7; Bartlett's Test Chi-Square 897.609***)
 Mean Stand.dev
. 
Pre-agreed 
marketing 
arrangement 
Diversifi
ed 
preferen
ce 
Permanent
e demand 
Quality is pre-agreed with my buyers 1.74 1.381 0.884 -0.048 0.027 
Price is pre-agreed with my buyers 1.63 1.386 0.827 -0.140 0.011
Specific production and harvesting practices are pre-agreed 1.37 1.086 0.762 0.068 0.110 
Volume/quantity are pre-agreed with my buyers 1.40 1.114 0.748 0.104 0.085 
I prefer to sell pineapples to modern markets 3.33 1.724 -0.028 0.949 -0.078
I prefer to sell pineapples to different markets 3.34 1.681 -0.061 0.923 -0.117 
I prefer to sell pineapples using different transaction 
agreements 
3.13 1.725 0.087 0.830 -0.126
Existence of permanent pineapple market and demand 4.59 .916 0.036 -0.113 0.852 
I am able to sell all of my pineapples 4.17 1.355 0.129 -0.135 0.826 
Institutional support (Eigenvalues>2.3; KMO=0.6; Bartlett's Test Chi-Square 67.766***)
   Institutional environment 
The institution assists in providing trainings on good 
agronomical practices 
0.49 0.501 0.887 
The institution assists in providing quality norms and 
standards 
0.40 0.492 0.878 
The institution assists in search for pineapple buyers 0.12 0.329 0.626 
The institution assists in providing/finding inputs 0.15 0.367 0.591 
Trust (control) (Eigenvalues> 1.7; KMO=0.7 Bartlett's Test Chi-Square 67.766***) 
 Mean Stand.dev
. 
Trust and commitment
Based on experience, I can rely on the buyers to fulfil 
agreements with complete confidence 
3.39 1.560 0.923 
The buyers have been fair in their negotiations with me 3.74 1.287 0.889 
My previous relationships with my buyers are satisfactory 3.78 1.239 0.879 
I should not hesitate to make important selling decisions 
based on my buyers’ suggestions 
3.70 1.387 0.840 
I expect the buyers to be working with me for a long time 3.94 1.318 0.797 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for pineapple farmers 
Name of Enumerator ……………………………………… Date ____ /____/_____/    Quest 
N°/_____/ 
 
Identification 
Sections Modalities Write the 
answers 
First and last name of 
respondent 
 
Department   
District    
Village  
 
a. Personal characteristics 
Gender Age 
Education level  Have you received trainings 
in pineapple production 
/processing/  
trading ? 
Who provided the 
trainings (precise 
Name) 
Pineapple 
production 
experience 
Type farmer 
1=male 
0=female years 
0=no education 
1=primary school 
2=middle school 
3=high school  
4=university level 
1=Yes
0=No 1= extension services, 2=NGOs  
3=Research 
4=other (précis) 
years 
1=large (>5ha)
2=medium (1-5ha) 
3=small (<1 ha) 
  
 
    
 
 
1. Have you made any changes in your trade practices in order to improve the quality of products and satisfy 
your clients during the last five years? □ Yes □ Non 
If yes what changes did you make? 
a_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
b_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
c_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
If no why don’t you change?   
a_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
b_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
c_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Resources 
 
1. How much farmland do you own?    (ha) 
2. How much farmland do you use for pineapple production?       (ha) or         (%) 
3. How many pineapples do you harvest during the last season?   (kg) 
4. Which variety of pineapples do you produce and what are the proportions of each of them? 
 Cayenne smooth (Abacaxi)  % 
 Pain de sucre (sugarloaf)  % 
 Others (specify) (  ) % 
              100% 
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b. Channel choice 
 
Please select the two most important pineapple markets for you _____and _____ then answer the following 
questions:  
1=local market; 2=urban market; 3= processing company; 4= exporting company;5= Regional market, 6=Other (to be specified) 
(__________________________) 
 If you only have one market, then the following questions are answered according to this market, no answer for 2nd market. 
 
Please indicate your response to the following statements. 
                                                   1st market 2nd market 
5. How far is this market away from your home?________________ (km) ____________ 
6. How long does it take to reach this market?________________ (hours) ____________ 
7. What transportation vehicle do you use for this market (specify) ____________ ____________ 
 
8. Would you please select your pineapple destination and write the development for each of them in 
terms of sales percentage for the last two pineapple seasons and expected in 2011 respectively? 
 
    Last period 2periods ago expected in 2011  Experience 
(next period) 
Local market   ______%  ______% ______% 
 _______(years) 
Urban market   ______%  ______% ______% 
 _______(years) 
Processing company   ______%  ______% ______% 
 _______(years) 
Exporting company/assoc. ______%  ______% ______% 
 _______(years) 
Regional market   ______%  ______% ______% 
 _______(years) 
Other (specify) (  ) ______%  ______% ______% 
 _______(years) 
  Total          100%       100%       100% 
For the selected channel(s), please indicate what the characteristics of each of them are: 
 not true                   totally 
at all     1st market    true 
 
2nd market 
9. This market requires consistent quality pineapples 1    2    3    4    5 ________ 
10. This market has accurate delivery time and delivery place 1    2    3    4    5 ________
 
Please indicate your response to the following statements: 
 not true                   totally 
at all                            true 
11. I am able to sell all of my pineapples 1    2    3    4    5 
12. I prefer to sell pineapples to different markets 1    2    3    4    5 
13. I prefer to sell pineapples to modern markets, such as supermarkets, 
processing companies, exporting companies, etc. 
1    2    3    4    5 
14. I prefer to sell pineapples using different transaction agreements 1    2    3    4    5 
Are there any other reasons for your choice of buyer? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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c. Transaction attributes 
The transaction attributes are related to a set of constructs defined by Williamson explaining what the determinants of the transaction cost 
are. The transactions are described by the following three TAs: specificity of the investments; uncertainty regarding the process and the 
value of the transaction; connectedness. These attributes of the transaction are assumed to affect the choice of a channel and also the choice 
of the GS. 
 
Transaction specific investments 
The specificity of the investment is reflected by the non-transferability of this investment to other activities or to other segments of the chain. 
An investment is considered to be specific for an asset when its procurement requires a large amount of money (> 50,000 fcfa). Human, 
site and the temporal specificity are considered in this study. 
 
Please indicate your response regarding the following statements. 
 not true                 totally 
at all     1st market      true 
 
2nd market 
15. We have made large investments (> 50,000 FCFA) for pineapple production in the 
last 5 years  
1    2    3    4    5 ______ 
16. We have made a large investment (> 50,000 FCFA) for upgrading pineapple quality 
in the last 5 years 
1    2    3    4    5 ______
17. We have made a large investment (> 50,000 FCFA) for acquiring knowledge and 
training in pineapple trading during the last 5 years 
1    2    3    4    5 ______
18. We have made significant investments to deliver products to this market 1    2    3    4    5 ______ 
19. If we switch to another market we would lose a lot of investments that we have 
made to sell to this market 
1    2    3    4    5 ______ 
20. If we decided to stop working with this market, we would lose a lot of knowledge 
regarding the method of operation in this market 
1    2    3    4    5 ______
 
Transaction uncertainty 
The transaction uncertain is seeing from two angles: the uncertainty of the transaction and human opportunism behaviour. This component 
of TAs are determinant to explain the high or low level of the transaction cost. 
 
 
 not true                 totally 
at all     1st market    true 
 
2nd market 
21. The amount of product bought by our most important buyers is always stable 1    2    3    4    5 ______ 
22. The quality required by our most important buyers is always stable 1    2    3    4    5 ______
23. The price we arrange with our most important buyers is stable 1    2    3    4    5 ______ 
24. The amount of product is never affected by the unpredictable climate change 
(instability of the rainfall between years) 
1    2    3    4    5 ______ 
 
Connectedness to other transactions 
 not true                 totally 
at all     1st market    true 2nd market 
25. I am aware of the required quality by the customers of my direct customers 1    2    3    4    5 ______
26. I am aware of the price paid by the customers to my direct customers 1    2    3    4    5 ______ 
27. The harvesting period is determined by the demands of the customers to my 
direct customers 
1    2    3    4    5 ______
28. I receive supports from buyer (or other chain actor) to harvest to products 1    2    3    4    5 ______
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Access to information 
The channel used to get information on the market and the required quality in different markets is also an  aspect that determines the 
choice of a particular market or GS. It is considered to be a transaction attribute that can permit to get further insight into the choice 
made by each actor involved in a segment of the chain. For this purpose the following questions are posed: 
 
29. In which way do you get the information? □verbally, □ written, □ mobile (or SMS) 
30. Do you use intermediaries to get access to information on the availability of buyers? □ yes, □ no 
31. How much time do you spend getting the price information?  __________________(hour)  
32. How important is the following information to your activities and where do you get it? 
 
Information type Importance  Main source 
Product price 1    2    3    4    5   
Selling location (distance) 1    2    3    4    5  
Quality of inputs 1    2    3    4    5   
Quantity of inputs 1    2    3    4    5   
Quality asked in the market 1    2    3    4    5  
Supply chain actor´s reputation 1    2    3    4    5   
 
d. Governance structure 
Based on Williamson’s perception of TCE, GS  is considered to be a form of relationship arranged by the actor with their upstream 
suppliers. This relationship can be a spot market type (without any arrangement) with contract arrangement (formal or informal). The 
following questions will help to understand what these arrangements are.  
 
33. Please, indicates what type of arrangement is commonly used by you in selling your product, and select 
the duration of this arrangement: 
Verbal arrangement □one harvest □ one season □several seasons □ Other (specify)(___________) 
Written arrangement □one harvest □ one season □several seasons □ Other 
(specify)(___________) 
 
34. Please, indicates what type of arrangement is commonly used to get your inputs (e.g. Ethephon or 
fertilizers) and select the duration of this arrangement: 
- Verbal arrangement □one harvest □ one season □several seasons □ Other 
(specify)(___________) 
- Written arrangement □one harvest □ one season □several seasons □ Other 
(specify)(___________) 
 
Please, can you specify what terms are indicated in the agreement:
 
not true               totally
at all   1st market     true 2nd market 
35. My transactions with buyers are based on written contracts 1    2    3    4    5 ________ 
36. Price is pre-agreed with my buyers  1    2    3    4    5 ________
37. Quality is pre-agreed with my buyers 1    2    3    4    5 ________ 
38. Specific production and harvesting practices are pre-agreed 1    2    3    4    5 ________
39. Volumes are pre-agreed with my buyers 1    2    3    4    5 ________
40. Delivery time and place are pre-agreed with my buyers  1    2    3    4    5 ________ 
41. Buyer pre-pays (credit) for my farm activities  1    2    3    4    5 ________ 
42. Buyer directly provides me some input (e.g. Ethephon or fertilizer) 1    2    3    4    5 ________
43. Buyer follows the quality of pineapple on farm and sometimes provides me with trainings, 
monitoring and or technical assistance 
1    2    3    4    5 ________ 
44. Clauses that define penalties if deadlines, services or products are not met, or product 
quality is not fulfilled 
1    2    3    4    5 ________ 
45. I belong to a producers’ cooperative which follows the quality of pineapple on farm 1    2    3    4    5 ________
46. I belong to a producers’ cooperative which provides with trainings and monitoring 
assistance 
1    2    3    4    5 ________
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Please, can you specify what terms are indicated in the agreement: 
 
not true               totally 
at all   1st market     true 
 
2nd market 
47. I belong to a producers ‘cooperative which takes all my product and helps to find market 1    2    3    4    5 ________ 
 
 
Trust  
 not true                   totally 
at all     1st market      true 2nd market 
48. The buyers I trade with have a good reputation 1    2    3    4    5 _______ 
49. I should not hesitate to make important selling decisions based on my buyers’ 
suggestions 
1    2    3    4    5 _______ 
50. My previous relationships with my buyers are satisfactory 1    2    3    4    5 _______
51. I  expect the buyers to be working with me for a long time 1    2    3    4    5 _______
52. The buyers have been fair in their negotiations with us  1    2    3    4    5 _______ 
53. The buyers may act at our expense  1    2    3    4    5 _______
54. Based on experience, I can rely on the buyers to fulfil agreements with complete 
confidence 
1    2    3    4    5 _______
 
e. Performance 
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Sales growth 
All the information collected above will be considered as explanatory variables to understand the performance of this segment of the chain. 
Will be considered as performance indicators: sales growth, the quality performance and the profit margin 
 
55. Considering the year 2008 as equal to 100%, what has been the development of your pineapple sales? 
 
 Cayenne smooth cultivar Pain de sucre cultivar 
 1st market 2nd market 1st market 2nd market 
2005  
_________% 
 
_________% 
 
_________% 
 
_________% 
 
 2009 100% 100% 100% 100% 
expected in year 2011 
_________% _________% _________% 
 
_________% 
 
 
56. What do you think that are the main causes of these developments? 
1st________________________________________________________________________________________ 
2nd________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3rd________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  not true               totally 
at all   1st market     true 2nd market 
57. My buyers are satisfied with the quality of my pineapples 1    2    3    4    5 ________ 
58. I am happy with the price I get from my buyers 1    2    3    4    5 ________
59. I get a good price for high quality pineapples from my buyers  1    2    3    4    5 ________ 
 
 
Quality perception and pineapple rejection 
 
60. What are are the  vous quand dit-on qu’un ananas est de bonne qualité ? 
a_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
b_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
c_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
61. Are you used to apply Ethephon/Ethrel for uniform maturity of the pineapple? □Yes  □No 
62. If yes at which moment of the production cycle you apply it? ____________(months after planting) 
63. Sort the elements of quality below from the most important to the least important 
 
Activities Smooth cayenne cultivar Sugarloaf cultivar
Low      1st market        high 
importance          importance 
2nd 
market 
Low      1st market       high 
importance      importance 
 2nd 
market 
Control of maturity days 1      2      3      4      5 ________ 1      2      3      4      5 ________
Peal colour 1      2      3      4      5 ________ 1      2      3      4      5 ________
Pulp colour 1      2      3      4      5 ________ 1      2      3      4      5 ________
Fruit size 1      2      3      4      5 ________ 1      2      3      4      5 ________
Fruit shape 1      2      3      4      5 ________ 1      2      3      4      5 ________
No external damage  1      2      3      4      5 ________ 1      2      3      4      5 ________
No internal damage 1      2      3      4      5 ________ 1      2      3      4      5 ________
Fruit taste 1      2      3      4      5 ________ 1      2      3      4      5 ________
Fruit firmness 1      2      3      4      5 ________ 1      2      3      4      5 ________
 
64. Did you experience cases of rejection of your product? Yes □  No □  If no continue wit 
question 81 
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Rejection Percentage What are the main cause What is done with the 
rejected pineapple 
In farm for the export market ______%  
In the harbour for export market ______%   
In the farm for urban market ______%  
In the urban market ______%   
In the farm for local market ______%  
In the local market ______%  
In the farm for the processing company ______%   
Other (_______________________) ______%  
 
65. Can you please indicate the proportion of the pineapple you sold for the following quality grade in the 
last season: 
 
Pineapple 
grade Grade description 
Smooth cayenne   Sugarloaf  
Percentage 
of trade 
product 
(%) 
Price Percentage 
of trade 
product 
(%) 
 
Local 
marke
t 
Regional 
market 
EU 
marke
t 
Local 
mark
et 
Regional 
market 
EU 
marke
t 
Grade III 
(class C) 
- very small weight 
significantly lower 
than (700g) 
- defects in shape & 
presence of fungus 
        
Grade II  
(class B) 
- medium size and 
Weight (slight < 700g or 
slightly > 700g) 
- slight defects in 
shape almost 
absence of fungus 
        
Grade I 
(class A) 
- No physical 
damage and 
absence of fungus 
-Weight ≈700g (big) 
        
Profit margin 
 
66. Would you please select the range of your total sales and profit for your pineapple sale in  2009? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SALES 
 Lower than 100,000 FCFA  
 Between 100,000 and 500,000 FCFA 
 Between 500,000 and 1,000,000 FCFA 
 Between 1,000,000 and 5,000,000 FCFA 
 Higher than 5,000,000 FCFA 
PROFIT 
 Negative profit (lost) 
 Positive but lower than 100,000 FCFA  
 Between 100,000 and 500,000 FCFA 
 Between 500,000 and 1,000,000 FCFA 
 Between 1,000,000 and 5,000,000 FCFA 
 Higher than 5,000,000 FCFA
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f. Institutional environment and arrangement 
 
We want to get an idea about the benefits/assistance you get from institutional environment for your pineapple 
production and marketing. Please indicate your response to the following statements. 
 
What are the existing institutions/organisations (extension services, NGOs, Research, Banks and credits facility- 
formal & informal- institutions) that support pineapple production in your village? Select the two main. 
 
 1st institution 2nd institution 
Name of the institutions ________________ ____________ 
 
 Low            1st inst             high  
importance              importance 
2nd institution
Degree of relevance of assistance 1      2      3      4      5 _______
Frequency of their visit  1      2      3      4      5 _______ 
Level of practicability/applicability of the intervention 1      2      3      4      5 _______ 
 
 
Which role do these institutions play - according to you: 
 not true                              totally 
at all     1st institution            true 
 
2nd institution 
67. to find new buyers and new markets 1    2    3    4    5 _______ 
68. to inform us about the required quality standards and norms 1    2    3    4    5 _______
69. to get payment more quickly  1    2    3    4    5 _______
70. to improve my production technology 1    2    3    4    5 _______ 
71. to order through telephone 1    2    3    4    5 _______ 
72. to get credits from my buyers quickly 1    2    3    4    5 _______
73. to get planting material or other inputs 1    2    3    4    5 _______
74. to provide credit/loan for pineapple production (or help to get credit 
from banks) 
1    2    3    4    5 _______ 
75. Other role (…………………………….) 1    2    3    4    5 _______ 
76. Are the required conditions easy to fulfil to get these services? □Yes  □No 
77. What makes it easier or difficult? Give one reason for each institution 
1st________________________________________________________________________________________
2nd________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3rd 
Inst_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Are you charged for these services? □Yes  □No 
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g. Using ICTs to receive market and quality information in pineapple supply chain 
 
The goal here is to assess perceptions of the traders on the application of innovation using new communication technology and new institutional arrangement for quality and 
price information diffusion among chain actor. 
 
Please to give a grade/score to the following innovation according to your perceptions and their own conditions? 
 
Do you have a mobile phone?  □Yes  □No 
Do you use mobile phone ? □Yes  □No 
What is telephone number? /_________________________/ 
 
 
 not true                 totally 
at all                       true 
How much are you will to 
pay for this (≤4000 FCFA)
What are the requested condition
1. I acknowledge that the use of SMS from mobile can help to improve my access to the 
information on quality request by the customers 
1    2    3    4    5
2. I am willing to get quality information (Norms and disease control) via SMS 1    2    3    4    5   
3. I acknowledge that the use of SMS from mobile can be help to improve my access to 
the information on market price of pineapple 
1    2    3    4    5
4. I am willing to pay to get price information via SMS 1    2    3    4    5   
5. I acknowledge that the use of SMS from mobile can help to make offers of my product 
to buyers 
1    2    3    4    5   
6. I am willing to pay to make product offers via SMS 1    2    3    4    5   
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Summary 
This study, part of CoQA’s multidisciplinary research, programme, aims to identify and 
characterize the marketing channels that smallholder farmers participate in, their governance 
structures (GSs) and explore an innovative mechanism to overcome market information 
asymmetric in Benin’s pineapple supply chain. 
Primary producers in low income countries face a range of obstacles: poor infrastructure, the lack 
of an enabling environment that offers institutional support, and of available resources and 
inefficiently and ineffectively coordinated value chains. Smallholder producers are at a particular 
disadvantage because they have little capital endowment to invest, rely on traditional techniques 
and family labour and lack contact with (international) market players. There is much literature 
on participation in market channels, with most of the work dealing with the nature of the 
producer-distributor relationship. However these studies have not modelled simultaneous 
participation in different market channels and did not seek to determine the role of product 
quality and suppliers’ bargaining power as factors. Smallholder farmers also lack vertical linkages 
and collective actions in marketing channels which, some argue, results in their exclusion from 
international (export) markets. It has also been argued that the bargaining power of chain 
stakeholders in marketing channels plays major role in excluding smallholder farmers from 
markets. 
However, most of this evidence comes from the South African context, and needs to be 
validated in different agro-ecological and economic contexts. This thesis examines the pineapple 
supply chain in Benin where most production is in the Guineo Congolian agroecological zone, 
and is largely oriented towards national and regional markets, which have less stringent quality 
and standards requirements than European markets. This thesis explores the extent to which the 
factors discussed above hold true in the Beninese context, and seeks to add to the literature that 
seeks to explain why small scale producers in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries often do not 
benefit from the growth of higher value commodity chains in emerging regional and urban 
markets. 
Mapping and chain barriers 
Chapter 2 maps Benin’s pineapple supply chains, paying particular emphasis to the forms of 
relationships between chain actors, the constraints and challenges they face and strategies they 
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adopt for improving quality and market access. This sheds light on the GSs already established 
and the extent to which these fill the existing gap of limited institutional support and reduce 
transaction costs. An overview of the pineapple supply chain in Benin is provided, indentifying 
the principal chain actors, their roles, importance, targeted markets and positions along the 
supply chain. Using a case study approach, it identifies the main issues about quality and market 
access along the supply chain, the socio-cultural conditions that affect profitability and the 
strategies developed to cope with the recurrent barriers. It was found that these barriers include 
(1) a lack of appropriate financial support (low market access and high interest rates) for a crop 
that is highly financially demanding (needing an average initial investment of $US 4,500 per 
hectare). (2) High quality standards on international markets, which act as barriers for small-scale 
producers: as a result of these Benin has only two companies exporting fresh pineapple to the 
EU. The majority of fresh pineapple is sold either on national or regional markets. The few 
farmers who do participate in international markets are engaged in outgrowing schemes, a 
hierarchical governance structure that allows them to reach these markets. (3) There is a lack of 
adequate transport facilities, resulting in the frequent overloading of fruit in trucks and cars and 
leading to high levels of damage (about 20%) to the fruit. (4) The chain is also characterized by 
high transaction costs, and weak levels of trust among chain actors, which give rise to conflicts 
between buyers and sellers. (5) Finally, farmers located in rural areas, have poor access to quality 
and market information both for inputs and products. One way of reducing transaction costs, 
may be to promote outgrowing schemes and develop formalized trading arrangements (involving 
a third party to safeguard investments) focused on the existing Nigerian market. 
Governance structures 
Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence on the determinants of producers’ choice of governance 
structures. It is based on transaction cost theory and considers the connectedness of a transaction 
as a determinant of producers’ choice of GS. It employs a multivariate econometric approach to 
explain why smallholder farmers generally opt for multiple governance strategies in their 
transactions. The study develops Williamson’s concept of the attributes of transactions by 
emphasizing connectedness as an important attribute when making a choice about governance 
structure in less developed counties like Benin. The construct of multiple-governance structure 
was investigated to further understand how and why farmers select among these governance 
structures and what guides their decisions. Farmers opt for multi-governance as a strategy to 
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safeguard their investments. This strategy is used by small-scale farmers as a means of selling 
different categories (in terms of quality) of their produce to different supply chains. Farmers 
involved in the outgrowing scheme GS are less likely to be involved in another type of 
governance; showing the specificity and exclusivity of this type of transaction arrangement in the 
pineapple supply chain. 
Marketing channel participation 
Chapter 4 investigates the determinants of smallholder farmers’ marketing channel participation 
decisions. It does so by complementarily using simple and multivariate Probit models. It provides 
insights into the influence of farmers’ characteristics (age and education level), their production 
systems (farm size and produced varieties), product quality (quality requirement and rejection 
rates) and marketing context (distance, the formality of the buyer-seller relation, the duration of 
the relationship, written contract) on participation in four major marketing channels (rural, urban, 
fresh export, and processing markets). The assumption that smallholder famers are excluded 
from international markets is rejected. Farmers diversify their production systems by planting two 
varieties simultaneously as a protective measure to safeguard their investments. Those involved in 
export marketing channels are less likely to send their pineapples to the urban market. The 
chapter contributes to theory by identifying that farmers supply the market channel best suited to 
the attributes of their produce. Bargaining power and physical distance were also identified as 
major determinants of marketing channel selection. Improving the existing physical infrastructure 
could help to overcome this problem. Alternatively, a solution could be found in enhancing 
farmers’ bargaining power through improving their access to information about production and 
markets (quality improvement techniques, market demand, up-to-date market prices and new 
varieties).  
Dealing with information asymmetry  
Chapter five assesses farmers’ willingness to use a mobile phone to supply and receive market 
and quality information on pineapple, and the amount they would be willing to pay for these 
services, which would overcome information asymmetry issues in the along the value chains. 
Request conditions and partnerships among value chain actors for sustainable smallholders’ 
access to high income markets were addressed by suggesting an ICT based multi-stakeholder 
platform for market information access. The chapter illustrates the potential value of ICT in 
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facilitating trading networks, and, most importantly, maintaining product quality, saving transport 
and market search time and reducing the number of unnecessary intermediaries. Lessons learnt 
from the case study in Ghana show the potential importance of ICT in developing and 
promoting quality and market access in fresh agri-food supply chains, not only in Benin but also 
across SSA countries that face similar challenges.  
Managerial implications 
Despite the existence of national institutes and support services involved in quality control and 
strengthening actors’ capacity to comply with quality standards, there is a clear need to design a 
better mechanism for coordinating the supply chain. If small scale producers are to respond to 
the quality norms and standards for regional and international markets they need to make 
investments in their production. Such investments ether from state, financial partners or NGOs 
are needed for building roads, cooling chain, safe handling and storage facilities, waste chemical 
disposal pits, hand washing facilities, personal protective equipment, knapsack sprayers, certified 
planting material, etc. The study suggests that promoting outgrowing schemes (aimed at the 
existing Nigerian markets) may be the best way to do this. Such arrangements would help to 
reduce the transaction costs related to market information asymmetry along the pineapple supply 
chain and the informal costs this gives rise to. It would also help to reduce bounded human 
rationality and opportunistic behaviour and would shift the governance structure from the spot 
market (now dominant) to a more integrated one. Pineapple production in Benin is recognized as 
having a huge potential. The supply chain is acquiring an increased international orientation 
despite the low adaptive capacities of smallholder farmers to comply with required norms and 
quality standards. Although the knowledge that farmers have is often underestimated, the supply 
chain is characterized by an asymmetry of information which unfairly rewards some and excludes 
others. To overcome this situation, information and communication technologies (ICT), such as 
a mobile phone IMS platform, could be  an appropriate tool to provide smallholder farmers with 
a package of advisory services about current market prices, bids and offers, advice for disease 
control, quality information, etc. These services could be provided at a low cost, through an SMS 
service in a local language understandable to the farmer. Even though farmers showed a high 
WTP for a mobile phone-based MIS, it remains important to assess how the existing 
infrastructure and institutional organizations can support such a process and make it effective. 
This offers opportunities for future development and policy-oriented research.  
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Samenvatting 
Deze studie, onderdeel van het multidisciplinaire onderzoeksprogramma CoQA's, is gericht op 
het identificeren en het karakteriseren van marketing kanalen waaraan kleine boeren deelnemen, 
de daarin gehanteerde governance-structuren (GS) en het verkennen van innovatieve 
mechanismen om een asymmetrische verdeling van marktinformatie over betrokken actoren in 
de Beninese ananas keten te overwinnen. 
Primaire producenten in landen met lage inkomens worden geconfronteerd met een aantal 
barrières: slechte infrastructuur, het gebrek aan institutionele ondersteuning, onvoldoende 
middelen, en inefficiënt en ondoelmatig gecoördineerde waarde-ketens. Kleinschalige 
producenten zijn in het nadeel, vanwege hun lage vermogenspositie om te investeren, hun 
vertrouwen op traditionele technieken en op gezinsarbeid, en een gebrek aan contact met 
(internationale) marktpartijen. Er is veel literatuur over participatie in marketing kanalen, waarin 
de meeste aandacht uitgaat naar de aard van de relatie tussen producent-distributeur. Deze 
studies nemen niet de mogelijke, gelijktijdige deelname van ketenpartijen aan verschillende 
marketing kanalen in beschouwing. Tevens nemen deze studies de kwaliteit van het product en 
de onderhandelingspositie van leveranciers niet mee als factoren. Kleine boeren ontberen ook 
verticale relaties en collectieve acties in marketing kanalen. Dit verklaart, volgens sommigen, de 
uitsluiting van kleine boeren van internationale (export) markten. In de literatuur wordt tevens 
verondersteld dat de onderhandelingspositie van ketenpartijen in marketing kanalen een 
belangrijke rol speelt in het uitsluiten van kleine boeren van markten. 
Echter, het grootste deel van de genoemde studies is uitgevoerd in Zuid-Afrikaanse context, en 
dient nog te worden gevalideerd in andere agro-ecologische en economische contexten. Dit 
proefschrift onderzoekt de ananas keten in Benin waar de meeste productie plaats vindt in de 
Guineo Congolian agro-ecologische zone. De studie is grotendeels gericht op de nationale en 
regionale markten, die minder strenge kwaliteitseisen en normen stellen dan de Europese 
markten. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de mate waarin de hiervoor besproken factoren  van 
invloed zijn op de Beninese ananas keten. Tevens wordt gepoogd een bijdrage te leveren aan de 
literatuur op het terrein van verklaringen waarom kleinschalige producenten in SSA vaak niet 
profiteren van de groei van basisproduct-ketens die een hogere waarde genereren, in opkomende 
regionale en stedelijke markten in SSA. 
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In kaart brengen van de keten en van barrières in de keten 
In hoofdstuk 2 is de Beninese ananas keten in kaart gebracht met daarbij bijzondere aandacht 
voor de relaties tussen actoren in de keten, en de beperkingen van en uitdagingen waarmee deze 
ketenactoren worden geconfronteerd en de strategieën die zij vaststellen om de kwaliteit van de 
ananas en toegang tot de markt te verbeteren. Deze inzichten kunnen mogelijk de reeds 
aanwezige GS’s verduidelijken en met name de mate waarin deze als een aanvulling kunnen 
functioneren op de beperkte institutionele steun en mogelijk kunnen helpen om de 
transactiekosten in de keten te verlagen. De ananas keten in Benin wordt gepresenteerd waarin de 
belangrijkste keten actoren zijn geïdentificeerd, en hun rol, belang, markten en posities binnen de 
keten zijn toegelicht. Met behulp van een case studie benadering, komen de belangrijkste kwesties 
ten aanzien van kwaliteit en de toegang tot de markt, de sociaal-culturele omstandigheden die van 
invloed zijn op de winstgevendheid en de reeds ontwikkelde strategieën met betrekking tot de 
steeds terugkerende barrières, aan de orde. De volgende barrières komen aan de orde. (1) Een 
gebrek bij kleine boeren aan voldoende financiële draagkracht (lage markttoegang en hoge rente) 
voor het verbouwen van een financieel veeleisend gewas (een gemiddelde initiële investering van 
$ US 4500 per hectare). (2) Hoge kwaliteitsnormen op de internationale markten, die fungeren als 
barrières voor kleine boeren. Als gevolg hiervan heeft Benin slechts twee bedrijven die verse 
ananas naar de EU exporteren. Het grootste deel van de verse ananas wordt verkocht op de 
nationale of regionale markten. De weinige boeren die deelnemen aan internationale markten 
houden zich bezig met zogenoemde ‘outgrowing schemes’, een hiërarchische GS die hen in staat 
stelt deze markten te bereiken. (3) Er is een gebrek aan adequaat vervoer. Dit resulteert in 
veelvuldige overbelasting van fruit in vrachtwagens en auto’s, met als gevolg een hoge mate van 
schade (ongeveer 20%) aan de vrucht. (4) De keten wordt ook gekenmerkt door hoge 
transactiekosten, en een laag vertrouwen tussen actoren, dat aanleiding geeft tot conflicten tussen 
kopers en verkopers. (5) Tot slot, de boeren in plattelandsgebieden, hebben weinig toegang tot 
kwaliteit- en marktinformatie voor zowel grondstoffen als voor eindproducten. Een manier om 
transactiekosten te reduceren, kan zijn om ‘outgrowing schemes’ te bevorderen en de 
ontwikkeling van geformaliseerd handelsverkeer te stimuleren (betrokkenheid van een derde 
partij om investeringen te beschermen) dat gericht is op de bestaande Nigeriaanse markt. 
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Governance-structuren 
In hoofdstuk 3 is empirisch bewijs gepresenteerd voor de factoren die van invloed zijn op de 
keuze van GS’s. De bevindingen zijn ingegeven door een theoretisch kader met als kern de 
transactiekosten theorie en waarin ‘verbondenheid van transacties’ als belangrijke factor voor 
keuze van GS is opgenomen. In de analyse is gebruik gemaakt van een multivariate 
econometrische benadering om te kunnen ingaan op het gelijktijdig gebruiken van GS’s door 
kleine boeren in hun transacties. Deze studie ontwikkelt Williamson's concept van de attributen 
van de transacties verder door verbondenheid van transacties te benadrukken als een belangrijke 
factor bij het kiezen voor een GS in minder ontwikkelde landen als Benin. Het construct van 
multi-GS is onderzocht om beter te begrijpen hoe en waarom kleine boeren kiezen voor deze 
GS’s en wat voor hen leidend is in deze beslissingen. Boeren kiezen voor multi-GS als een 
strategie om hun investeringen te beschermen. Deze strategie wordt door kleine boeren gebruikt 
als een middel om de verschillende categorieën (in termen van kwaliteit) van de door hun 
geproduceerde producten in verschillende ketens te kunnen verkopen. Boeren die betrokken zijn 
bij de GS ‘outgrowing scheme’, hebben minder kans om betrokken te zijn in een ander type GS. 
Deze bevinding geeft aan dat de ‘outgrowing scheme’ een specifieke en exclusieve vorm van GS 
is in de ananas keten van Benin. 
Participatie in marketing kanaal 
In hoofdstuk 4 zijn de factoren gepresenteerd die van invloed zijn op beslissingen van kleine 
boeren voor participatie in bepaalde marketing kanaal. De analyse is uitgevoerd door op een 
complementaire wijze eenvoudige en multivariate Probit modellen te gebruiken. Het geeft inzicht 
in de invloed van kenmerken van boeren (leeftijd en opleidingsniveau), hun productiesystemen 
(omvang van de bedrijven en geproduceerde variëteiten), kwaliteit van het product (kwaliteitseis 
en afkeuringspercentage) en marketing omgeving (afstand, de formaliteit van de koper-verkoper 
relatie, de duur van de relatie, de schriftelijke overeenkomst), op de deelname aan vier belangrijke 
marketing kanalen (landelijk, stedelijk, export van verse producten en de markt voor verwerking 
van de ananas). De veronderstelling dat kleine boeren zijn uitgesloten van internationale markten, 
wordt afgewezen. Boeren diversifiëren hun productiesystemen door het planten van twee rassen 
tegelijk als een maatregel om hun investeringen te beschermen. Degenen die betrokken zijn bij 
export marketing kanalen zijn minder geneigd om hun ananas op de stedelijke markt aan te 
bieden. In dit hoofdstuk wordt bijgedragen aan theorie door aan te tonen dat boeren hun 
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producten leveren aan dat marketing kanaal dat het beste past bij de kenmerken van hun product. 
De factoren onderhandelingspositie en fysieke afstand zijn ook vastgesteld als zijnde belangrijke 
factoren die van invloed zijn op de keuze voor een marketing kanaal. Verbetering van de 
bestaande fysieke infrastructuur kan helpen om de factor fysieke afstand minder beperkend te 
maken. Daarnaast kan met betrekking tot verbetering van ‘onderhandelingspositie’ een oplossing 
worden gevonden in het vergroten van de toegang van kleine boeren tot informatie over 
productie en markten (kwaliteitsverbetering technieken, de marktvraag, up-to-date marktprijzen 
en nieuwe rassen). 
Omgaan met informatie-asymmetrie 
In hoofdstuk vijf wordt ingegaan op de bereidheid van boeren om een mobiele telefoon te 
gebruiken om markt- en kwaliteitsinformatie over ananas aan te leveren en te ontvangen. Tevens 
komt daarbij het bedrag aan de orde dat zij bereid zouden zijn te betalen voor deze diensten en 
daarmee informatie-asymmetrie in de waarde keten te reduceren dan wel te overwinnen. Door 
een ICT gebaseerd multi-stakeholder platform voor uitwisseling van de genoemde informatie te 
suggereren, is ingegaan op voorwaarden en partnerschappen tussen de waardeketen-actoren, om 
voor kleine boeren duurzaam toegang te creëren tot markten waarin hogere inkomens haalbaar 
gaan worden. In dit hoofdstuk is de potentiële waarde van ICT geïllustreerd voor het faciliteren 
van de handel binnen netwerken, en, belangrijker nog, het handhaven van de kwaliteit van het 
product, het reduceren van transport en van tijd om marktpartijen te zoeken, en het verminderen 
van het aantal onnodige tussenpersonen. De case studie in Ghana toont het potentiële belang aan 
van ICT in het ontwikkelen en bevorderen van kwaliteit en van toegang van agro-food vers-
ketens tot de markt, niet alleen in Benin, maar ook in SSA landen die soortgelijke uitdagingen 
kennen. 
Management implicaties 
Ondanks het bestaan van nationale instituten en ondersteunende diensten gericht op 
kwaliteitscontrole en het in staat stellen van ketenactoren om aan kwaliteitsnormen te voldoen, is 
er een duidelijke behoefte aan een beter coördinatie-mechanisme in de keten. Als kleine boeren in 
staat moeten zijn om te voldoen aan kwaliteitseisen en normen gesteld door regionale en 
internationale markten, dan zijn investeringen in productie en ondersteuning van ketenactiviteiten 
nodig. Dergelijke investeringen, gedaan door overheid, financiële partners of ngo's, zijn nodig 
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voor het aanleggen van wegen, koeling door de keten heen, veilige faciliteiten voor verwerking en 
opslag, chemische afvalverwerking, faciliteiten voor het wassen van handen, persoonlijke 
beschermingsmiddelen, op de rug gedragen spuiten, gecertificeerd plantmateriaal, enz.. De 
onderhavige studie suggereert dat het stimuleren van ‘outgrowing schemes’ (gericht op de 
bestaande Nigeriaanse markten) een goede manier kan zijn om dit te bereiken. Een dergelijke GS 
kan bijdragen aan het reduceren van transactiekosten voor het verkrijgen van marktinformatie en 
daarmee het verminderen van de informatie-asymmetrie in de ananas keten. Het zou ook helpen 
om de huidige begrenzing van menselijke rationaliteit van beslissers in de keten en van 
opportunistisch gedrag, te verminderen. De GS zou dan vervolgens verschuiven van spotmarkt 
georiënteerde GS (nu dominant) naar een meer geïntegreerde GS. Het enorme potentieel van de 
ananas productie in Benin wordt erkend. De ananas keten is bezig een steeds grotere 
internationale oriëntatie te verwerven, ondanks het lage aanpassingsvermogen van kleine boeren 
aan vereiste normen en kwaliteitseisen. Hoewel de kennis die boeren hebben vaak wordt 
onderschat, wordt de keten gekenmerkt door informatie-asymmetrie. Deze informatie-
asymmetrie zorgt er voor, dat sommigen in de keten worden beloond en anderen worden 
uitgesloten. Een manier om deze situatie te overwinnen is het introduceren van informatie- en 
communicatietechnologie (ICT), zoals een mobiele telefoon IMS-platform, om kleine boeren te 
voorzien van informatie over huidige marktprijzen, biedingen en aanbiedingen, adviezen voor 
ziektebestrijding, kwaliteitsinformatie, enz. Deze diensten kunnen worden geleverd tegen lage 
kosten, en door middel van een sms-dienst in een lokale taal die begrijpelijk is voor boeren. 
Hoewel de boeren een hoge bereidheid toonden voor een mobiele telefoon op basis van MIS, 
blijft het belangrijk om te beoordelen hoe de bestaande infrastructuur en institutionele 
organisaties een dergelijk proces kunnen ondersteunen en doeltreffend maken. Dit biedt kansen 
voor toekomstige ontwikkeling en voor beleidsgericht onderzoek. 
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